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Nabokov's Details: Making Sense of Irrational Standards
Abstract
Vladimir Nabokov’s passion for detail is well-known, central to our very idea of the “Nabokovian.”  
Yet Nabokov’s most important claims for detail pose a challenge for the reader who would take them 
seriously.  Startlingly extreme and deliberately counterintuitive -- Nabokov called them his “irrational
standards” -- these claims push the very limits of reason and belief.  Nabokov’s critics have tended to 
treat his more extravagant claims for detail -- including his assertion that the “capacity to wonder at 
triﬂes” is the highest form of consciousness there is -- as just a manner of speaking, a form of italics, a
bit of wishful thinking, a mandarin’s glib performance, or an aesthete’s ﬂight of fancy.   is 
dissertation, by contrast, asserts that Nabokov meant what he said, and sets out to understand what 
he meant.  Nabokov’s passion for detail, I argue, represents more than a stylistic preference or 
prescription for good noticing.  Rather, it reﬂects and advocates for a special way of being in the 
world, of disposing or orienting oneself to things, and for this reason is best understood as part of a 
broad program of detailphilic habits, attitudes, practices and attunements Nabokov adhered to 
throughout his life.  In making this argument, I draw on the work of a wide array of thinkers, 
including Descartes, Heidegger, Richard Rorty, Cli ord Geertz, and Philip Fisher, and focus on three
of Nabokov’s texts in particular: Speak, Memory, Lolita, and “ e Art of Literature and 
iiiCommonsense.”  Making sense of Nabokov’s irrational standards, I argue, helps us to make sense of a
number of other critical puzzles as well, from what, exactly, Nabokov means by the word “reality” to 
what a cruel noticer like Humbert Humbert implies about the moral meaning of passionate 
attention.
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viiINTRODUCTION
Nabokov’s love of detail shows itself everywhere -- in his style, of course, so radiant with bright 
particulars; but also in the many letters, lectures, interviews, and essays in which he asserts that love 
with an intensity peculiar to him.  No other novelist invests “the divine detail” with so much 
glamour and prestige (Look at the Harlequins! (LATH) 24); no other writer’s praise is as impassioned, 
or as ﬁnal.  And yet, on the long shelf of books about his work, among studies of his thoughts on the
afterlife, his quarrels with psychoanalysis, his interest in butterﬂies, games, memory, childhood, and 
painting, his uses of metaﬁction, parody, pattern, and deception, one ﬁnds no full-length work 
devoted to his love of detail.  It seems that Nabokov's detailphilia is so basic to our sense of who he 
is, and so well-known, that we tend not to ask too many questions about it.  It's something we 
simply know about him, and something he makes it easy for us to know.
Yet if we step back from it for a moment, that love of detail begins to look a little strange.  Why, 
for example, is it so extreme?  Consider his claim about the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes":
these asides of the spirit, these footnotes in the volume of life are the highest forms 
of consciousness, and it is in this childishly speculative state of mind, so di erent 
from commonsense and its logic, that we know the world to be good (Lectures on 
Literature (LL) 373-374).
What does Nabokov mean, really, when he says that the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" is the "highest
form[] of consciousness"?  Or that it is in this "state of mind" that we "know the world to be good"? 
Already it seems a little less legible than before.  Heidegger has a good phrase for what happens when
we step back from familiar things in this way: we make them “worthy of questioning” ( e Essence of 
1Truth 5).  
 e following chapters are organized around the parts of this central claim, and are designed to 
be read in order.  Chapter One, "On the Capacity to Wonder at Triﬂes," begins by rendering 
Nabokov's claim "worthy of questioning."  It works toward a deﬁnition of what the "capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes" is, using philosophical accounts of wonder from Descartes and Philip Fisher as 
important points of reference and comparison.  Chapter Two, "Commonsense and Its Logic," adds 
depth to this deﬁnition by contrasting it with Nabokov's idea of "commonsense."  Here Cli ord 
Geertz's concept of "common sense as a cultural system" and Heidegger's notion of "enframing" 
help to bring Nabokov's own idea into sharper focus.  Chapter  ree, "Speak, Memory and the 
Highest Form of Consciousness" explains how this fuller notion of the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes"
might be plausibly deemed the "highest form[] of consciousness," and argues that Speak, Memory 
o ers a vision of a world revealed by its light.  Chapter Four, "Knowing the World to Be Good: the 
Riddle of Lolita," argues that Lolita is best read as the antithesis of Speak, Memory, and that through 
the ﬁgure of Humbert Humbert Nabokov explores what it means to be cut o  from "the highest 
form[] of consciousness."   is long chapter disputes the claim that Humbert's "artistic gifts" -- his 
capacity for noticing details among them -- exist on a continuum with Nabokov's own, and in the 
process examines Nabokov's peculiar notion of "what reality is."   e study concludes with a short 
reﬂection on the implications of Nabokov's claim for how we think about his style.
 is study might also be thought of as an elaboration of Michael Wood's deﬁnition of style as a 
"complex but still legible trace" of a "person's interaction with the world" (23).  Over the course of 
its four main chapters, I argue that "the capacity to wonder at triﬂes" is Nabokov's phrase for a 
special, privileged attunement to the world, and that his details are best understood in relation to 
2that attunement.  In my view, the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" signiﬁes a certain way of being in 
the world, and consequently I've found Heidegger's language of attunements, revealing, allowing 
things to show up, and disposing oneself to things useful here.  I'm not suggesting that Nabokov was
inﬂuenced by Heidegger, and I'm not attempting a Heideggerean "reading" of Nabokov.  Rather, 
I've borrowed from the vocabularly of Being and Time, because I've found it to be a particularly 
congenial vocabularly for understanding, and explaining, what Nabokov means.
Most readings of Nabokov put one of his books at their center.  For many critics, Lolita is really 
the central Nabokovian work.  For some it is Pale Fire, for others it is Ada, and for still others it is 
 e Gift.  Each selection orients the conversation around a di erent set of concerns, tonalities, 
techniques, images, capacities, and commitments.  A study that gives Pale Fire pride of place will 
o er a very di erent vision of Nabokov than one centered on Lolita.   is study puts Nabokov's 
memoir at its center.  I see Speak, Memory as the major expression of Nabokov's ethos, and Speak, 
Memory and Lolita, considered as a unit, as Nabokov's major work of art.
3CHAPTER ONE:
On the Capacity to Wonder at Triﬂes
I.  e Challenge of Extremity
Strange Superlatives
Vladimir Nabokov is, famously, a writer with strong opinions.  One of those opinions is that few 
things are more important, for readers or writers, than attention to detail.  He tends to frame this 
promotion of detail as a challenge, an act of opposition.  He often depicts himself as a lonely 
champion of the particular, preserving “the divine detail” from numberless enemies (LATH 24): 
students inclined to abstraction; critics in thrall to theories; seekers of symbols, teachers of types; 
writers with ideologies to express; readers in want of dictionaries, and imagination.  “At a time when 
American readers are taught from high school on to seek in a book ‘general ideas,’” he wrote with 
typical force in 1956, “a critic’s duty should be to draw their attention to the speciﬁc detail, to the 
unique image, without which [...] there can be no art, no genius, no Chekhov, no terror, no 
tenderness, and no surprise” (“To Edmund Wilson” 331).    
 For the contemporary reader, the challenge of Nabokov’s position persists not so much in the 
direction of his argument as in the extremity of his terms.  His basic argument -- that details should 
be given priority over generalizations -- seems barely contentious today.  It’s familiar, and ubiquitous.
We see the same argument made by Cli ord Geertz in his famous deﬁnition of ethnography; by New
Historicists and cultural critics; by Richard Rorty, in his description of the liberal ironist’s task; by 
maximalist writers from Wallace to Roth.  Moreover, we’ve been heading in this direction for a while.
4As Naomi Schor and others have shown, the critical estimation of detail has been rising steadily 
within the arts and humanities for the last two hundred years, beginning with Romanticism, 
intensifying through the nineteenth century, and reaching something of an apotheosis in our time.  
Even so, Nabokov’s own passion for detail remains unique -- and uniquely challenging -- in its 
extremity.  Details, he insists, aren’t just valuable or important: they’re “everything” (Strong Opinions 
(SO) 168).  In memory, science, and scholarship, too, “the detail is all” (Ada 71).  Savoring details 
constitutes not one but the very ﬁrst rule of reading (LL 1), not merely a central but “the main” 
delight of the mind (374).  In his published lecture on “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense,” 
Nabokov describes the act of wondering at details as not merely integral to peak experience but as the
very thing itself, the “highest form[] of consciousness”:
I remember a cartoon depicting a chimney sweep falling from the roof of a tall 
building and noticing on the way that a sign-board had one word spelled wrong, 
and wondering in his headlong ﬂight why nobody had thought of correcting it. In a
sense, we all are crashing to our death from the top story of our birth to the ﬂat 
stones of the churchyard and wondering with an immortal Alice in Wonderland at 
the patterns on the passing wall.  is capacity to wonder at triﬂes - no matter the 
imminent peril - these asides of the spirit, these footnotes in the volume of life are 
the highest forms of consciousness, and it is in this childishly speculative state of 
mind, so di erent from commonsense and its logic, that we know the world to be 
good (LL 374).
Everything, highest, main, ﬁrst, without which there can be no -- Nabokov’s claims for detail tend 
always toward the superlative and the absolute.   ere’s a puzzle here, something in these superlatives
that wants explaining.  What can it really mean to believe that details are “everything,” in literature 
and in life?  To say that wondering at details constitutes not a “high” but the very “highest” form of 
consciousness there is?  To insist, again and again, not only that details matter, but that nothing else 
matters as much?  What are details, for Nabokov, such that assertions like these make sense?  
5Nabokov challenges us to develop an account of detail commensurate with his most extreme claims 
for them.
Taking Nabokov Seriously
 at challenge, of course, only comes into view if we take Nabokov’s claims “seriously” -- that is, if 
we assume that he means what he says, and acknowledge the strangeness of what he is saying.  
Nabokov’s critics tend to take his superlatives more lightly than this, often treating them as just a 
manner of speaking, a form of italics.  From this perspective, words like “highest” and “everything” 
serve to amplify Nabokov’s argument without distorting it into something hard to understand.  
Brian Boyd, for example, writes wonderfully about Nabokov’s “passion for the particular,” but never 
puzzles over the extravagant terms in which that passion is expressed (American Years 350).  He 
summarizes the Nabokovian ethos in the form of an imperative -- “notice the details of your book or 
your world and it will enrich your whole life” -- that leaves out the superlative inﬂection of that ethos
altogether (174).  For Leland de la Durantaye, too, the vehement quality of Nabokov’s expression 
does little to compromise the essentially reasonable nature of his claims.  While noting that 
“Nabokov is both adamant and militant on the matter of generality,” he stresses that “he is also 
careful not to push his position into incoherence.  In philological questions, faithful and loving 
attention to the particular was a principle and a method, but not a dogmatism” (114).  For Michael 
Wood, the language of superlatives and overstrong opinions belongs to “Nabokov the mandarin,” a 
stylized persona less interesting to Wood than the “real,” “di dent, doubting person” he admires.  
 e more conﬁdent and unwavering the mandarin’s claims become, the more Wood’s interest in 
them wanes (22).  Richard Rorty, by contrast, ﬁnds himself genuinely perplexed and intrigued by 
6one of Nabokov’s more extreme claims for detail.  Yet in the end he ﬁnds that claim so di cult and 
so strange that he decides Nabokov must really not have meant what he said.  “Nabokov’s best 
novels,” he concludes, “are the ones which exhibit his inability to believe his own general ideas” 
(168).  In this way he, too, reduces Nabokov’s extreme vocabulary to a manner of speaking.
 e trouble here is that, by making Nabokov’s claims less strange, his critics tend to make them 
less interesting; and they miss an opportunity to pursue the hard questions those claims pose.  
“Notice the details of your text or your world and you will enrich your whole life” is a statement 
with which anyone might agree; “Notice the details of your text or your world and you will be 
engaging in the highest form of consciousness,” on the other hand, is a strange and challenging 
argument.   ere’s value in taking that argument seriously.  
   e following pages consider the strongest and strangest of Nabokov’s claims for detail: his 
equation, quoted in the passage above, of the capacity to wonder at triﬂes with the very highest form 
of consciousness.  What makes this claim so hard to accept?  What does it mean?  In what way might
Nabokov have supposed it to be true?  I propose to build a way through these questions by hewing 
closely to the particulars of the claim itself: by asking, for example, what the word "triﬂes" conveys 
that "details" does not; or what “commonsense and its logic” has to do, exactly, with the qualities to 
which it is opposed.  By advancing through Nabokov’s claim in this way, I hope to more fully reveal 
its meaning, and, further, the meaning of his tendency to speak of details always in superlative terms.
Nabokov’s Credo
In 1941, with nine novels, two novellas, and a slate of stories, plays, and poems behind him, 
Nabokov prepared a set of lectures on “ e Art of Writing” for Stanford University.   e course, his 
7ﬁrst, had only four students, and only lasted a summer, but Nabokov seems to have imagined that at 
least some of those lectures would live beyond their Stanford debut (Boyd, American 22-23).  One in
particular did.  His lecture “on ‘commonsense’” (Nabokov, “ e Russian Professor” 102), a spirited 
a rmation of his artistic creed, traveled back with him to the East Coast, where he published it 
under the title “ e Creative Writer,” and where it proved popular during a lecture tour he 
undertook in the following year.   e piece remained part of Nabokov’s teaching repertoire, and was 
eventually republished, in a revised form, with his Cornell lectures as “ e Art of Literature and 
Commonsense.”
“I don’t recall that he lectured in any conventional sense of the term,” said one student of 
Nabokov’s Stanford course.  “He shared with us his creative activity and experience” (Boyd, American
32).  His lecture on commonsense is an example of such sharing: in it he describes his artistic values 
and creative process, and encourages his students to embrace those artistic values for themselves.  Yet 
the expansive tone and scope of the piece suggest that Nabokov had always had a broader audience 
in mind for it than the quartet of creative writers in his Art of Writing class.  His later audiences 
would be comprised mainly of aspiring readers -- students of “the art of literature,”  rather than 
writers -- but the lecture works well for them, too.  For the reader, it o ers insight into how artists 
work and what they value, and lends a Nabokovian sense of how to best enjoy and rate the worth of 
what one reads.  And ultimately the lecture speaks to a broader audience still, for in articulating the 
articles of his artistic faith, Nabokov describes not only a way of approaching books but a way of 
approaching the world.
Nabokov’s credo a rms, above all, “the supremacy of the detail over the general.”  Over and over 
Nabokov asserts the value of the individual over the group, the freak over the mob, rare genius over 
8mass culture, the “triﬂe,” the “little thing,” the “footnote,” the “aside.”  He dubs these his “irrational 
standards” (LL 373-374) -- irrational because, in privileging part over whole, they reverse the “linear 
logic of pedestrian thought” that too often passes for rationality (“ e Creative Writer” 21).   at 
plodding logic is the logic of “commonsense” (21).  Commonsense tells us that anomalies are only so
much statistical noise, and that we ought to privilege collective wisdom over individual truth, the big
picture over the small, the abstract over the concrete, the genus over the species, the average over the 
exception.   ese are two ways of looking at the world, and the di erence between them matters.  
Nabokov associates his irrational standards with all that is good in the world (heroism, innocence, 
childhood, freedom, tenderness, imagination, poetry, play) and commonsense with all that is bad 
(crime, cruelty, dictators, death, madness and mobs, closed-mindedness and mediocrity).  “ e Art 
of Literature and Commonsense” is playful, ﬂamboyant, inventive, and funny, more a demonstration
of Nabokov’s irrational standards than a lecture “in any conventional sense of the term,” but its 
argument is serious, and its stakes are high.
Unbalanced Equations
 is, then, is the context within which Nabokov submits his claim that “the capacity to wonder at 
triﬂes” is the “highest form[] of consciousness” there is.  It’s a counterintuitive claim -- but then it’s 
meant to be.  It’s a deliberate a ront, after all, to the “monster of grim commonsense” (380).
Does that make any puzzlement on our part a sign that we’re being too commonsensical 
ourselves?  An indication that we’re approaching Nabokov’s claim in too literal, too limited, too 
“pedestrian” a way?  Nabokov’s critics do sometimes suggest as much.  David Andrews, for example, 
argues that Nabokov’s lecture proceeds according to an imperfectly rational, “aesthetic” logic, and 
9thus ought to be understood in an aesthetic way, as a “thing disclosing its particular truth...through 
its sensuousness as a thing” (53).   is suggests that we have only two responses available to us: 
irrational acceptance of Nabokov’s claim or commonsensical rejection.  But then, commonsense and 
rationality are not the same.  Commonsense, Nabokov tells us in “ e Creative Writer,” is not 
equivalent to rationality but is in fact a “false” or “lower form of” it (21).  Neither, then, is the 
puzzlement of commonsense equivalent to the puzzlement of genuine reason.   e ﬁrst is an end-
point; the second is a beginning.  Whereas a ronted commonsense will dismiss Nabokov’s odd claim
out of hand, our own sense of its strangeness and di culty will draw us into a deeper engagement 
with its meaning.  
 e puzzle of Nabokov’s claim lies in the apparent incommensurability of its terms.  Nabokov 
deﬁnes the “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” by means of two equations, each as provocatively 
unbalanced as the other.   e ﬁrst of these is the positive equation he makes between the experience 
of wondering at triﬂes and the experience of consciousness in its highest form.  Nabokov chooses the
word “triﬂe” (over the more value-neutral “details” or “particulars”) to underscore the 
counterintuitive quality of his claim.  Nothing could be less signiﬁcant than a triﬂe, by deﬁnition 
“something of little value or importance”; nothing could be more signiﬁcant, in the Nabokovian 
universe, than the highest form of consciousness, a phenomenon Nabokov once described as “the 
only real thing in the world and the greatest mystery of all” (Bend Sinister (BS) 188).   e 
philosopher Charles Taylor describes something like the “highest form of consciousness” in his 
history of secularism, A Secular Age.  Where Nabokov writes of  "the highest form[] of 
consciousness," Taylor writes of “a place of fullness”:
Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that is, in that 
10place (activity or condition), life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more 
admirable, more what it should be...a place of fullness, to which we orient ourselves 
morally or spiritually (5-6).
1
Compared with more typical ways of deﬁning the “place of fullness” or the “highest form of 
consciousness” -- as a sense of oneness with God, perhaps, or the experience of falling in love -- the 
act of wondering at triﬂes seems very slight.
 e second strange equation is the negative one Nabokov draws between the experience of 
wondering at triﬂes and the experience of “physical danger, pain, dust, death.”  Nabokov portrays his
irrational standards as a response or counterweight to the “darkest and most dazzling hours” of 
existence.  He describes two di erent kinds of darkness with which our irrational standards help us 
to contend.   ere’s the darkness of war, oppression, police states intent on “turn[ing] the globe into 
ﬁve million miles of terror, stupidity, and barbed wire”; and there’s the more distant and democratic 
dark fact of our mortality.   e ﬁrst is a matter of historical circumstance, summed up in an image of
“crashing buildings in the roaring and whining night”; the second an existential condition, summed 
in an image of us “all...crashing to our death from the top story of our birth to the ﬂat stones of the 
churchyard” (LL 373).    
For Nabokov, these were concrete evils, with which he was on particularly intimate terms.  By 
the time he drafted the ﬁrst version of his lecture in 1941, he had lost his childhood home, a 
1. Taylor shifts, in his description, from an aesthetic vocabulary (“fuller, richer, deeper”) to a moral
one (“more worthwhile...more what it should be”); the “place of fullness,” like the “highest form of 
consciousness,” refers to an aesthetically and morally privileged category of experience.   e terms are
not exactly alike; Nabokov’s phrase suggests a graduated series of forms -- high, higher, highest -- 
where Taylor’s phrase does not, and a more absolute scale of evaluation.  But they are otherwise close 
in tone and meaning, and the description of one helps illuminate the other.
11fabulous inheritance, his country of origin, and a favorite cousin to the Russian Revolution. His 
father had been killed by an extremist’s bullet in Berlin; his mother had died, out of reach and in 
relative penury, in Prague.  He had lost access, in exile, to a whole generation of Russian readers, and 
had ﬁnally given up writing in his beloved native language altogether.  He had su ered through years
poverty, depression, attacks of psoriasis, and ﬁnally, with the rise of the Nazis, fear for the lives of his 
Jewish wife and son.  He had ﬂed three countries under desperate circumstances.
I rehearse these details of Nabokov’s biography only to underscore the fact that his evocation of 
“physical danger, pain, dust, death” has the weight of lived experience behind it.   ese very concrete
encounters with “badness,” “evil,” “dictators” and “war gods” lend his claims a solidity and a 
seriousness beyond what they might otherwise have (373).  And the second sort of evil he describes, 
the basic law of mortality to which “we are all” subject, was one he contemplated often.   e routine 
extinguishment of consciousness in sleep was, for Nabokov, a torture and an insult, a “travesty of the 
death struggle,” a dress rehearsal for the “still more risible disintegration” to come (Speak, Memory 
(SM) 109).  Every night, as he struggled against “Somnus, that black-masked headsman binding 
[him] to the block,” Nabokov confronted the graver insult sleep presaged: the “utter degradation, 
ridicule, and horror of having developed an inﬁnity of sensation and thought within a ﬁnite 
existence” (109; 297).
 ese, then, are the dark realities against which Nabokov pits his triﬂes.  Nabokov suggests that 
wondering at triﬂes is somehow a match for these things, in gravity and power, just as he suggests it 
is the equal of other, more typical ways of deﬁning the highest form of consciousness -- spiritual 
enlightenment, creative achievement, falling in love, having a child.   ese are strange equations, in 
which one term always seems smaller than the other.   ey pose a particular challenge: that of 
12discovering how “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” could be equal to those things to which it is 
compared. 
II.  e Capacity to Wonder at Triﬂes
Nabokov’s claim has a simple structure: he proposes one concept (“the capacity to wonder at triﬂes”),
equates it to a second (“the highest form of consciousness”), and opposes it to a third 
(“commonsense and its logic”).  My argument will follow the logic of the claim itself, asking, ﬁrst, 
what the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” really means; second, what the comparison with 
“commonsense” reveals; and, ﬁnally, in what way such an anti-commonsensical capacity might be 
said to be the “highest form of consciousness.”   ese questions will mark out the basic route of our 
investigation.  
Let’s begin, then, with the phenomenon at the center of Nabokov’s claim.  To what, exactly, does 
the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” refer?  Nabokov’s critics tend to take the meaning of the phrase to 
be self-evident: wondering at triﬂes simply means “notic[ing]....external details” (Andrews 62), 
“recognizing something others would miss” (Alexandrov 54), “noticing things that most other people
do not notice, being curious about what others take for granted, seeing the momentary iridescence 
and not just the underlying formal structure” (Rorty 159).  But these deﬁnitions aren’t quite 
su cient: madmen and nympholepts, after all, are also good at “noticing things that most other 
people do not notice.”  Wondering at triﬂes must mean something more, or other, than this, 
something richer and deeper than simply noticing details and taking pleasure in particulars.  Until 
we can identify that meaning, Nabokov’s arguments must always seem somewhat outsized and 
13“imperfectly rational” (Andrews 53), idiosyncratic at best, incoherent at worst, or, as Richard Rorty 
thinks, “gallant, splendid, and foredoomed” (Rorty 150).
Each part of the phrase is important to its meaning -- “capacity,” “to wonder at,” “triﬂes” -- but as
a point of entry, that middle term -- wonder or to wonder at -- is especially promising.   e readings 
above treat Nabokov’s use of the term “wonder at” as an almost arbitrary choice, as though “notice,” 
“recognize,” “observe,” “be curious about,” or “see” might have done just as well.  But “wonder” has 
particular associations relevant to any interpretation of the phrase.   e word is, in fact, a particular 
Nabokovian favorite, like “throb,” “tingle,” “ecstasy,” and “thrill,” and wonder is a particularly 
Nabokovian subject.  Usually Nabokov uses the word to invoke a speciﬁc state of mind: the “passion”
of wonder, a straightforwardly privileged state of consciousness, likely familiar to us from experience 
and from poetry and the philosophy of the passions, where its features, mechanisms, and claims to 
value have been worked out in great detail.  In this case, though, and as we will see, Nabokov uses the
word to invoke a related but di erent state of mind, a more unusual and speciﬁc kind of 
wonderment.   is is a less familiar sort of wonder: improbably focused on triﬂes; capacitative, rather
than passionate.  Comparing the two sorts of wonder -- traditional and triﬂe-centered -- should be 
useful to us here, for in marking where “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” coincides with and departs 
from the “passion” of wonder, we will have begun to draw a picture of that less familiar state of 
mind.  
I’ll start, then, by reviewing the “passion” of wonder and its place in Nabokov’s own life and 
work.  I’ll then turn to consider these two wondering forms of consciousness alongside one another, 
the traditional “passion” and the Nabokovian “capacity,” one rooted in rare experiences, the other 
centered on “little thing[s]” and realized in “asides.”  
14 e Philosophical Account of the Passion of Wonder
Much has been written about the passion of wonder: what it is, what it means, how it works, how 
and why it should be valued.  Socrates famously describes wonder as the origin of all philosophy; 
Descartes orders it ﬁrst among the passions; Wordsworth movingly commemorates its visionary 
gleam.  More recently, Philip Fisher has argued for the existential and intellectual value of wonder in 
Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences.  In this book, Fisher o ers a rich 
philosophical account of the passion of wonder. 
Fisher’s account draws on, clariﬁes, elaborates and amends Descartes’s deﬁnition of wonder from 
Passions of the Soul: 
Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul that brings it about that the soul goes on to 
consider with attention the objects that seem rare and extraordinary to it (Descartes 
56).
Descartes’s compact description sums up three crucial facts about wonder: that it takes us by 
surprise; that it leads to thought; and that it tells us something about our present understanding of 
the world.  We can see all three elements at work in our response to the appearance of a rainbow, a 
classic instance of wonder and the central example of Fisher’s book.  Rainbows are rare and 
unpredictable enough that they usually take us by surprise; we don’t expect them or go looking for 
them.  We don’t strike wonder, the way a miner strikes gold: wonder strikes us, happens to us.  We 
“ﬁnd ourselves in” wonder, we “are wonderstruck,” all at once and of a sudden.  Partly for this 
reason, the most powerful experiences of wonder tend to be visual ones.  A novel or a piece of music 
unfolds in time, but a purely visual experience may impress itself upon us, in all its detail, in an 
15instant.   e visual nature of the rainbow supports the immediacy of its impact, the suddenness of its
surprise.
What distinguishes this feeling from mere shock or surprise is that it also contains an element of 
delight.   e characteristic “ah!” of wonder expresses both surprise and pleasure.  An object of 
genuine wonder has aesthetic appeal, a delightful quality that attracts and interests us, as the beauty 
of the rainbow -- the grace of its form, the brilliance of its colors -- attracts and interests us.   is 
quality inspires us not only to attend but to “consider,” to question, reﬂect, explain.  Wonder, in 
other words, moves us to make sense of the thing wondered at, as Aristotle, and later Descartes and 
Newton, were moved to make sense of the rainbow.  Fisher draws attention to these explanatory 
e orts in Wonder, the Rainbow, emphasizing the intimate connection between the aesthetics of 
wonder and the poetics of thought, between wondering at and wondering how and why, between the
pleasure of surprise and the pleasure of investigation.  In demonstrating the close connection 
between the aesthetics of wonder and the poetics of understanding, Fisher counters the objections of 
those who, like Keats, would see explanation as an enemy of wonder, a technique for unweaving the 
rainbow and disenchanting the world.
 e pleasure of surprise depends on the “rare and extraordinary” nature of the wonderful thing, 
its strangeness; but the pleasure of investigation depends on the possibility of our coming to know it,
its knowability.   e order and symmetry of the rainbow, for example, suggest the explicability of 
that phenomenon by means of physical and mathematical laws, or at least they do for a person 
within a culture used to explaining things by such means.   e wonderful, in other words, exists for 
us in the realm of the as-yet-unknown, between what we already know and what we cannot know, 
between the ordinary and the unknowable.  But both ordinariness and knowability are variable 
16quantities; what seems extraordinary to us now, or unknowable, might not seem so ﬁve years from 
now, and might not seem so to you, or to a person in a di erent culture.  For this reason wonder tells
us something about our own present understanding of the world.  It shows how we deﬁne the 
knowable and the known; it reveals to us the shape of our own experience and knowledge.
 e passion of wonder, in sum, is brought about by something rare and extraordinary that arrests
us, often visually, with “its beauty, its strangeness, and its order” (Fisher 121); is characterized by a 
sudden feeling of surprise and delight; moves us to consider with attention the object or 
phenomenon that has stirred us; and contributes to our self-understanding by showing us what lies 
within and beyond our present understanding of the ordinary and knowable.  
 ere is one ﬁnal fact that must be included in any précis of passionate wonder.  Wonder fades --
with repetition, with experience, with age.  An extraordinary thing cannot remain extraordinary for 
long.  As freshness turns into familiarity, and the new into the known, the possibilities for passionate 
wonder diminish.  Fisher cites this susceptibility to decay as a “deep problem with and limit to the 
use of wonder,” “essential to any accurate deﬁnition of its nature” (55).   e problem of decay ﬁnds 
its most powerful, and likely most familiar, expression in Wordsworth’s “Ode: Intimations of 
Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood,” the poet’s moving meditation on the erosion of
wonder within experience.  Wordsworth’s speaker imagines wonder as a “celestial light” that clings to 
us from heaven (4), a kind of luminous residue from a previous life that brightens the world around 
us in childhood but gradually “fade[s] into the light of common day” (77).  By the start of the poem,
that light has dimmed to nothing, and the speaker’s world has wholly lost its “visionary gleam” (56). 
Even the rainbow has ceased to show up as an occasion for wonder (now it simply “comes and goes”)
(10).   e poem registers the speaker’s complex response to this depleted world: his nostalgia; his 
17grief; his desire to recover some part of the “glory” that once was (5); his cooler desire to understand 
the nature of that glory; his brave e ort to accept its passing; his resolution to ﬁnd strength in what 
remains.  As it traces out these patterns of emotion, the poem renders both the bright pleasure of 
wonder and the dark problem of its decline.
What compensation, if any, exists for the loss of passionate wonder?  Wordsworth suggests that 
maturity may provide its own forms of compensation, that the same years of experience that narrow 
our capacity for wonder may enable other, possibly richer, ways of seeing.   e mature observer 
encounters a world enriched by memories and associations, resonant with personal meaning and 
poetic possibility; for him, the sky at daybreak, a rose in bloom, a gathering of clouds around a 
setting sun, though no longer occasions for wonder, have an emotional power and a symbolic 
suggestiveness they cannot have for a child.   e speaker of the Immortality Ode goes so far as to 
insist that he delights in the world now as much as ever, only in a di erent, more “philosophic” and 
“habitual” way (187; 192).  Still, the poem concludes with an image of inexpressible loss, a grief 
deeper than grief, suggesting that the compensations of age for the loss of wonder can only ever be 
partial.
Fisher o ers a di erent answer to the problem of decline.  In Wonder, the Rainbow, he points to 
the “wonder-preserving” quality of explanation (119), showing how wonder conserves and 
perpetuates itself in the very processes of investigation and discovery to which it gives rise.   e “ah!” 
of wonder reproduces itself in the “aha!” of understanding, in the click of intelligibility that, like 
wonder, is marked by a feeling of surprise and delight, of sudden apprehension and aesthetic 
satisfaction.  A robust explanation is made up of a series of such moments, one leading energetically 
to the next in a “chain of...ever repeated, small-scale repetitions of the experience of wonder” (41).  
18Wonder persists -- beyond its inception, into the processes of inquiry and explication that succeed it,
and beyond childhood into the maturity that makes such “disciplined thought” possible (120).  Still, 
as an answer to the “deep problem” of erosion Wordsworth so vividly evokes, Fisher’s account is not 
and does not claim to be ﬁnal.  Fisher shows us that wonder has a longer and more complex career 
than it is often said to have, but he does not deny the reality of its “slow decline” (120), the di culty
of recapturing the pleasure and surprise of ﬁrst encounters, the unrepeatability of the feeling of 
having “never seen anything like this before” (150), the inevitable dimming down of passionate 
wonder over time.
Even as they register its limitations, these poetic and philosophical accounts of wonder emphasize
the value of that passion for our happiness, for our self-knowledge, for the creativity and vitality of 
our thinking, and for our e orts to better understand our world.  Descartes, Wordsworth, and Fisher
help us to recognize the passion of wonder as a privileged form of consciousness: a “place of fullness,”
surely, in which “life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more admirable, more what it should 
be”; a state of being characterized by unsought-for, unmediated delight; a vital engine of knowledge 
and discovery; a model for the poetics of thought itself.  From here it is not hard to see how 
passionate wonder might be plausibly described as the “highest form[] of consciousness.”
Nabokov and the Passion of Wonder
 ese accounts, moreover, help us to recognize passionate wonder as a central Nabokovian value.  In 
Wonder, the Rainbow, Fisher describes the aesthetics of wonder as an aesthetics of surprise, discovery, 
delight, and also -- because wonder is so closely tied to novelty and youth -- as an aesthetics of 
19freshness, quickness, spontaneity, experimentalism and innovation, optimism and openness to the 
new.  It’s an aesthetics, he argues, appropriate to a conﬁdent, modern age, exempliﬁed by the 
skyscraper and by the bold visual experiments of Monet, Cezanne, Pollock, and Twombly.   ese are 
all distinctly Nabokovian qualities, deﬁnitive not only of Nabokov’s art but of his personality, his 
values, his whole ethos.  Consider, for example, Nabokov’s response to the moon-landing in this 
interview from 1969:
Interviewer: 
Did you sit up and watch the Americans land on the moon?  Were you impressed?
Nabokov: 
Oh, “impressed” is not the right word!  Treading the soil of the moon gives one, I 
imagine (or rather my projected self imagines), the most remarkable romantic thrill 
ever experienced in the history of discovery.  Of course, I rented a television set to 
watch every moment of their marvelous adventure.   at gentle little minuet that 
despite their awkward suits the two men danced with such grace to the tune of 
lunar gravity was a lovely sight.  It was also a moment when a ﬂag means to one 
more than a ﬂag usually does.  I am puzzled and pained by the fact that the English 
weeklies ignored the absolutely overwhelming excitement of the adventure, the 
strange sensual exhilaration of palpating those precious pebbles, of seeing our 
marbled globe in the black sky, of feeling along one’s spine the shiver and wonder of
it.  After all, Englishmen should understand that thrill, they who have been the 
greatest, the purest explorers.  Why then drag in such irrelevant matters as wasted 
dollars and power politics? (SO 149-150)
One might have responded to the Apollo mission in any number of ways: with the sort of restrained 
appreciation Nabokov’s interviewer seems to expect; with the cynicism and pragmatism on display in
the papers; or perhaps with the feelings of fear and anxiety that inﬁnite spaces can sometimes inspire.
But these would all be distinctly un-Nabokovian responses.  Nabokov responds, instead, with 
unalloyed wonder, a response in keeping with his love of discovery and surprise, his enthusiasm for 
20new experiences, his optimism and conﬁdence and keen sense of delight.  His account emphasizes 
the surprising grace of the astronauts, the surprising lightness of their movements; the wonder of 
seeing the earth from a wholly fresh perspective; and above all the projected thrill of being the ﬁrst 
person to set foot on undiscovered lunar land.  He imagines a “shiver” of strangeness “along one’s 
spine,” but even this belongs more to the aesthetics of wonder than the aesthetics of the sublime, to 
that category of “artistic” “shiver[s]” and “telltale tingle[s]” he associates with a poet’s ingenious 
imagery or a grandmaster’s brilliant move (LL 382; 6).
Two more examples should su ce to conﬁrm the privileged role of wonder in Nabokov’s ethos 
and aesthetics.   e ﬁrst involves his famous love of butterﬂies and moths.  Nabokov could vividly 
imagine the awe and exhilaration of the astronauts on the moon in part because he knew the 
“romantic thrill” of discovery so well himself, having had many “marvelous adventures” of his own in
the ﬁeld of lepidopterology.  “ e pleasures and rewards of literary inspiration are nothing,” he once 
claimed, “beside the rapture of discovering a new organ under the microscope or an undescribed 
species on a mountainside in Iran or Peru” (SO 100).
2  In Nabokov’s responses to lepidoptera we ﬁnd
all the classic features of wonder: the element of surprise; the perception of beauty and undiscovered 
order; the impetus to inquiry; the revelation of the ever-shifting boundaries of one’s experience and 
knowledge.  He lives for the rare encounter, for the unfamiliar insect that will cause him “to stop 
with a quick intake of breath” (SM 132), for the “precious” “aberration” (127), the “striking 
sport...the delightful rarity” (274), for creatures “very scarce” and “rarely met with” (12).   ey are 
2.  e pleasures and rewards of literary inspiration were less, but their demands were greater: “the 
miniature hooks of a male butterﬂy are nothing,” Nabokov said in another interview a few years 
later, “in comparison to the eagle claws of literature which tear at me day and night” (SO 190).
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“incredible” (135), and of intense scientiﬁc interest as well.  In these encounters, surprise and 
appreciation lead naturally into inquiry and investigation.   e sudden beauty of a Swallowtail -- “a 
rare visitor, a splendid, pale-yellow creature with black blotches, blue crenels, and a cinnabar eyespot 
above each chrome-black tail” (120) -- soon leads Nabokov to reference books and periodicals, to the
net and the spreading board, and, eventually, to the microscope and the Museum of Comparative 
Zoology at Harvard.
3 Pleasure, astonishment, and satisfaction are constant features of his experience 
at all of stages of engagement, from sighting to dissection, and just as he evokes, in Speak, Memory, 
the “delight[]” of observing butterﬂies in childhood (135), he describes his years at the Museum as 
“the most delightful and thrilling” of his “adult life” (SO 190).  
 e second example involves his autobiography, every page of which testiﬁes to a life 
“orient[ed]...spiritually” and strongly toward the passion of wonder.  Speak, Memory registers, as it 
progresses, a rich, full scale of human feeling, from ecstasy to bereavement, but its dominant mood 
by far is one of wonder.  It presents the world, or, more precisely, the “embrace[ment]” of the world 
by consciousness (218), as a continual source of surprise and delight; and it o ers itself as a source of 
wonder, too, by setting up a seemingly endless series of happy surprises for the attentive reader: 
thematic correspondences, chronological puzzles, structural symmetries, intellectual jokes and games.
3. Nabokov worked as a Research Fellow in Entomology at the M.C.Z. throughout the 1940s, 
and made, while he was there, signiﬁcant contributions “not only to taxonomic knowledge but also 
to theoretical notions of how di erent species were likely to be related or to evolve,” contributions 
that continue to be of interest to lepidopterists today (Blackwell 23).
  Most recently, scientists at 
Harvard and Texas State University have used DNA sequencing to test -- and vindicate -- Nabokov’s 
identiﬁcation of the Karner blue as a distinct species of butterﬂy as well as his sweeping explanation 
of how the Polyommatus blues evolved (Zimmer D3). 
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emblem and object of passionate wonder.  Nabokov does not include “Rainbows” in his cheeky 
index to Speak, Memory, though he does draw attention to “Mushrooms,” “Great Danes,” 
“Honeysuckle,” “Jewels,” and all manner of other “thematic designs” (27).  Still, rainbows are 
everywhere, in every chapter.   e whole book is steeped in color.   ere are rainbows in the 
aquarelles his mother paints for him as a child, blue, lilac, red (36), and in the watercolor “treats” a 
teacher “gives” him, red, orange, yellow (92); in the “beautiful device” a governess shows him of 
arranging fallen leaves in color order, “green shading into lemon, lemon into orange and so on 
through the reds to purples, purplish browns, reddish again and back through lemon and green 
(which was getting quite hard to ﬁnd except as a part, a last brave edge)” (97), and in the “detailed 
spectrum” of hues advertised on a box of colored pencils (100).   ere are rainbows in the “vague 
iridescence” of a moonlit cloud on an imagined winter evening (99) and in the “dewy brilliancy” of a
remembered summer day (119).  In the varicolored pavilion that rises “like a coagulated rainbow” 
above a river on his family’s Vyra estate (216); in the “mother-of-pearl plated revolver” of his cousin 
Yuri (197); in a half-remembered detail of a young girl’s dress -- a ribbon maybe, or a patterned 
stocking -- that reminded him, as a child, of a “rainbow spiral in a glass marble,” and which now 
lingers, a “wisp of iridescence,” in his mind (152).  In the ﬁgures produced by the idle, “metronomic 
motion” of his butterﬂy net on “brownish sand; earthen rainbows, with variations in depth of stroke 
rendering the di erent colors” (222).  In the resplendent wings of “Fra Angelico’s Gabriel” (120).  In 
a poem, “blue, green and orange, wonderstruck/ with its own loveliness and luck” (165), and in a 
painting: “young birch trees, the half of a rainbow - everything very melting and moist” (226).   ere
are metaphorical rainbows: Nabokov views his father’s life through a “prism” that splits “into many 
23enchanting colors the rather austere light” others perceive (186), and he likens his own life to a 
“colored spiral in a small ball of glass” (275).   ere is a “private rainbow” spotted in a park in Paris, 
hanging in the spray of a sprinkler “above gemmed grass” (304).  And there is an even more private 
rainbow, kzspygv, a string of letters that, in Nabokov’s private world of “colored hearing,” form a 
“primary, but decidedly muddy, rainbow,” huckleberry, thundercloud, iridescent azure, unripe apple, 
bright gold, rich brown, Rose Quartz (35).
Yet these private, painted, miniature, metaphorical, half-formed, half-remembered rainbows -- 
these minor emblems of wonder -- are not the main event, the “central image” I mentioned, though 
they gesture toward and echo it.   e main event is the appearance of an actual rainbow, the only 
such appearance in the book.  Nabokov recounts how, when he was ﬁfteen, he sought shelter from a 
summer storm in “the pavilion,” a wooden structure with “chapel-like” windows comprised of “wine-
red and bottle-green and dark-blue lozenges of stained glass,” set on a bridge above a ravine in Vyra 
park.   e storm passed, and then, 
[b]eyond the park, above steaming ﬁelds, a rainbow slipped into view; the ﬁelds 
ended in the notched dark border of a remote ﬁr wood; part of the rainbow went 
across it, and that section of the forest edge shimmered most magically through the 
pale green and pink of the iridescent veil drawn before it: a tenderness and a glory 
that made poor relatives of the rhomboidal, colored reﬂections which the return of 
the sun had brought forth on the pavilion ﬂoor.
“A moment later,” he tells us, “my ﬁrst poem began” (215-216).
“Glory” is Wordsworth, but the rest is pure Nabokov.   e rainbow heralds the beginning of 
Nabokov’s career, and henceforth his writing will always aspire to the qualities of that vision: its 
iridescence, its “beauty and surprise” (290), its “shock of wonder” (217).  It heralds the coming of 
another era, too, as it is around this time that Nabokov begins to notice a girl’s name -- “Tamara” -- 
24scribbled here and there around his family’s estate, and it is here, in the “rainbow-windowed” 
pavilion, that he will eventually meet her and begin his ﬁrst real love a air (230).  
Viewed, then, within the context of the chapter in which it appears, the rainbow serves as a form
of poetic emphasis: it signals Nabokov’s emergence as a poet and a lover in the summer of 1914.  But
viewed “artistically,” as Nabokov might say, as the central instant of Speak, Memory’s rainbow motif, 
it takes on a di erent, deeper meaning.  All the partial, putative, vague and wispy rainbows in the 
book serve to emphasize the memoir’s basic theme, the pleasure and surprise of consciousness and of 
the “veritable Eden of visual and tactile sensations” to which it gives rise (24).   is rainbow, then, 
the core instant to which those many scattered rainbows allude, seems to stand for the “tenderness 
and...glory” of consciousness itself, its “magic[]” and “shimmer[]” and close association with the 
passion of wonder.  Here it seems relevant to note that Nabokov considered calling his memoir 
“Rainbow Edge,” a reference to the side of a glass or the edge of a jewel where light bursts 
prismatically into color (Boyd, American 192).
4  
4. If the rainbow of Chapter Eleven is really the central image of Nabokov’s autobiography, why 
does he not place it at the center of his ﬁfteen-chapter book?   ere’s no reason why he should 
necessarily have done so, though such a move would have had a certain Nabokovian neatness or 
“snugness” about it (291), especially when combined with his reticence about rainbows in the 
memoir’s paratextual apparatus.  Still, an answer might be found in his projections for Speak On, 
Memory, the sequel Nabokov planned to Speak, Memory but never wrote.  Speak On, Memory (or 
Speak, America) was to chronicle Nabokov’s years in America, and by 1968 Nabokov had sketched 
out ideas for seven chapters, on such topics as the Wellesley carpool and his relationship with 
Edmund Wilson (Boyd, American 564).   ere might, of course, have been more chapters, 
eventually, or less, but there’s a certain logic to the number seven.  Speak, Memory covers Nabokov’s 
twenty years in Russia and twenty-one years in Europe in ﬁfteen chapters, so about half as many 
chapters, one-third of the total, seems an appropriate number to devote to the twenty years he spent 
in the United States.  Such a structure might even have been visible to Nabokov in the early ﬁfties, 
when he assembled the chapters of his memoir into their ﬁnal order.  A little fancifully, then, though 
not, I think, implausibly, we might imagine a ﬁnal, two-volume version of Nabokov’s life of some 
twenty-two chapters, with that “tender[]” and “glor[ious]” rainbow appearing precisely halfway 
25 e Capacity to Wonder at Triﬂes Distinguished from the Passion of Wonder
So far, we’ve been discussing the “passion” of wonder, taking note of its properties and its central 
place in Nabokov’s work.  Let’s turn, now, to that other form of consciousness, the one he deems the 
very “highest" -- the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes.”  What does our discussion of passionate wonder 
help us to see about this other state of mind?
 Here, again, is Nabokov’s description of the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” in “ e Art of 
Literature and Commonsense”:  
What exactly do these irrational standards mean?   ey mean the supremacy of the 
detail over the general, of the part that is more alive than the whole, of the little 
thing which a man observes and greets with a friendly nod of the spirit while the 
crowd around him is being driven by some common impulse to some common 
goal.  I take my hat o  to the hero who dashes into a burning house and saves his 
neighbor’s child; but I shake his hand if he has risked squandering a precious ﬁve 
seconds to ﬁnd and save, together with the child, its favorite toy.  I remember a 
cartoon depicting a chimney sweep falling from the roof of a tall building and 
noticing on the way that a sign-board had one word spelled wrong, and wondering 
in his headlong ﬂight why nobody had thought of correcting it.  In a sense, we all 
are crashing to our death from the top story of our birth to the ﬂat stones of the 
churchyard and wondering with an immortal Alice in Wonderland at the patterns 
on the passing wall.   is capacity to wonder at triﬂes -- no matter the imminent 
peril -- these asides of the spirit, these footnotes in the volume of life are the highest 
forms of consciousness, and it is in this childishly speculative state of mind, so 
di erent from commonsense and its logic, that we know the world to be good (LL 
373-374).
Our discussion up to this point, in articulating the speciﬁc features of the “passion” of wonder, 
provides us with a structure for thinking about the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes,” too.  It helps us to 
see, for example, that the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” also involves a sudden, present-tense 
response “of the spirit” to something in the world; that it, too, leads on to acts of contemplation, 
through.
  
26questioning, investigation, “specula[tion]”; and that it, too, is a form of consciousness that does not 
necessarily depend on the presence of other people.  Alice, the chimney sweep, the man standing 
apart from the crowd are all, notably, alone.  Finally, it, too, is associated with youth.  Nabokov 
describes “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” as a “childishly speculative” state of mind.   e whole 
passage, in fact, is built around images and reminders of childhood: a child, a toy, a cartoon, a 
children’s book, another child.  
What Nabokov calls the “highest form[] of consciousness,” then, resembles passionate wonder in 
many respects.  But it also departs from it, in important and even deﬁnitive ways.   e ﬁrst and most
obvious di erence between the two is the di erence of object: “delightful rarit[ies]” on the one hand,
“triﬂes” on the other.   e moon-landing, the rainbow, and the rare butterﬂy are all archetypal 
objects of passionate wonder: splendid, surprising, unusual; and Nabokov clearly counts his 
responses to these “rare and extraordinary” things as a highly privileged form of consciousness.  And 
yet the very highest form of consciousness, he says, though also a kind of “wondering...at,” takes a 
very di erent sort of object: trivial, unsurprising, everyday.  Nabokov’s examples of this form of 
consciousness, the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes,” center on simple objects, “little thing[s],” 
encountered not rarely but all the time: toys, cartoons, billboards, spelling errors, the jars of 
marmalade and humble “pictures hung on pegs” Alice encounters on her way down the rabbit-hole, 
rather than the strange sights she will soon see (Carroll 3).  
Because the object is di erent here, the situation of wondering-at is di erent, too.   e rainbow, 
as we’ve noted, strikes us; it seizes our attention; as long as we haven’t seen too many rainbows 
before, we cannot help but respond to it.  In the passage above, however, Nabokov’s wonderers 
attend to precisely the thing that would seem, at that moment, least likely to command their 
27attention.   ey remark the unremarkable.   e world seems to have been made over for them, or 
they have made it over, in such a way that peripheral things seem central and little things seem big.  
 is suggests that the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” is not only a kind of experience but also a more 
general kind of attitude, a way of comporting oneself toward the things of the world so that they 
show up in a certain way.  Similarly, we might say, recalling Charles Taylor, that the “capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes” is not only a kind of “activity” but also a kind of “condition.”  Taylor explains that 
we tend to identify heightened experiences of consciousness with either one or the other:
Somewhere, in some activity, or condition, lies a fullness, a richness; that is, in that 
place (activity or condition), life is fuller, richer, deeper, more worthwhile, more 
admirable, more what it should be...a place of fullness, to which we orient ourselves 
morally or spiritually (5-6; my italics).
An activity might be a special kind of work or play or life event: completing a painting, ﬂy-ﬁshing, 
getting married.  A condition might be a state of mind, a mode of being, a way of orienting oneself 
in the world: experiencing a state of grace, perhaps, or enjoying a sense of really knowing and feeling 
known by another person.  Nabokov’s critics tend to describe his “highest form[] of consciousness” 
in the ﬁrst way, as a kind of activity, a special sort of “noticing” or “recognizing” or “seeing” or 
observing; but we should note that Nabokov also describes it as a kind of condition, as a “capacity” 
and a “state of mind.”  A funny lapse in parallelism allows him to have it both ways:
 is capacity to wonder at triﬂes - no matter the imminent peril - these asides of the
spirit, these footnotes in the volume of life are the highest forms of consciousness 
[...]
Nabokov, in other words, identiﬁes his “highest form[] of consciousness” as both a capacity for a 
certain kind of wonder and the realization of that capacity in speciﬁc acts of wondering-at, 
28experiential “footnotes” and spiritual “asides.”   e capacity seems to me prior, as it is the condition 
that makes those elevating footnotes possible.   is privileged form of consciousness, then, refers to 
something greater than an act or even practice of “good noticing” (James Wood, How Fiction Works 
(HFW) 63).  It suggests a whole way of disposing oneself toward the things of one’s world, a certain 
kind of openness or readiness, a special attunement that allows “triﬂes” -- the smallest, most under-
noticed, undervalued parts of that world -- to show up as occasions for wonder.
 is marks the second major di erence, after the di erence in object, between the “passion” of 
wonder and the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes.”  If the second is, at least in part, a “dispositional” 
state, the ﬁrst is a wholly “occasioned” one.  Fisher distinguishes between occasioned and 
dispositional states in  e Vehement Passions:
We need to notice ﬁrst the di erence between the eruptive momentary impassioned
state and the more enduring underlying states of which we sometimes speak when 
thinking of the passions, the di erence between occasioned, onetime events and the 
passions as we experience them in settled, persistent, temperamental facts (or, in 
Kant’s term, inclinations).  Grief felt at the unexpected and sudden death of the 
central person in one’s life might be the best example of an occasioned vehement  
state.  We always distinguish a general disposition, like the fear of heights, from a 
moment of fear when we see a large snake in front of us on a path...
Ambition and avarice are passions commonly invoked as settled, underlying 
dispositional facts about a person.  Grief and fear are examples, on the other side, of
passions we think of ﬁrst by means of single, experiential moments.  When you hear
the word, you think of an occasioned grief or fear.  In other words, even within any 
ordinary list of the passions some are likely to seem essentially occasioned, eruptive, 
and eventlike, even while also having a dispositional form, while others are the 
opposite, primarily dispositions, and only rarely eventlike.  Among the most clearly 
episodic, it is hard to think of wonder as anything but a momentary event in which 
we feel surprise and pleasure at something noticed just now (18-19).
From Fisher’s point of view, wonder is so clearly an occasioned, episodic, eruptive, vehement state 
that it is hard to imagine a dispositional version of it at all.   e very idea of being “disposed to” or 
29“ready for” the passion of wonder has something incoherent about it, as that readiness would seem to
work against the sense of rarity and surprise central to the experience of that passion.   e “capacity 
to wonder at triﬂes” then, can’t really be understood as a type or instance of passionate wonder. 
Instead we should think of it as a close cousin, one that shares with it some phenomenal 
characteristics -- some part of the surprise and pleasure, curiosity and awe characteristic of the 
“passion” of wonder -- while remaining a distinct form of consciousness in its own right.  If 
Nabokov’s rapt response to the extraordinary rainbow in Chapter Eleven of Speak, Memory 
emblematizes the vehement passion of wonder, his habit of perceiving small prismatic patterns, 
minor rainbows everywhere emblematizes this other state of mind.
Further di erences follow.  Once we identify the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” as not only a 
response to the world but also an attitude that makes such responses possible, we might ask whether 
it is possible to actively cultivate such an attitude.  Nabokov suggests that it is.  He certainly thought 
it possible to cultivate such an attitude toward texts.  His lectures on literature aim, in large part, to 
cultivate his students’ “capacity to wonder at” textual triﬂes.   rough a combination of instruction, 
encouragement, and example, Nabokov endeavored to increase his students’ capacity for 
experiencing literary details -- original epithets, unusual gestures, brief, bright images, striking 
“evocations” and “particular revelations” -- as occasions for surprise and delight (LL 116).  His 
inclusion of “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense” among these lectures suggests an analogy 
between literary matters and existential ones, between the question of how to read well and the 
question of how to live well, between our way of relating to books and our way of relating to the 
world.  Among other things, that analogy suggests that if our capacity for wondering at the “sunny 
triﬂes of the book” can be improved and increased (LL 1), then perhaps our capacity for wondering 
30at the triﬂes of everyday life can be improved as well.  
 e hortatory tone of “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense” further suggests Nabokov’s 
belief that the capacity to wonder at triﬂes may be expanded, encouraged, increased.  Nabokov 
characterizes his lecture as an “advertise[ment]” for a certain “divinely absurd,” “emphatically and 
unshakably illogical” way of thinking, one that privileges “detail[s],” “part[s]” and “little thing[s]” far 
above the general, the aggregate, and the abstract.  In “advertising” this way of thinking as a “home 
for the spirit,” he implies that we may, if we choose, embrace that way of thinking and take up its 
“irrational standards” for ourselves (373).  Both the pedagogical context and exhortative quality of 
the “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense,” then, suggest that we can actively cultivate our 
capacity to wonder at triﬂes, increase our lot of spiritual footnotes and asides, and, in this way, court 
the highest form of consciousness there is.  Our capacity for the “vehement passion” of wonder, on 
the other hand, though variable (over time, with experience and exposure, across cultures, with one’s 
shifting sense of the familiar and the unknown), is not directly manipulable in this way.  One can 
learn to recognize the passion of wonder, to analyze and appreciate it, but not to wonder “more” or 
wonder “better,” to experience the vehement passion of wonder more ﬁercely or frequently.   is is 
true for the same reason it is true that you cannot “dispose” or “incline” yourself to passionate 
wonder: such learning, disposing, and inclining would moderate the drama of surprise central to that
passion.
 ere is one last di erence worth noting here.  Time, as we noted earlier, poses a problem for the
passion of wonder.  Passionate wonder depends on the “rare and extraordinary” quality of the thing 
wondered at, but what seems rare and extraordinary, strange and surprising to us now is unlikely to 
seem so for long.  Wondering at triﬂes, however, does not depend on the obvious rarity and 
31extraordinariness of its object.  It begins with what is already common, ordinary, unimportant, 
triﬂing, and for this reason would seem to be less vulnerable than passionate wonder to 
diminishment over time.  It is as though, in this case, the threshold for the feeling of wonder has 
been pushed back to and ﬁxed at its position at an earlier age, when even the most ordinary things 
presented themselves as occasions for wonder.  And, indeed, Nabokov describes “the capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes” as a “childishly speculative state of mind” that remains available to us long after 
we’ve grown up.  He even likens our wondering experience of the world to that of a child suspended 
in time, an “immortal Alice in Wonderland.” 
*
We can sum up the features of Nabokov’s “highest form[] of consciousness,” then, in the following 
way.  “ e capacity to wonder at triﬂes” refers to a cultivable, durable attunement or way of disposing 
oneself toward the things of the world that allows the most undervalued, under-noticed parts of that world 
to show up as occasions for surprise, delight, curiosity, and speculation.  Nabokov’s “highest form[] of 
consciousness” refers to this dispositional state as well as to the occasioned states of wonder it 
enables, those experiential “footnotes” and spiritual “asides.”
Already we should be able to see how di erent this is from merely “notic[ing]....external details,” 
“recognizing something others would miss,” or “being curious about what others take for granted.”  
 e “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” refers, instead, to a whole way of being in the world.  More than a
healthy habit of “good noticing,” it speaks to a far-reaching, transformative way of relating to and 
valuing things.  It also speaks to a way of responding to things, not merely with interest or pleasure 
32but with the richer, more complex response of wonder.
And yet the lateral comparison of the “passion” of wonder with the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes”
only gets us so far.  It helps us to see what “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” is and even why, like the 
“passion” of wonder, it might be valued, but it doesn’t explain why it should be considered the very 
highest form of consciousness of all.  We have yet to answer the question with which we began: how 
might this special state of mind, part activity, part condition, focused on triﬂes and realized in asides,
be said to be the highest form of consciousness there is?  And what, for that matter, distinguishes this
special attentiveness to under-noticed things from other states of mind -- generally considered 
defective or inferior -- that also involve an exaggerated amount of attention to “trivial and 
insigniﬁcant matters” (Augustine 243)?  From what Descartes calls “astonishment” (58), for example,
what Augustine calls “curiosity” (243), or what Heidegger refers to as curiosity or “distraction” (Being
and Time (BT) 216)?
5 
Fortunately Nabokov o ers us another angle from which to make sense of his claim.  He deﬁnes 
his highest form of consciousness, after all, in more than one way, both in terms of what it is like -- 
“wonder” -- and in terms of what it is utterly unlike -- “commonsense and its logic.”   is alternative
deﬁnition provides us with another way into the question of why Nabokov values “the capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes” as highly as he does.  Let’s turn, then, to the “monster of grim commonsense” (LL 
380).  Understanding Nabokov’s low evaluation of commonsense should help us better understand 
his high evaluation of its opposite, the capacity to wonder at triﬂes, “so di erent from” it.
5. I will return to these questions in my conclusion.
33CHAPTER TWO:
Commonsense and Its Logic
Nabokov portrays commonsense as a “grim” and “lumbering” beast; the enemy of everything artistic 
and good; a “monster” to be spotted, stalked, and, in the lecture’s ﬁnal moments, coolly slain.  What,
exactly, is Nabokov targeting when he targets commonsense?  What is “commonsense,” and what 
makes it so monstrous?
Two Faces of “Commonsense”
“Commonsense” actually stands for more than one thing in this lecture: a general shape, style, and 
context of thought on the one hand, and a particular way of orienting oneself toward the things of 
the world on the other.  Let’s take each of these two ways in turn.
First, Nabokov often seems to use the term “commonsense” to refer to a general style of thought,
rather than to some particular commonsensical notion or other.   is use of the term recalls Cli ord 
Geertz’s description of common sense as a “cultural system” in his essay by that name.  Geertz 
observes that while the particular content of common-sense wisdom varies widely from culture to 
culture -- whether “make hay while the sun shines” or “it is the prudent hyena that lives long” -- the 
general style and attitude of common sense are largely consistent between them (90).  “[W]hat simple
wisdom has everywhere in common,” he writes, “is the maddening air of simple wisdom with which 
it is uttered.”  Geertz identiﬁes ﬁve basic, cross-cultural “stylistic features” or “marks of attitude” that 
give common sense its “peculiar stamp”: naturalness, practicalness, thinness, immethodicalness, and 
34accessibleness.  Naturalness refers to the way common sense “represents matters -- that is, certain 
matters and not others -- as being what they are in the simple nature of the case...inherent in the 
situation, intrinsic aspects of reality, the way things go,” in other words, to its general “air of ‘of-
courseness’” (85).  Practicalness refers to its typical emphasis on prudence, sensibleness, and all-
around levelheadedness, apparent in such admonitions as “don’t buy any wooden nickels” or “stay 
away from slow horses and fast women,” and in the fact that when we say that something or 
someone lacks common sense, “what we most often mean...is that they are impractical” (87).  
 inness (or “simpleness”) refers to the way common sense has of taking things to be “precisely what 
they seem to be, neither more nor less,” of insisting that “the world is what the wide-awake, 
uncomplicated person takes it to be,” that “[s]obriety, not subtlety, realism, not imagination, are the 
keys to wisdom,” and that “the really important facts of life lie scattered openly along its surface, not 
cunningly secreted in its depths” (89).  Immethodicalness refers to the ad hoc quality of common 
sense, its casual inconsistency, the way it “shamelessly and unapologetically” embraces contradiction 
to include, for example, both “seize the day” and a “stitch in time saves nine,” “he who hesitates is 
lost” and “look before you leap” (90).  And accessibleness, ﬁnally, refers to the notion that common-
sense wisdom is readily available to “any person with faculties reasonably intact” -- no special 
training, knowledge, technique or “peculiar giftedness” required.  Common sense, in short, 
“represents the world as a familiar world, one everyone can, and should, recognize, and within which
everyone stands, or should, on his own two feet” (91). 
When Nabokov declares that “[c]ommonsense is square whereas all the most essential visions and
values of life are beautifully round,” it is to this general shape or style of thought that he refers (LL 
372).  It’s not hard to see why this “genre[] of cultural expression” (Geertz 92), with its preference for
35the literal and the plain, its mistrust of complexity and contempt for expertise, would be especially 
o ensive to someone like him.  (He would surely have taken pleasure in Geertz’s choice of example 
of an un-commonsensical activity: “chasing butterﬂies”) (Geertz 88).  Nabokov objects to 
commonsense on intellectual, aesthetic, moral, and spiritual grounds: its methods are lazy, its 
conclusions specious, its logic pedestrian, trite, and dull; it obscures the truth and compromises the 
moral instrument of the imagination; it narrows our sense of what is possible and, in the process, our
freedom, our creativity, our capacity for joy, our very humanity.  
“Commonsense,” moreover, signiﬁes not only a certain style of thought but a certain context or 
situation of thought as well.  It’s what “everyone can, and should recognize,” the set of beliefs “we all”
have in common (Geertz 91).  Nabokov sometimes emphasizes this aspect of commonsense in his 
lecture, so that the term reads as a synonym for groupthink, collective belief, popular opinion, the 
wisdom of the crowd.  (For him, of course, that last phrase always has the status of an oxymoron.)  
Nabokov’s case against the communal aspect of commonsense is threefold.  First, collective thought 
tends to reﬂect a lower common denominator of thought -- hence the “thin,” reductive, “accessible,” 
anti-intellectual quality of commonsense, its incomprehension in the face of ambiguity and 
complexity.  Second, crowds are always, in Nabokov’s view, hostile to individuals.   ey’re intolerant 
and parochial, suspicious of di erence and independence; they demand conformity.   ird, the sheer
volume of commonsense opinion lends it a kind of easy and false authority that can turn brutal if left
unchecked.  Together these traits make for an ugly -- and menacing -- combination.  Hence 
Nabokov’s pointed reminder that
there is not a single person in this room, or for that matter in any room in the 
world, who, at some nicely chosen point in historical space-time would not be put 
to death there and then, here and now, by a commonsensical majority in righteous 
36rage.   e color of one’s creed, neckties, eyes, thoughts, manners, speech, is sure to 
meet somewhere in time or space with a fatal objection from a mob that hates that 
particular tone.  And the more brilliant, the more unusual the man, the nearer he is 
to the stake.  Stranger always rhymes with danger (LL 372).
Here “commonsense” stands not only for a “genre of cultural expression” characterized by 
“naturalness,” “thinness,” and so on, but also for whatever it is that some bullying majority happens, 
at some moment in space-time, to believe.  In both cases the particular content of that belief or 
expression is beside the point.  Nabokov’s concern is instead with the general style, shape, and 
context of commonsense thought, its crude logic and troubling association with the senseless, 
insensitive judgement of the crowd.
 is vision of commonsense doesn’t present us with a particularly “ﬂattering view of the creature”
(LL 372).  But neither is that vision wholly formidable.  After all, there are many ways available to us
of undermining “commonsense” as so deﬁned.  We can challenge its claims of authority, for example,
by showing the wide range of what counts as “common sense” in di erent cultures, as Geertz does in 
“Common Sense as a Cultural System.”  We can show how the content of common-sense wisdom 
changes over time, like fads in “neckties...manners, speech.”  Or else we can go after commonsense 
with what Jonathan Culler calls a “pugnacious critique,” interrogating its assumptions and exposing 
its logical ﬂaws.   is, after all, as Culler explains, is the basic aim of critical theory:
 e main e ect of theory is the disputing of ‘common sense’: common-sense views 
about meaning, writing, literature, experience... eory is often a pugnacious 
critique of common-sense notions, and further, an attempt to show that what we 
take for granted as ‘common-sense’ is in fact a historical construction, a particular 
theory that has come to seem so natural to us that we don’t even see it as a theory 
(4).
Satire, of course, is yet another powerful weapon against the “cultural system” of “commonsense,” as 
37Flaubert in particular shows.  And as for debunking one’s faith in popular opinion and the “common
impulse” of the crowd, Nabokov simply points us to the historical record (LL 373).  Even the most 
cursory examination of history, he implies, should assure us that the wisdom of the crowd is often 
anything but wise.
Commonsense, then, understood in this general way, is a forbidding but vulnerable foe, stalked 
and “shot dead” -- or at least wounded -- many times over (LL 380), not only by Nabokov but by 
anthropologists, philosophers, novelists, historians, psychologists and “theorists” of every stripe.  But 
“commonsense” also means something more speciﬁc in this lecture -- more speciﬁc and, I would 
submit, more formidable.  In addition to using the term to invoke a general, transcultural, 
transhistorical system or style of thinking -- the “good sound ordinary...horse sense” Webster’s 
dictionary describes (LL 372) --, Nabokov uses it to invoke a particular, and particularly modern, 
collection of ideas, values, beliefs, patterns of thought and behavior.   ese are particular precepts 
that qualify as “commonsense” in our modern and modernized world.  Among them Nabokov 
includes the notion that the real value of something adheres in its practical, instrumental, material 
value, in how it may be used or for what it may be exchanged, in what material beneﬁt it may 
ultimately provide; that the best view of reality is always the widest view, the aggregate view, the 
general picture; that statistical analysis provides the readiest way to truth; that the world is fully 
knowable, measurable, calculable, accessible; that whatever lies beyond our calculations -- “inevitable
indeterminism[s]” (LL 374), intangible qualities, untestable intimations of immortality -- is either 
unimportant or unreal, and that the contrapositive of that is also true: nothing important is beyond 
38us; there is no limit to what we can know or do.
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Nabokov indicates that these precepts, like all particular iterations of commonsense, have a 
history:
Man at a certain stage of his development invented arithmetic for the purely 
practical purpose of obtaining some kind of human order in a world which he knew
to be ruled by gods whom he could not prevent from playing havoc with his sums 
whenever they felt so inclined.  He accepted that inevitable indeterminism which 
they now and then introduced, called it magic, and calmly proceeded to count the 
skins he had bartered by chalking bars on the wall of his cave.   e gods might 
intrude, but he at least was resolved to follow a system that he had invented for the 
express purpose of following it.   
 en, as the thousands of centuries trickled by, and the gods retired on a more 
or less adequate pension, and human calculations grew more and more acrobatic, 
mathematics transcended their initial condition and became as it were a natural part
of the world to which they had been merely applied.  Instead of having numbers 
based on certain phenomena that they happened to ﬁt because we ourselves 
6. Nabokov’s critique is at least as relevant today as it was at midcentury.  Kathryn Schulz, in a 
recent New York Times piece -- with which Nabokov surely would have agreed -- on Franco Moretti 
and the Stanford Literary Lab, describes the modern faith in statistics, data, aggregation and 
generalization as the “theology of the 21st century”:
...Moretti isn’t interested in the unquantiﬁable, inscrutable actions of intelligent 
human beings trying to write stu .   ere will always be some people for whom 
new technologies seem to promise completeness and certainty, and Moretti, 
enthusing over the prospect of “a uniﬁed theory of plot and style,” is one of them.  
Literature, he argues, is “a collective system that should be grasped as such.”  But 
this, too, is a theology of sorts - if not the claim that literature is a system, at least 
the conviction that we can ﬁnd meaning only in its totality.
Moreover, as theologies go, Moretti’s is neither new nor, at present, rare.   e 
idea that truth can best be revealed through quantitative models dates back to the 
development of statistics (and boasts a less-than-benign legacy).  And the idea that 
data is gold waiting to be mined; that all entities (including people) are best 
understood as nodes in a network; that things are at their clearest when they are 
least particular, most interchangeable, most aggregated -- well, perhaps that is not 
the theology of the average lit department (yet). But it is surely the theology of the 
21st century (BR14).
 
39happened to ﬁt into the pattern we apprehended, the whole world gradually turned 
out to be based on numbers, and nobody seems to have been surprised at the queer 
fact of the outer network becoming an inner skeleton.  Indeed, by digging a little 
deeper somewhere near the waistline of South America a lucky geologist may one 
day discover, as his spade rings against metal, the solid barrel hoop of the equator 
(LL 374).
Nabokov’s fable traces the origins of commonsense back to a certain moment in time when 
“the gods retired” and “the whole world...turned out to be based on numbers.”  He doesn’t punctuate
his just-so story with dates and place names, but one could reasonably say that “the...world turned 
out to be based on numbers” about three or four hundred years ago, with the advent of the 
Scientiﬁc, and later Industrial, Revolutions.   e rise of commonsense -- that is, this particular form 
of commonsense, these particular precepts -- is therefore coincident with the rise of modernity; let’s 
call it “modern commonsense.”  And yet it’s important to see that Nabokov’s position is, at root, 
neither anti-scientiﬁc nor anti-modern.  His wonder at the Apollo mission is too complete, his 
rapture in the laboratory too profound for his case against commonsense to be mistaken for a case 
against science or even modernization per se.  Modern commonsense, as Nabokov describes it, is a 
collection of attitudes, values, habits of mind, a way of approaching and encountering things, and it 
is more readily associated with number-crunching technocrats, businessmen obsessed with bottom 
lines, closed-minded materialists and cynical statesmen than with physicists, mathematicians, 
biologists or inventors.  It can, of course, co-opt the language and tools of science just as it can co-
opt everything else; but science, at its best, is, in Nabokov’s view, as far from commonsense as is the 
40art of literature: open-minded, imaginative, creative, inspired, reverent and attentive to detail, 
di erence, and design.
7  
Modern commonsense, by contrast, is narrow, rigid, “matter-of-fact” (LL 377), routine, 
hubristic, dismissive of detail and di erence, and in thrall to the power of “numbers,” “statistics,” 
7. After all, the practice of science -- especially the sort of natural, empirical science Nabokov was 
himself involved in -- depends very much on the scientist's "capacity to wonder at triﬂes."   at 
phrase, in fact, recalls -- and very possibly alludes -- to a particular passage in Alexander Pope that is 
concerned with just this sort of scientiﬁc wonderment.  Among the many forms of contemporary 
stupidity or "dulness" Pope lampoons in  e Dunciad is the study of natural history, with its 
excessive, mundane interest in the "triﬂes" of the natural world.  In Book Four of Pope's mock-
heroic, he describes a "tribe" of naturalists, come to pay homage to the Queen of Dulness:
 en thick as Locusts black'ning all the ground,
A tribe, with weeds and shells fantastic crown'd,
Each with some wond'rous gift approach'd the Pow'r,
A Nest, a Toad, a Fungus, or a Flow'r.
A horticulturalist and a butterﬂy collector come forward, and ask the Queen to settle a dispute.   e 
horticulturalist's prize carnation has been destroyed by the collector, who in his "insect lust" has 
managed to trample it.  He defends himself as Nabokov might in such a situation:
 ' Accus'd stood forth, and thus address'd the Queen.
Of all th' enamel'd race, whose silv'ry wing
Waves to the tepid Zephyrs of the spring,
Or swims along the ﬂuid atmosphere,
Once brightest shin'd this child of Heat and Air.
I saw, and started from its vernal bow'r
 e rising game, and chac'd from ﬂow'r to ﬂow'r.
It ﬂed, I follow'd; now in hope, now pain;
It stopt, I stopt; it mov'd, I mov'd again.
At last it ﬁx'd, 'twas on what plant it pleas'd,
And where it ﬁx'd, the beauteous bird I seiz'd:
Rose or Carnation was below my care;
I meddle, Goddess! only in my sphere.
I tell the naked fact without disguise,
And, to excuse it, need but shew the prize;
Whose spoils this paper o ers to your eye,
41“generalization[s]” and “calculating machine[s]” (LL 374).   e real trouble with this attitude is that 
it radically devalues everything it apprehends.  It insists that value is primarily instrumental, and that
everything is ultimately interchangeable.  From this perspective, the child’s “favorite toy” is, in the 
context of the rescue, useless, and recovering it would be a useless act -- and the child can always get 
Fair ev'n in death! this peerless Butterﬂy.
Dulness acquits them both ("My sons! (she answer'd) both have done your parts:/Live happy both, 
and long promote our arts"), and muses:
O! would the Sons of Men once think their Eyes
And reason giv'n them but to study Flies!
See nature in some partial narrow shape,
And let the Author of the Whole escape:
Learn but to triﬂe; or, who most observe,
To wonder at their Maker, not to serve (4:397- 458).
"Learn but to triﬂe...to wonder at": Pope's satirical poem implies that merely wondering at triﬂes is 
but a dull and misguided distraction from more important things -- such as, for example, the First 
Cause of all those triﬂes.  Nabokov's scrupulous attention to butterﬂy wings -- and, moreover, the 
arrangement of scales on butterﬂies' wings -- makes him an even more fervid disciple of "Dulness," 
from  e Dunciad's point of view, than Pope's collector.  Nabokov was undoubtedly familiar with 
the passage.  First, he knew Pope's work well (and would later make one of his better-known 
characters a Pope scholar); he was especially alert to poetic descriptions of butterﬂies, as he tells us in 
Speak, Memory (SM 128-129); he was also particularly alert to 18th century slights against butterﬂy 
collectors, "those happy hunters with their captures pinned to the crown of their hats, of whom the 
Age of Reason made such fun" (SM 278).  And, ﬁnally, there's the close textual correspondence 
between the two passages -- "wonder at," "triﬂes."  Nabokov's position is precisely the opposite of 
that implied by  e Dunciad, and it may be that he's folded a bit of 18th century commonsense 
directly into his argument here, cheekily appropriating Pope's language, scrubbing it of irony, and 
presenting the spurious wisdom of Dulness as truth.  Of course, Nabokov admired Pope, even in 
spite of his distaste for certain 18th century habits of mind.  Neoclassical "commonsense" isn't the 
primary, or even secondary, target of Nabokov's essay, which is mainly concerned with two other, 
grimmer and duller, incarnations of that beast: the "good sound ordinary sense" (LL 372) of 
Webster's dictionary (Geertz's "common sense as a cultural system") and what I am here describing 
as "modern commonsense."
42another toy, anyway.  But if value is instrumental, and everything is interchangeable, then nothing 
ever really matters, in a deep sense.  Nothing matters in itself, that is, nothing is allowed “to show up 
as having an intrinsic worth...a signiﬁcance independent of [its] usefulness to our current projects”; 
and nothing really matters for us, for our “self-realization” (Wrathall 204; 200).  Mark Wrathall’s 
distinction between “instrumental” and “existential” importance helps clarify this latter point:
 ings have an instrumental importance anytime we take up some of the purposes 
made available by the intelligible structure of the world.  In a world where it makes 
sense to be a doctor, for instance, one can take up the objects that a doctor employs,
and come into relation with the people a doctor relates to in her doctoring activities.
 ese people and objects will matter to her, just as long as she continues to be a 
doctor.  But outside of her doctoring activity, these devices and people need not 
make any claim on her.
Existential importance, by contrast, would consist in some practice or object or 
person having an importance for our self-realization.   at is, the object or person 
or practice is something without which we would cease to be who we are.  Such 
objects or persons or practices thus make a demand on us -- require of us that we 
value them, respect them, respond to them on pain of losing ourselves (200).
Nabokov’s irrational hero -- the man who “squander[s] a precious ﬁve seconds” to ﬁnd and save both 
child and toy -- lives in such a way that things still show up for him as having existential importance.
 e beloved toy has existential importance for the child, and the act of acknowledging and honoring 
that fact has existential importance for the man.   e toy, in other words, “make[s] a demand” on 
them both: it requires them to value it, respect it, respond to it.
Kaufman’s Birder
Valuing things solely in terms of their “usefulness to our current projects,” by contrast, drains the 
world of meaning and, with it, joy.   e impoverishing e ect of this approach is vividly illustrated by
an anecdote from Kenn Kaufman’s “One and a Half Cheers for List-Keeping,” recently published in 
43Field Notes on Science and Nature, an edited collection of essays about naturalists and their ﬁeld 
notebooks.  In this essay, Kaufman, “one of the most accomplished and revered birders in the world” 
(Canﬁeld 289), warns against the dangers of taking “an extreme list-chasing approach” to birding 
(Kaufman 54):
...a continued emphasis on just ﬁnding and checking o  new species can eventually 
stunt a person’s development as a naturalist and limit her ability to learn more.  I 
worked for several years as a leader of birding tours, and I met a few sad individuals 
who were so focused on adding to their life lists that they would refuse to look at a 
bird species that they had seen before, no matter how spectacular the view or how 
fascinating its behavior of the moment might be.  “I don’t need that bird” was their 
standard reply.  I knew one man who went repeatedly on organized spring birding 
trips to St. Lawrence Island, Alaska, hoping to see strays from Siberia to add to his 
North American life list.  He would sit in the lodge by the radio, waiting for one of 
the other birders to call in and report some rarity that would be new to him.  One 
year there was nothing found that he hadn’t already seen before, so as far as we 
could tell, he didn’t look at a bird the whole time he was there.  And this at a place 
where the “everyday” birds, utterly di erent from those in most of the United 
States, occur in mind-blowing concentrations (Kaufman 54).
Kaufman’s stunted birder, sitting alone, indoors, beside a silent radio, cut o  from the inﬁnitely rich 
world of experience outside, provides us with an image of what it means to live in a such a way that 
things no longer “make a demand on us.”  Among other things, the birder’s “sad” story highlights the
transformative quality of the instrumentalist approach, the way it seems actually to a ect how birds 
show up for him, to change what, in e ect, they are for him.  His life lists and checklists transform 
the birds into items to be recorded or checked o , and, once checked o , they are very little, and 
they mean almost nothing; one year they simply don’t show up for him at all.
8 
8. Of course it’s not the lists alone that do this; but part of Kaufman’s point in this essay is that the
tools we use really can have an e ect on what we do.  Hence his half-cheer against list-keeping.   e 
very idea of a “life list” can change how we approach birds (or trees, or wildﬂowers), think about 
what they are, what they “are for,” what we should “do with” them.  A list can’t create an atmosphere 
44Depleted of value, the birds become interchangeable.  For the purpose of crossing a species o  a 
list, one Cedar Waxwing is as good as any another; and, once crossed o , as meaningless as any other.
 e response of the jaded birders -- “I don’t need that bird” -- does not in fact refer to any particular 
bird but rather looks through “that” bird to the whole species.  (An interesting aspect of the anecdote
is that, in Kaufman’s telling of it, this aura of interchangeability begins to envelop the list-keepers 
themselves, so that they all respond to the birds in the same way, with the same “standard reply.”)     
 e list-keepers’ casual dismissal of di erence might put us in mind of Mademoiselle O, Nabokov’s 
sometime governess, who, in one memorable scene from his autobiography, dismisses a carefully 
delineated series of Large Whites as just a bunch of “papillons de potager”:
One summer afternoon, in 1911, Mademoiselle came into my room, book in hand,
started to say she wanted to show me how wittily Rousseau denounced zoology (in 
favor of botany), and by then was too far gone in the gravitational process of 
lowering her bulk into an armchair to be stopped by my howl of anguish: on that 
seat I had happened to leave a glass-lidded cabinet tray with long, lovely series of the
Large White.  Her ﬁrst reaction was one of stung vanity: her weight, surely, could 
not be accused of damaging what in fact it had demolished; her second was to 
console me: Allons donc, ce ne sont que des papillons de potager! -- which only made 
matters worse.  A Sicilian pair recently purchased from Staudinger had been crushed
and bruised.  A huge Biarritz example was utterly mangled.  Smashed, too, were 
some of my choicest local captures.  Of these, an aberration resembling the 
Canarian race of the species might have been mended with a few drops of glue; but 
a precious gynandromorph, left side male, right side female, whose abdomen could 
not be traced and whose wings had come o , was lost forever: one might reattach 
the wings but one could not prove that all four belonged to that headless thorax on 
its bent pin.  Next morning, with an air of great mystery, poor Mademoiselle set o  
for St. Petersburg and came back in the evening bringing me (“something better 
than your cabbage butterﬂies”) a banal Urania moth mounted on plaster.  “How 
you hugged me, how you danced with joy!” she exclaimed, ten years later in the 
course of inventing a brand-new past (SM 127-128).
of instrumentalism out of nothing -- no list could disrupt Nabokov’s way of being with butterﬂies -- 
but it can enable such an atmosphere, encourage it, amplify it, help it along.    
45To Nabokov each White is unique, while to Mademoiselle they are all the same.  Like Kaufman’s 
birder, she never really sees the di erent specimens, and, in truth, she isn’t really all that interested in 
seeing them.  (Part of the comedy of the scene involves the fact that, having literally failed to see the 
butterﬂies at ﬁrst -- with disastrous results -- she persists in her blindness to them until the end.)  
Yet there’s a crucial di erence between the birder and Mademoiselle.  Mademoiselle’s response, 
one feels, derives from simple ignorance, a lack of knowledge, a gap in her experience.  She simply 
doesn’t know anything about butterﬂies -- or, presumably, “zoology” in general.
9  e birder’s 
blindness, by contrast, derives not from a lack of knowledge or even interest but rather from an 
outright refusal to look.  His is an active turning away: he rejects his fellow birders’ invitations to 
examine this or that bird in closer detail; he opts to stay indoors; he makes it through one trip 
without “look[ing] at a bird the whole time” (Kaufman 54) -- which, one supposes, must have taken 
some e ort.  Among other things, his example helps us to see how this way of valuing and 
encountering things only in terms of their instrumental value, their “usefulness to [one’s] current 
projects” (Wrathall 204), closes down other ways of valuing and encountering those same things.  It 
actively precludes the birder from delighting in the “spectacular” appearance or 
“fascinating...behavior” of a given bird, and, indeed, from recognizing its profound distinctness from 
any bird he has “seen before” (Kaufman 54).  Being one sort of thing -- an item on a list to be 
crossed o  -- a bird can’t be something else -- an existentially important object of beauty and wonder,
9. And, in fact, her larger response to the situation suggests anything but an instrumentalist 
attitude: she quickly recognizes the collection’s existential importance to Nabokov; the situation 
“make[s] a demand” on her; irrationally, uncommonsensically, she travels one hundred miles in one 
day to ﬁnd some compensation for his loss; and she returns from her journey with an exotic Urania 
moth (another rainbow!), “banal” to the young expert but, one assumes, quite wonderful to her.
46for example; or an independently signiﬁcant, intrinsically worthwhile being, valuable simply in 
itself.
10
*
 e example of Kaufman’s birder sheds light on what I have been calling “modern commonsense,” 
since modern commonsense, too, values things according to their “usefulness.”  It, too, represents an 
active, transformative way of orienting oneself toward things in the world.  It, too, reveals things to 
be interchangeable, scrubbed of distinctness and di erence.  And it, too, closes down other ways of 
revealing what things are.  But commonsense goes one step further than this, for in addition to 
evaluating things in terms of their “usefulness to our current projects,” it also evaluates the projects 
themselves.  By the standards of modern commonsense, a worthwhile project is one that beneﬁts our
material well-being: writing a book is only worthwhile if the book will “s-e-double-l” (Nabokov, LL 
380), and stopping to retrieve a child’s toy from a burning house is not worthwhile at all.  From this 
perspective, Kaufman’s birder represents a good example of the instrumentalist attitude but an 
10. Kaufman’s anecdote also illustrates the close connection between intrinsic value and existential 
importance.  When something is deeply important to our self-realization, it is easier to recognize its 
own intrinsic worth; and, conversely, orienting ourselves toward things in a way that allows them to 
show up as being inherently worthwhile makes it more likely that they will become existentially 
important for us.   e more time a birder spends acknowledging the birds’ “signiﬁcance independent
of their usefulness” to her practice of birding -- by, for example, learning about and closely observing 
them, attending to their “fascinating...behavior of the moment” -- the dearer they will become to her,
the more central to her birding practice and to her identity as a birder.  By the same logic, orienting 
herself toward the birds in a way that denies or occludes their intrinsic value -- by, say, maintaining “a
continued emphasis on just ﬁnding and checking o  new species” and otherwise “refus[ing] to look” 
at them -- will stunt and limit her “development as a naturalist and...ability to learn more,” and thus 
diminish their existential importance for her as well.   
47imperfect example of commonsense.  For though he approaches his project in an almost absurdly 
“commonsensical” way, the project itself serves no obvious material purpose.  Why does he go on 
those birding trips year after year?  What point is there, really, to accumulating bird names on a list?  
His situation contains a redemptive dash of “the irrational, the illogical, the inexplicable” after all 
(Nabokov, LL 377).
 e Monstrousness of Modern Commonsense
To this point modern commonsense, with its emphasis on material realities, instrumental value, 
generalization and quantiﬁcation, might yet seem like mere, as Nabokov might say, “philistinism,” or
else a pitiable a iction of a “few sad individuals” (Kaufman 54).  But modern commonsense is really
more formidable than this.  Acknowledging the full extent of its “monst[rousness]” is important for 
us here (Nabokov, LL 380), as it helps us to recognize commonsense as a genuine counterweight to 
“the highest form[] of consciousness,” and generally to appreciate the gravity of Nabokov’s argument,
the seriousness that undergirds his lecture’s play and humor.
 Heidegger’s essay on “ e Question Concerning Technology” helps bring the full “threat” and 
“danger” of modern commonsense to light (332).  Heidegger’s essay, drafted, like “ e Art of 
Literature and Commonsense,” in the 1940s, similarly draws attention to the “monstrousness” of the
modern-technological “way of revealing” what things are (321; 318).  Heidegger’s vision is darker 
than Nabokov’s, and generally more extreme, but the comparison is especially useful for this reason.  
Heidegger shows us modern commonsense at its most monstrous.  His essay helps to clarify the 
stakes of Nabokov’s argument, by showing what the very highest possible stakes of such an argument 
might be.
48In “ e Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger argues that modern man, through a 
mysterious process called “enframing,” ﬁnds himself “challenge[d]...forth...to reveal the actual...as 
standing-reserve” (324).   at is, he ﬁnds himself called upon to “exploit the energies of nature” and,
moreover, to reveal nature to be a mere resource, a supplier of energy, something to be regulated, 
ordered, and secured, so that it is always “at our command” (323), “immediately on hand” and “on 
call for a further ordering” (322).   is revealing is enabled by the rise of modern math and science, 
whose “way of representing pursues and entraps nature as a calculable coherence of forces” and which
insists that “nature report itself in some way or other that is identiﬁable through calculation and that 
it remain orderable as a system of information” (326; 328).  To illustrate what this modern way of 
revealing looks like, Heidegger o ers the example of a “hydroelectric plant set into the current of the 
Rhine”:
It sets the Rhine to supplying its hydraulic pressure, which then sets the turbines 
turning.   is turning sets those machines in motion whose thrust sets going the 
electric current for which the long-distance power station and its network of cables 
are set up to dispatch electricity.  In the context of the interlocking processes 
pertaining to the orderly disposition of electrical energy, even the Rhine itself 
appears to be something at our command.   e hydroelectric plant is not built into 
the Rhine River as was the old wooden bridge that joined bank with bank for 
hundreds of years.  Rather, the river is dammed up into the power plant.  What the 
river is now, namely, a water-power supplier, derives from the essence of the power station
(my italics).
 e “revealing that rules throughout modern technology” changes what the river is, transforms it 
into a resource, into “standing-reserve” -- an outcome Heidegger describes as “monstrous[]” (321).
Here a comparison with Nabokov’s critique of “commonsense...and its calculating machine” is 
hard to resist (LL 374): modern commonsense, too, presents things as being “orderable,” available, 
“identiﬁable through calculation,” valuable because useful; it, too, is enabled by the progress of 
49modern math and physics; it, too, is “monstrous[].”  In “ e Question Concerning Technology,” 
though, Heidegger describes this ordering phenomenon as a deep, pervasive, powerful, 
transformative “way of revealing” what things are.   e comparison suggests that Nabokov’s modern 
commonsense might be even more formidable than it ﬁrst appears.  It suggests that modern 
commonsense, at its worst, might represent more than just a collection of pernicious habits, values, 
attitudes, and precepts, easily dropped, picked up, or, as in his lecture’s cathartic conclusion, “shot 
dead” (LL 380).  It might, instead, represent a whole, entrenched way of being in the world, 
expressed in what we do, how we think, how we value things, who we are -- a way of being that 
changes, in a deep way, what the world is for us.  Not just birds, but everything; not just for a few 
sad individuals, but for everyone.  And Nabokov does, in fact, occasionally describe commonsense in
this way, as a pervasive, transformative way of approaching the world.   is, I think, is the meaning 
behind his warning that “everything is comfortably cheapened by its touch” (LL 372): commonsense 
touches everything, devalues everything, changes what “everything is.”  His joke about the geologist 
who “may one day discover, as his spade rings against metal, the solid barrel hoop of the equator” 
speaks to the scale and the completeness of this change.  Over time, he suggests, the “whole 
world...turned out to be based on numbers” not just for a few sad individuals, but for everyone save 
a few thousand “fellow dreamers” (LL 373).   e image of the “solid barrel hoop equator” suggests 
that this commonsensical sensibility may run deeper than we know.  
But Heidegger goes further than this in “ e Question Concerning Technology.”  He draws 
attention to two further problems with the modern-technological “way of revealing.”  One is that, in 
revealing everything “exclusively as standing-reserve,” we may eventually come to reveal ourselves in 
the same way:
50As soon as what is unconcealed no longer concerns man even as object, but 
exclusively as standing-reserve, and man in the midst of objectlessness is nothing 
but the orderer of the standing-reserve, then he comes to the brink of a precipitous 
fall; that is, he comes to the point where he himself will have to be taken as 
standing-reserve (332).
 e other is that we may ﬁnd ourselves without access to any other way of revealing.   is, Heidegger
writes, is the “extreme danger.”   e modern way of revealing “drives out every other possibility of 
revealing” and thus “blocks the shining-forth and holding sway of truth” (332-333).  
Here, too, Heidegger’s essay alerts us to darker possibilities within Nabokov’s discussion of 
modern commonsense.  For example, it helps us to see that commonsense, too, threatens to reveal 
not only things but people in a commonsense way.  It prompts us to understand our “fair but frail 
neighbors” in instrumental terms, as resources to be “exploit[ed]” (Nabokov, LL 372), and it invites 
us to think of even the “loveliest woman” as a mere complex of biological processes and chemical 
“formula[s]” (378).  And it, too, threatens to close down other possibilities of revealing what things 
are.  Nabokov suggests that commonsense, with its authoritative explanations, its conﬁdence in its 
own methods and rationalized standards of proof, may preclude us from experiencing other, deeper -
- Heidegger might say “more primal” (“Question” 333) -- truths: 
...[C]ommonsense will point out that life on earth, from the barnacle to the goose, 
and from the humblest worm to the loveliest woman, arose from a colloidal 
carbonaceous slime activated by ferments while the earth was obligingly cooling 
down.  Blood may well be the Silurian sea in our veins, and we are all ready to 
accept evolution at least as a modal formula.  Professor Pavlov’s bell-hopping mice 
and Dr. Gri th’s rotating rats may please the practical minds, and Rhumbler’s 
artiﬁcial amoeba can make a very cute pet.  But again it is one thing to try and ﬁnd 
the links and steps of life, and it is quite another to try and understand what life and
the phenomenon of inspiration really are (LL 378; my italics).
Heidegger, then, helps us to appreciate just how formidable a foe modern commonsense, at its 
51worst, might be.  For if commonsense represents a deep, pervasive way of understanding what things 
are; if it threatens to reveal people in a commonsense way; if it deprives us of un-commonsensical 
ways of revealing, then how can it be overcome?  If “newspaper editors” only run commonsensical 
stories (Nabokov, LL 373); if their op-eds always take a commonsense point of view; if publishers 
refuse to publish books that will not “s-e-double-l” (380); if commonsense “back-kick[s] dirt” over all
the new artists; if it silences the “prophet,” turns on the “enchanter,” puts the poet “to death” (372); 
if “ugly but strong nations” disrupt old ways of life and institutions (372-373); if everything is so 
cheapened by commonsense that it can no longer so much as make a demand on us -- what will be 
left for us to encounter but commonsense?  From here we can see that the truly awful thing about 
commonsense is its potential to so dramatically reshape the world in its own image, right down to 
the “inner skeleton,” that it can seem impossible to get outside of or around (374). 
And yet we shouldn’t confuse the worst possible scenario for commonsense with what Nabokov 
actually says.  Heidegger’s essay is helpful because, in showing us just how monstrous commonsense 
might be, it helps us recognize modern commonsense as something more serious, threatening, and 
formidable than Nabokov’s playful tone and conﬁdent posture can sometimes make it seem.  But it is
also helpful inasmuch as it allows us to appreciate how far Nabokov’s vision falls short of Heidegger’s 
own.   e point of Nabokov’s lecture isn’t that there will soon be no escape from commonsense, but 
rather that, strangely enough, in spite of its persistence and danger, its pervasiveness and power, the 
rule of commonsense will never be complete.   ere will always be those few fellow dreamers, 
irrational optimists, freaks and indignant artists lodging their quiet, or not-so-quiet, protests against 
the monster of grim commonsense.  Just where their freedom comes from is a mystery that belongs 
in the lecture’s “[two pages missing]” with other “irrational...illogical...inexplicable” mysteries of life 
52(LL 377).  But Nabokov’s trust in it remains a central part of his creative creed. 
So Di erent from Commonsense 
Let’s return, then, to the question that prompted this chapter.  What does all this -- this elaboration 
of the meaning of “commonsense” -- tell us about the form of consciousness that lies opposite 
“commonsense and its logic”?  What would it mean to be “so di erent from” commonsense?
First, it tells us that such a form of consciousness would allow things (and people, and practices) 
to show up as having more than just instrumental importance; as being both valuable to our own 
self-realization and valuable in themselves; as being capable of “making demands” on us.  It would 
attune us to singularity and di erence, and reveal things as being unique, rather than 
interchangeable.  It would also be essentially “reverent,” in the philosopher Paul Woodru ’s sense of 
the term.  Woodru  deﬁnes reverence as a “capacity to be in awe of whatever we believe lies outside 
our control,” a capacity often expressed in, but without any necessary connection to, religious ritual 
and feeling (3).  Commonsense, in its conviction that everything is either explicable or else unreal, is,
from this perspective, irreverent.  Nabokov’s alliance with “the irrational, the illogical, the 
inexplicable,” on the other hand, suggests a reverent capacity for awe at what lies beyond our control:
the “wild magic” of artistic inspiration, for example (LL 378); the question of what happens to us 
when we die; the “miraculous” processes of nature, and the uncanny “subtlety, exuberance, and 
luxury” of its design (SM 125). 
Second, it tells us that this form of consciousness must represent more than just a collection of 
assertions and beliefs.  If commonsense is best understood as a way of disposing oneself toward the 
world, and, moreover, a way of revealing and understanding what things are, then this form of 
53consciousness must be too.  As such it can’t be something about which we can simply be convinced 
by means of isolated arguments and examples, no matter how good those examples and arguments 
may be.  To the extent that it can be acquired, it must be by a more comprehensive means: by 
example and argument, yes, but also by a fuller, perhaps vicarious, immersion in this way of 
orienting oneself toward things, and in the enactment of certain uncommonsensical habits and 
practices of our own.
Insofar as it would intensify our sense of the degree to which things matter, both to us and in 
themselves, and insofar as this heightened sense of value represents a deeper truth about the world 
than that revealed by commonsense, this form of consciousness would seem a plausible candidate for
the “highest form[] of consciousness” there is.  
 
54CHAPTER THREE:
Speak, Memory and the Highest Form of Consciousness
By this point we’ve deﬁned the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes”; we’ve described the opposite of 
“commonsense”; and in the process we’ve suggested what it might mean for something to be, in 
Nabokov’s view, the “highest form[] of consciousness.”  If we put these explanations together, we 
have an answer to our original question: how should we understand Nabokov's most extravagant 
statements?  How should we make sense of his "irrational standards"?  How can the "capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes" be the "highest form[] of consciousness" there is?
We can make sense of those statements, I have argued, by understanding the “capacity to wonder
at triﬂes” as an attunement -- a cultivable, durable way of disposing oneself toward the world that 
allows the most undervalued, under-noticed parts of that world to show up as occasions for surprise, 
delight, curiosity, and speculation.  We can now see that what makes this attunement a plausible 
candidate for the “highest form of consciousness” is that it allows things -- even seemingly useless, 
unremarkable things -- to show up as intrinsically and existentially worthwhile.  In short, it locates us
in a world in which things really matter, for us and in themselves.
It does all this in deﬁance of “commonsense,” which would have things show up as mattering 
less, in fewer ways, or not at all.  Commonsense -- particularly what I have been calling “modern 
commonsense” -- is, as we’ve seen, a formidable, robust, transformative orientation toward the world 
that threatens to  “cheapen[]” “everything” (Nabokov, LL 372), to deplete things of meaning and 
value.  By pitting “the capacity to wonder at triﬂes” against commonsense, then, Nabokov suggests 
55that it, too, is formidable, robust, transformative.   is power would be less apparent if Nabokov had
opposed the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” to states of simple loss or lack, states deﬁned less by what 
they are than by what they are not: jadedness, for example (a diminishment of the capacity for 
surprise); dullness (a diminishment of the capacity for delight); indi erence, apathy, boredom, 
enervation.  Instead, he opposes the capacity to wonder at triﬂes to a forbidding, pervasive, 
ideologically powerful sensibility -- one which has real e ects in the real world, and which is 
animated by clearly outlined values of its own.  For Nabokov, the capacity to wonder at triﬂes isn't 
just a pleasant mood, a vague sense of openness and appreciation.  It's a strong and active stance 
toward the world, set over against a strong and serious foe.
But how, exactly, does one become attuned to the world in this way?  And how, exactly, does a 
readiness to “wonder at triﬂes” attune us to the extra-instrumental importance of things?   is is a 
major topic of Nabokov’s autobiography, a book that begins, ﬁttingly, with a rebuke to “common 
sense” and concludes with a “blissful shock” of wonder (SM 19, 309).  In between, it shows us, with 
great speciﬁcity, a world revealed by the attunement we’ve been describing, and o ers a detailed, 
coherent account of how Nabokov came to have this particular orientation toward things, this 
particular way of being in the world.  As it traces the development of Nabokov’s own “capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes,” Speak, Memory shows us what it is to see, feel, encounter, experience things in this 
way, to live so that even trivial things “make...demand[s]” on oneself (Wrathall 200), in a world lit 
up by meaning.
A World Lit Up
56Speak, Memory presents us with a vision of the world which is polemically opposed to modern 
commonsense, as it appears in the light of the “highest form[] of consciousness.”  From the outset of 
his memoir, Nabokov frames this way of orienting oneself, this readiness for wonder and meaning, as
a rebellious inversion of common sense.  Common sense tells us that “our existence is but a brief 
crack of light between two eternities of darkness,” and would have us accept the ﬁnal insigniﬁcance 
not only of triﬂes but of everything (19); Nabokov’s irrational standards insist that the opposite is 
true, that those “two black voids” are mere peripheral matters, and that the real story, the main story, 
adheres in the “extraordinary visions in between” (20).   ey imply that even the tiniest and most 
trivial of these visions have something remarkable about them, simply because they are or have been -
- are felt, are experienced, have been encountered, have been seen.  It’s easy, of course, to be skeptical 
about the claim that things matter, and are in a sense wondrous, just because they "are."  It can seem 
indulgent, capricious, and decadent.  But, Nabokov believes, "indulgent," "capricious," and 
"decadent" are exactly the sorts of terms used by the ideological regime of modern commonsense to 
prevent us from taking the possibility of such mattering seriously.
Let’s start with an example.  Near the end of Speak, Memory, Nabokov presents an image of his 
son Dmitri playing, as a small child, by the seashore.   e passage shows us what it means for triﬂes 
to show up as occasions for wonder, and for things generally to show up as “important,” as having 
value outside of their “usefulness to our current projects,” as capable of making demands on us.   e 
“you” invoked here is, of course, his wife Véra:
Graded gardens on hillsides, a succession of terraces whose every stone step ejected a
gaudy grasshopper, dropped from ledge to ledge seaward, with the olives and the 
oleanders fairly toppling over each other in their haste to obtain a view of the beach.
 ere our child kneeled motionless to be photographed in a quivering haze of sun 
against the scintillation of the sea, which is a milky blur in the snapshots we have 
57preserved but was, in life, silvery blue, with great patches of purple-blue farther out, 
caused by warm currents in collaboration with and corroboration of (hear the 
pebbles rolled by the withdrawing wave?) eloquent old poets and their smiling 
similes.  And among the candy-like blobs of sea-licked glass -- lemon, cherry, 
peppermint -- and the banded pebbles, and the little ﬂuted shells with lustered 
insides, sometimes small bits of pottery, still beautiful in glaze and color, turned up. 
 ey were brought to you or me for inspection, and if they had indigo chevrons, or 
bands of leaf ornament, or any kind of gay emblemata, and were judged precious, 
down they went with a click into the toy pail, and, if not, a plop and a ﬂash marked
their return to the sea.  I do not doubt that among those slightly convex chips of 
majolica ware found by our child there was one whose border of scrollwork ﬁtted 
exactly, and continued, the pattern of a fragment I had found in 1903 on the same 
shore, and that the two tallied with a third my mother had found on that Mentone 
beach in 1882, and with a fourth piece of the same pottery that had been found by 
her mother a hundred years ago -- and so on, until this assortment of parts, if all 
had been preserved, might have been put together to make the complete, the 
absolutely complete, bowl, broken by some Italian child, God knows where and 
when, and now mended by these rivets of bronze (308-309).
 e scene is built up almost entirely out of “triﬂes” -- small, useless, ordinary things “of little value or
importance”: pebbles and shells, pieces of glass, small bits of pottery, “parts” and “patches,” “chips” 
and “fragment[s].”  Common sense wouldn’t make much of these things, if it made anything of them
at all.  But for Nabokov they show up quite di erently.  For him, the patches of sea, the blobs of 
glass, and the bits of pottery show up as occasions for surprise, delight, curiosity -- wonder.   e 
purple-blue patches of sea stand out for him, surprising and satisfying in their corroboration of 
Homer’s lines.   e sea glass stands out for him, too, delightful in its unlikely resemblance to candy, 
whose color, shape, size, texture, and translucence it cheerfully mimics.  Together the sea and the sea 
glass form another of those minor rainbows, those modest emblems of wonder collected in the ﬁrst 
chapter of this study: cherry red, lemon yellow, minty green and purple-blue.  Even the pebbles and 
shells are striking in their way.  “Banded” and “lustered” like the majolica ware, with its beautiful 
glazes and “bands of leaf ornament,” they are intriguingly evocative of “man-wrought things” (SM 
58124).  
A fuller example of what it means to “wonder at triﬂes,” though, can be found in Nabokov’s 
response to those chips of majolica, those little bits of pottery that just “turn[] up” on occasion on 
the shore.   ese, too, are surprising, beautiful, intriguing; and these, too, provide Nabokov with a 
certain delight of recognition, inasmuch as they remind him of similar pieces he found and 
“judged...precious” as a child.   ey’re a little mysterious; they stir his curiosity: he wonders about 
where they came from, how and when they came to be broken.   e passage concludes in a richly 
“speculative” mood, with Nabokov seeming to wonder about other, stranger things: the patterns of 
family history and inheritance; the larger picture into which he ﬁts; the limits and possibilities of 
what can be recovered and restored. 
Here, as in “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense,” Nabokov implicitly identiﬁes this 
wondering mood as the natural attunement of young children (Dmitri seems to be “about four”) 
(307), for whom triﬂes show up as wonderful much the time, and who naturally deem “precious” 
precisely those things that common sense would ignore.  Nabokov portrays these two “childish[]” 
capacities -- the capacity to experience triﬂes as occasions for wonder, and the capacity to experience 
things as deeply, intrinsically worthwhile -- as two parts, or two faces, of the same attunement.  
Wondering at triﬂes is valuing things apart from their “usefulness.”  It presupposes that value, and it 
also helps to reveal that value, by encouraging us to admit things to “inspection”; to carefully 
distinguish one thing from another; to handle things with attention and care; to approach things as 
though they had already been judged by someone to be “precious.”  In taking time to attend carefully
to each piece of majolica, to “wonder at” it, to note the unique details of its design and its unique 
place in some as-yet-unrecovered whole, Nabokov and Véra and Dmitri a rm the value and reality 
59of that speciﬁc piece, its irreplaceability by any other.  Even the chips they decide not to keep have a 
certain weightiness about them, reﬂected in the satisfying “plop and...ﬂash” they make as they are 
thrown back into the sea, and in the fact that they, too, have been held and inspected, and that they, 
too, will be remembered one day.  We might compare the fate of those unwanted chips to that of the
birds in Chapter Two, unlooked at and unconsidered, rejected in advance, and which therefore 
seemed to have, for Kaufman’s birder, hardly any existence at all.  
Finally, the scene shows us how this attunement allows things to show up as not only intrinsically
but “existentially” important.  Once we allow things to show up as having value apart from their 
“usefulness to our current projects,” then they can begin to make real demands on us, really matter to
us, show up as important for our “self-realization” (Wrathall 204; 200).   e chips are shown to have
this sort of deep, personal importance for Dmitri and for his father, too.  Dmitri, for example, puts 
them at the center of a whole rich, absorbing, pleasurable activity of hunting, encountering, 
collecting, sharing, inspecting, comparing, appraising, admiring, sorting, rejecting and keeping.  His 
activity recalls, and I think is meant to recall, the activity of two other hunters in the book: Nabokov,
who hunts butterﬂies, and Nabokov’s mother, who hunts mushrooms.   e connection suggests that 
Dmitri’s activity really matters to him, or at least that it might, in the way that Nabokov’s butterﬂies 
really matter to him or Elena Nabokov’s boletes really matter to her.  (In Nabokov’s case, certainly, it 
would not be an exaggeration to say that his passion for butterﬂies is integral to his “self-realization,” 
and that without it he would “cease to be who [he is]”) (Wrathall 200).   e majolica chips assume 
existential importance for Nabokov as well.  For him, these “slightly convex chips of majolica ware” 
matter because they assert the continuity of his son’s life with his own, and theirs with his mother’s, 
and theirs with her mother’s, “and so on.”   ey testify to a whole family history and context -- 
60shared patterns of experience, shared temperaments, shared memories -- without which he would 
“cease to be who [he is].”  In this way, these broken bits of pottery, valueless from any 
commonsensical point of view, “make a demand” on both the father and the child (Wrathall 200).
11  
 e passage, then, shows what it means to be disposed to the world in such a way that triﬂes 
show up as occasions for wonder, and things generally show up for us as “important,” as capable of 
making demands on us.   is is, of course, ultimately an argument about Nabokov’s style as much as 
it is about his way of being in the world, for it describes that style as an evocation of that way of 
being.  It might, however, be objected that Nabokov’s way of representing things in this passage is 
actually nothing more than a way of representing, that his obsessively precise, intensely visual, detail-
oriented style is actually nothing more than style.  From this perspective, the passage, and by 
extension Speak, Memory, doesn’t reveal how things “show up” for Nabokov at all.  Instead, it shows 
how he manages to transform those things later, in the process of writing.  It tells us something about
the eye of Nabokov the artist, in his bathtub, on his bed, in a car, on a lounge chair with his pencil 
and his index cards, not Nabokov the man, encountering things in the world, whoever and whatever 
that is.  
We’ll be looking more closely at the meaning of Nabokov’s style at the close of this study; for 
now, though, su ce it to say that seeing the passage as pure style would be just as wrong as seeing it 
11. Here it is worth noting that while Nabokov associates the capacity to wonder at triﬂes with the
life and mind of the child, his own wondering activity exceeds the capacities of a child's
consciousness. Nabokov's relationship to the majolica chips is elegiac, historical, richly imaginative,
the work of an adult consciousness with a broader awareness of time and of the world. In this way
the passage, though focused on Dmitri, gives us a sense of sophisticated, and how enduring, this
wondering activity can be.
61as a record of pure, unmediated experience.  Of course it’s true that no one, apart from Nabokov 
himself, could say how things actually showed up for him -- whether the sea glass really stood out for 
him so brightly on that beach, or whether the pieces of pottery really seemed so weighted with 
importance.  What we can say is that Nabokov tells us that this is how things show up for him, not 
just in writing, not just in retrospect, but in real life.  He tells us in “ e Art of Literature and 
Commonsense” when he describes his irrational standards; and he also tells us by means of his 
stylistic choices, by the way he draws attention to things, and by the words he uses to describe them. 
When he recalls, early on in Speak, Memory, that “there was usually a carnation in the buttonhole of”
his Uncle Ruka’s “dove-gray, mouse-gray or silver-gray summer suit” (SM 69), he tells us something 
about his Uncle Ruka, and he tells us something about himself: that he, Nabokov, is someone on 
whom triﬂes are not lost; that he registered the di erent shades of his uncle’s suits back then; and 
that, moreover, it was important to have registered those subtle di erences in color, just as it is 
important to retrieve them with precision now.  When he tells us that the majolica chips “click[ed]” 
on their way into the pail and “plop[ped]” on their way into the water, and the sea glass was red and 
yellow and green, and the pottery sometimes had indigo chevrons on it and at other times had little 
leaves, he’s telling us much the same thing: that this is actually how the world shows up for someone 
who, unfettered by commonsense, has learned to wonder at triﬂes.
Nabokov’s style, in other words, is always polemical -- always expressive of his irrational 
standards, and an argument for them.   is is true in Speak, Memory, and often true, in a more 
complicated way, in his novels.  It’s important, though, to see that this expressive, implicitly 
polemical style represents more than “propaganda on behalf of good noticing” (James Wood, HFW 
63), or an a rmation of the fact that such noticing will help us to “enrich [our] whole li[ves]” 
62(Boyd, American 174).  Instead, it’s expressive of a whole way of being, of approaching and 
encountering things, of orienting oneself in the world.   is attunement can’t be reduced to a set of 
propositions, easily taken up or cast aside; and so it isn’t best represented by means of propositions.  
Better simply to show us what things look like in the light of it, better to show us by means of style.
Loving, Learning, Looking: a History of an Attunement
Speak, Memory, however, is more than a description of an attunement. It is also a history: it shows us
how one comes to be attuned to the world in this way.   e memoir is strewn with clues to the 
mystery of where Nabokov’s own prodigious “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” came from.  Overall these
clues suggest that that attunement is partly something that ﬁnds Nabokov, and partly something he 
ﬁnds his way into.  It’s a product of his particular circumstances: the temperament he’s born with; 
the environment he grows up in; the examples he’s exposed to and absorbs.  And it’s also a product of
what he chooses to involve himself in, of his experiences and habits and practices.
What are some of the more important parts of that history?  First, Speak, Memory suggests that 
Nabokov was raised by people for whom things, even triﬂing things, showed up as having existential 
importance, and who modeled this orientation for him.  His mother is one such person:
To love with all one’s soul and leave the rest to fate, was the simple rule she heeded.  
“Vot zapomni [now remember],” she would say in conspiratorial tones as she drew 
my attention to this or that loved thing in Vyra -- a lark ascending the curds-and-
whey sky of a dull spring day, heat lightning taking pictures of a distant line of trees 
in the night, the palette of maple leaves on brown sand, a small bird’s cuneate 
footprints on new snow.  As if feeling that in a few years the tangible part of her 
world would perish, she cultivated an extraordinary consciousness of the various 
time marks distributed throughout our country place...Her special tags and imprints
became as dear and sacred to me as they were to her.   ere was the room which in 
the past had been reserved for her mother’s pet hobby, a chemical laboratory; there 
was the linden tree marking the spot, by the side of the road that sloped up toward 
63the village of Gryazno (accented on the ultima), at the steepest bit where one 
preferred to take one’s “bike by the horns”...as my father, a dedicated cyclist, liked to
say, and where he had proposed... (40).
Elena Nabokov is oriented to the world in such a way that things -- even very ordinary, triﬂing 
things -- show up as deeply important, as mattering to her, as capable of making demands on her.  
 e lark, the lightning, the linden, the leaves, the old laboratory and the little bird’s tracks all seem to
require of her that she “value them, respect them, respond to them,” and also that she share that 
sense of value with her son.  Some of these things, like the old room and the linden tree, matter 
because of their connection to some remembered person or event.  Memories, of course, always have 
“existential importance” for Nabokov -- even, especially, the earliest ones, and the most triﬂing ones, 
the ones we are most likely to forget.  Every page of Speak, Memory implies that without our 
memories “we would cease to be who we are,” and that we need to value and respect them “on pain 
of losing ourselves.”  Here his mother extends that sense of deep importance to the objects connected
with those memories: a certain room, a certain tree.   e other “loved thing[s]” in this passage matter
to her in a di erent way.   ey have value now, in the present, and not because of any intimate 
connection with the personal past: the strange and stunning lightning, the curious footprints, the 
cheering lark and pretty palette of leaves.   ese things, too, are worth noticing, worth remembering.
Nabokov, in fact, describes a whole early milieu in which ordinary things were routinely imbued 
with importance.  He remembers how his father would “piously pause” in a “certain spot in the 
forest, a footbridge across a brown brook” where a rare butterﬂy had once been caught for him (75).  
He recalls an early tutor’s manner of handling his toys -- some alphabet blocks -- “as if they were 
inﬁnitely precious things, which, for that matter, they were...” (28).  He connects Dmitri’s childhood
64activity at the beach to his own in a way that suggests that he, too, was used to having his seaside 
ﬁnds conﬁrmed by someone -- perhaps a governess -- as “precious.”  Most often, though, it is his 
mother who is at the center of such scenes.  Part of what her particular example adds to our 
understanding of the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” is that it connects this attunement -- this way of 
allowing things to “show up” -- to attitudes of a ection, tenderness, adoration, to the habit of loving 
things and holding them dear.  Nabokov describes his mother’s basic, even exclusive, orientation 
toward the world as one of “love”: “[t]o love with all one’s soul and leave the rest to fate was the 
simple rule she heeded.”  She approaches things with tenderness, devotion, and gratitude, a stance 
movingly summed up later by Nabokov in a single cherished image: that of his mother “getting 
down on her hands and knees to kiss the earth every time we came back to the country from town 
for the summer” (SM 249).  From this position, even the tiniest and most ordinary things show up 
for her as capable of being “loved,” of being held “dear” and “special” and “sacred.”  Her example 
suggests this feeling of “love” as an a ective component of what Nabokov calls the “highest form[] of
consciousness,” as part of the attunement that allows triﬂes to show up as occasions for wonder, and 
things generally to show up as important, as capable of making demands on us. 
Nabokov’s mother, then, “wonder[s] at triﬂes” herself, and models this attitude of wondering-at 
for him.  She also translates that attitude into a kind of practice.  She actively draws her son’s 
attention to “this or that” little thing at Vyra and encourages him to observe it, appreciate it, commit
it to memory, in the hope that he will acquire some of her own natural feeling for those things.  And,
eventually, he does.  Eventually “her special tags and imprints” become, as he says, “as dear and 
65sacred” to him as they are to her.
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Nabokov describes two other childhood pastimes or practices that seem likely to have expanded 
or at least supported his “capacity to wonder at triﬂes,” and which help to elucidate the connection 
between attending to triﬂes and allowing things to show up as important. Hunting butterﬂies is one. 
Earlier we noted that butterﬂies are objects of passionate wonder for Nabokov -- he prizes the “rare 
visitor” (120), the “uncommon” insect, the “remarkable new species” that will cause him to “stop 
with a quick intake of breath” (136; 132).  But he also wonders at these creatures more routinely: 
every venture into the “grassy wonderland” surrounding Vyra a ords some interest and surprise 
(136); “every hour and every season” of lepidopterological activity “ha[s] its delights” (135).  In both 
cases, his pleasure in butterﬂies depends on particular practices of close attention.  
 is is, in fact, a very special sort of attention, aimed at attuning oneself to very minute 
di erences between things.   e goal here is to be able to distinguish one thing from another, so that 
a given butterﬂy can show up as a member of a particular species, or subspecies, or rare aberration of 
that subspecies, rather than as just a Blue, or a butterﬂy, or a bug.  It requires acts of close attention 
12. He’s brought up, moreover, in a world that is easy to love.  As the eldest son of two adoring 
parents, endowed with an expansive intelligence and with what Richard Rorty aptly describes as an 
“eccentrically large capacity for joy” (Rorty 155), Nabokov really does seem to have enjoyed, as he 
claims, “the harmonious world of a perfect childhood” (SM 24).   e elegant interiors of Morskaya 
Street, the Arcadian environs of Vyra, the sparkling beaches of Biarritz could hardly have been 
resistant to being loved, down to the smallest detail, by a well-loved child.  Nabokov, of course, 
writes Speak, Memory with a keen and even painful awareness of his own privilege.  He observes, for 
example, that his younger brother Sergey, though also intelligent, sensitive, and artistic, and very 
close to Nabokov in looks and age, was not quite as well-loved.  “I was the coddled one,” he asserts, 
“he, the witness of coddling.”  Nabokov seems to imagine that for Sergey, with his stammer, his 
inconvenient homosexuality, and his “bully” of an older brother, the world must have shown up as 
harsher and less perfectly harmonious place (257).  In drawing attention to Sergey -- something he 
does throughout Speak, Memory -- Nabokov underscores, among other things, his awareness of the 
contingency of his own early happiness.
66and comparison -- attention to the details of a butterﬂy’s appearance or behavior, comparison with 
other butterﬂies like it.  Notably, Nabokov suggests that in order to really see a thing you need to be 
familiar with the general category of thing to which it belongs: to appreciate the aberration, you have
to be acquainted with the norm.  In this case, you have to have some familiarity with butterﬂies, 
whether from books, or journals, or museums, or experiences in the ﬁeld, and the more you know 
about them, the better.  Nabokov implies that such knowledge, far from inhibiting one’s perception 
of the particular, is in fact often necessary for it: it’s the background against which particular things 
show up as what they particularly are. 
 ese practices of close attention and informed comparison are part of a general stance or 
attunement that allows things to show up as highly speciﬁc, one-of-a-kind.   us what shows up as 
just a brown butterﬂy for Mademoiselle shows up as one particular Small Pearl-bordered Fritillary to 
Nabokov, and what is “just another gray moth to the reader” shows up as a “dark aberration of 
Sievers’ Carmelite” for him (132).  Here the contrast between Nabokov and Kaufman’s birder is 
immediate and obvious: Nabokov always attends closely where the birder would turn away, because 
even the most ordinary animal, even an animal of a type or species one has already seen, might turn 
out to be extraordinary -- particularly rare, or beautiful, or otherwise interesting.  Nothing can be 
dismissed out of hand; every creature must be looked at, considered; and its details must be so closely
observed that even the slightest variation can impress itself upon the observer.  Eventually this 
attunement -- this alertness to and expectation of di erence -- enables things to show up as new, 
surprising, wonderful:
 at summer I had been collecting assiduously on moonless nights, in a glade of the
park, by spreading a bedsheet over the grass and its annoyed glowworms, and 
casting upon it the light of an acytelene lamp...Into that area of radiance, moths 
67would come drifting out of the solid blackness around me, and it was in that 
manner, upon that magic sheet, that I took a beautiful Plusia (now Phytometra) 
which, as I saw at once, di ered from its closest ally by its mauve-and-maroon 
(instead of golden-brown) forewings, and narrower bractea mark and was not 
recognizably ﬁgured in any of my books (134).
In the ﬁgure of the acytelene lamp, Nabokov o ers an elegant image for this attunement: an “area of 
radiance” which draws things out of darkness and allows them to show up “at once” as rare, 
beautiful, distinct, individual, unprecedented, delightful, curious, and strange.
 ese practices of attention, then, allow rare and peculiarly beautiful things, like the unusual 
Plusia and the uncommon Carmelite, to show up as rare and peculiarly beautiful.  But they also 
allow more common, everyday creatures to show up as individual and unique -- and unique things, 
especially unique living things, are always, for Nabokov, compelling.   us even the most resolutely 
ordinary species show up for him as worthy of notice.  Sometimes, in fact, he tells us, the most 
“exquisite pleasure” is to be found in the most familiar things:
...when you walk, especially in a region you have studied well, there is an exquisite 
pleasure in departing from one’s itinerary to visit, here and there by the wayside, this
glade, that glen, this or that combination of soil and ﬂora - to drop in, as it were, on
a familiar butterﬂy in his particular habitat, in order to see if he has emerged, and if 
so, how he is doing (137).
It’s not so much that “this” butterﬂy, in “this or that” particular location, doing “this” particular 
thing, shows up for Nabokov as being as strikingly rare, as stunning and memorable, as the member 
of a species he has never encountered before.   e truth is simpler and more plausible than that.  It’s 
simply that this “familiar butterﬂy” shows up for him as being utterly individual, utterly itself, and 
that that perfect, irreproducible individuality, apparent even in so common a thing, is, for Nabokov, 
always remarkable. 
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thing, never ﬁnds himself in the position of Kaufman’s birder -- dismissive of common things he 
knows too well, jaded, bored, inert, waiting around for something new and unusual to manifest 
itself.  At one point, recounting a particular outing in the ﬁelds around Vyra, he does distinguish 
between some “familiar insects” and the promise of ﬁnding “something better” -- that is, rarer; 
something like the “uncommon Hairstreak” he once reached for but failed to catch.  Yet even these 
familiar, usual, common, everyday, ordinary insects show up as fascinating in their way:
Very fresh, very dark Arran Browns, which emerged only every second year...ﬂitted 
among the ﬁrs or revealed their red markings and checkered fringes as they sunned 
themselves on the roadside bracken.  Hopping above the grass, a diminutive Ringlet
called Hero dodged my net.  Several moths, too, were ﬂying -- gaudy sun lovers that
sail from ﬂower to ﬂower like painted ﬂies, or male insomniacs in search of hidden 
females, such as that rust-colored Oak Eggar hurtling across the shrubbery.  I 
noticed (one of the major mysteries of my childhood) a soft pale green wing caught 
in a spider’s web (by then I knew what it was: part of a Large Emerald).   e 
tremendous larva of the Goat Moth, ostentatiously segmented, ﬂat-headed, ﬂesh-
colored and glossily ﬂushed, a strange creature ‘as naked as a worm’ to use a French 
comparison, crossed my path in frantic search for a place to pupate (the awful 
pressure of metamorphosis, the aura of a disgraceful ﬁt in a public place)...From a 
ﬂower head two male Coppers rose to a tremendous height, ﬁghting all the way up -
- and then, after a while, came the downward ﬂash of one of them returning to his 
thistle.   ese were familiar insects, but at any moment something better might 
cause me to stop with a quick intake of breath (131-132).
 ese are familiar insects, but not overly familiar; there’s no aura here of weariness here, no boredom,
no shrug of “just another”: just another Arran Brown, just another Oak Eggar.   e gesture is instead, 
here and always, “this particular”: this particular Copper, ﬂying upward, ﬂashing down; this particular
Ringlet, artfully dodging the net.  Each creature is shown to be doing something distinct and 
unrepeatable in space and time, as exhibiting some interesting behavior or another.  And each shows 
up for him as an occasion -- a small occasion -- for surprise, delight, curiosity, or speculation.   e 
69newborn Arran Browns surprise and delight him; the comical Oak Eggar amuses him; the mysterious
moth wing stirs his curiosity; the larva’s behavior is a source of interest and speculation.  In short, his 
practice of attending closely to things, of noticing small details and small di erences, allows the ﬁelds
and forests of Vyra to show up for him as, in his words, a “wonderland” (136).
Nabokov describes one last childhood activity that seems likely to have supported the 
development of his “capacity to wonder at triﬂes.”  In “1907 or 1908,” just a short while after 
catching his ﬁrst butterﬂy, Nabokov began to study with a series of drawing masters: his mother’s 
former teacher, Mr. Cummings; S. P. Yaremich, a “well-known ‘impressionist’”; and, ﬁnally, “the 
celebrated” Mstislav Dobuzhinsky (92), described by Brian Boyd as a “master of the ﬁne line, who 
did for St. Petersburg what Canaletto did for Venice” (Russian Years 103).  Drawing and painting 
were, for Nabokov, very pleasurable activities, and he seems to have spent much of his childhood 
engaged in them.  He seems also to have seriously considered painting as a vocation.  “I think I was 
born a painter,” he once told an interviewer.  “[U]p to my fourteenth year, perhaps, I used to spend 
most of the day drawing and painting and I was supposed to become a painter in due time.”  
Eventually, though, he decided that he didn’t have “any real talent there,” and by ﬁfteen was spending
more time writing poems than making pictures (SO 17).  
Still, he tells us, these experiences had a lasting e ect on him, inasmuch as they initiated him 
into new habits and practices of attention.  Training his hand meant training his eye; learning to 
draw meant learning to see things better.  Dobuzhinski in particular encouraged Nabokov to attend 
very closely to the world around him, reinforcing the pattern set by his mother and his “mania” for 
butterﬂies (SM 126).  Here, though, the immediate purpose of that attention is somewhat di erent.  
Dobuzhinski encourages him to study things closely not in order to “cherish[]” them or to 
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...Dobuzhinski...liked to give me his lessons on the piano nobile of our house, in one
of its pretty reception rooms downstairs, which he entered in a particularly noiseless
way as if afraid to startle me from my verse-making stupor.  He made me depict 
from memory, in the greatest possible detail, objects I had certainly seen thousands 
of times without visualizing them properly: a street lamp, a postbox, the tulip design
on the stained glass of our own front door.  He tried to teach me to ﬁnd the 
geometrical coordinations between the slender twigs of a leaﬂess boulevard tree, a 
system of visual give-and-takes, requiring a precision of linear expression, which I 
failed to achieve in my youth, but applied gratefully, in my adult instar, not only to 
the drawing of butterﬂy genitalia during my seven years at the Harvard Museum of 
Comparative Zoology, when immersing myself in the bright wellhole of a 
microscope to record in India ink this or that new structure; but also, perhaps, to 
certain camera-lucida needs of literary composition (92).
Nabokov credits these lessons -- and, presumably, all those many hours he spent “drawing and 
painting” as a child -- with showing him the di erence between just “see[ing]” things and really 
“visualizing them properly.”  Apprehending things with su cient clarity to accurately reproduce 
them later, whether in paint or in prose, requires a special kind of attention: close, deep, patient, 
prolonged.  In How to Use Your Eyes, a kind of manual for “visualizing [things] properly,” the art 
historian James Elkins describes this way of looking as a way of “us[ing] your eyes more concertedly 
and with more patience than you might ordinarily do.  It’s about stopping and taking the time 
simply to look, and keep looking, until the details of your world slowly reveal themselves” (viii).
13  
13.  e idea that “the details of the world” require time and patience to “reveal themselves,” and that
this way of looking represents a departure from our more “ordinarily” rushed way of encountering 
things, is a familiar one.  “But we haven’t time, in this world of ours” laments Gaston Bachelard in 
 e Poetics of Space, “to love things and see them at close range, in the plenitude of their smallness...” 
(163).  In “ e Art of Literature and Commonsense,” Nabokov takes this notion one step further, 
ﬁguring the registration of detail as not only a departure from, but a form of irrational resistance to, 
the onslaught of time.  So Alice and the chimney sweep, in “stopping and taking the time simply to 
look, and keep looking” at things in spite of the fact that they “haven’t time,” in spite of the 
“imminent peril,” are shown to be engaged in an act of deﬁance against the tyranny of both time and
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colored by feeling, and more ﬁrmly grounded in the present.  It’s also di erent from the comparative,
informed, passionate attention Nabokov pays to butterﬂies, again because it’s less “existentially” 
engaged -- the street lamp and the postbox surely mean less to him than his butterﬂies -- and because
it focuses so completely and exclusively on the thing itself, rather than on the relation of that thing 
to other things -- nearby postboxes, remembered postboxes, the “general category” of the postbox.  It
directs itself squarely and unhurriedly to the thing at hand, seeking out the particular qualities of 
form, color, texture, luminance, and position that help make it what it uniquely is.
 is manner of looking at things supports the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” in a couple of ways. 
First, by helping details to show up, it helps make things, even triﬂing things, available for 
wondering-at: 
I especially love the strange feeling I get when I am looking at something and 
suddenly I understand -- the object has structure; it speaks to me.  What was once a 
shimmer on the horizon becomes a speciﬁc type of mirage, and it tells me about the
shape of the air I am walking through.  What was once a meaningless pattern on a 
butterﬂy’s wing becomes a code, and it tells me how that butterﬂy looks to other 
butterﬂies.  Even a postage stamp suddenly begins to speak about its time and place,
and the thought of the person who designed it (Elkins viii).
Elkins suggests that even triﬂing things, looked at closely and intensely enough, will “reveal 
themselves” as occasions for surprise, delight, curiosity, and speculation.  What’s true for Elkins of a 
postage stamp -- that by looking at it long enough he will reveal it as an occasion for wonder -- 
might be true for Nabokov of a postbox; it’s certainly true for him of the “pattern on a butterﬂy’s 
wing.”  In any event, this sort of deep, sustained, concentrated, clear-sighted attention to things 
commonsense.
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Second, this particular kind of deep, artistic attention represents yet another way of revealing 
things to be unique.  Here, though, that uniqueness is revealed not by comparing one thing to 
another but rather by looking at things in an extra-“ordinarily” close, deliberate, patient, concerted 
way.  Reproducing the image of something on paper with precision requires one to see it clearly, to 
apprehend the very precise conﬁgurations of line and color that make it what it is.  Dobuzhinski 
pushes Nabokov to apprehend things with even greater clarity than this, by challenging him to 
examine things with such intensity, and to get to know their particular characteristics so intimately, 
that he can accurately reproduce them even when they are no longer at hand.  For these exercises, he 
purposely selects very ordinary, commonly encountered subjects -- things Nabokov has seen 
“thousands of times before” -- and pushes him to see them as totally singular.   at sense of 
singularity comes about not by di erentiating things from one another (by, for example, noticing 
how this bare tree is di erent from that one) but rather by observing it (“the geometrical 
coordinations between [its] slender twigs”) in such perfect detail that it simply could not be mistaken
for anything else.
Finally, this perceptual training, in allowing things to show up as unique, contributes to an 
attunement that allows things to show up as important, as intrinsically signiﬁcant and capable of 
making demands.  So long as we see a postbox as just “a” postbox, interchangeable with any other, 
we’re likely to value it only in terms of its instrumental value, its “usefulness to our current projects” 
(Wrathall 204).   e postbox gets my letter from here to there, and it doesn’t matter if I use this one,
or if I use that one.  But if I attend to it in a way that invites it to show up not as a postbox but, 
rather, as this particular postbox, it now becomes possible to value it in other ways.  It now assumes, 
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of mailing a letter.  In this way it assumes a presence, a weightiness and a solidity, that it didn’t have 
earlier, and in this way it becomes really capable of “mak[ing]...demands.”  It might seem absurd to 
imagine Nabokov going around gaping at postboxes, “valu[ing],” “respect[ing]” and “respond[ing] to
them” (Wrathall 200).  Easier and more plausible to simply say that this deep attention readies us for 
the apprehension of meaning; it makes it possible for things, more things, a wider range of things, to
really matter to us.  In a sense, though, the image isn’t all that far-fetched, for this is, after all, 
precisely what it means to wonder at triﬂes.  In Speak, Memory, we don’t ﬁnd Nabokov responding to
any postboxes, but we do ﬁnd him responding in a profound way to all manner of unlikely things: “a
basket (stained blue on the inside by somebody’s whortleberries)” (44); “the bright, wet rubber of a 
gardener’s hose to which some of the gravel over which the hose has just slithered appears” (305); 
and, “[i]n a sweating glass jar, several spiny caterpillars...feeding on nettle leaves (and ejecting 
interesting, barrel-shaped pellets of olive-green frass”) (80).
Between a Gift and a Choice
Speak, Memory, then, describes three childhood pastimes that seem likely to have contributed to 
Nabokov’s “capacity to wonder at triﬂes”: his observation and emulation of his mother’s a ectionate 
attitude toward the little “loved thing[s]” in Vyra; his passion for and pursuit of butterﬂies; and his 
early training in the visual arts.  Each directs the attention to triﬂes -- tiny bird tracks on snow, the 
markings on a moth’s wing, the slender twigs of a tree; and each does so in a di erent way, and for a 
di erent reason -- whether to express one’s love for a place and to lovingly store up one’s experiences 
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well that they can be depicted later, from memory, with perfect accuracy.  In allowing triﬂes to show 
up as worthy of notice, moreover, these di erent practices help to allow things generally to show up 
as unique and important -- intrinsically important, existentially signiﬁcant, weighty, distinct, capable
of making demands -- capable, in short, of having real meaning for us, of mattering to us.
 ese examples, then, suggest how Nabokov came to be attuned to the world in a way that 
allowed triﬂes to show up for him as occasions for wonder.   ey draw a connection between “the 
capacity to wonder at triﬂes” and particular practices of loving, learning about, and looking at things 
in the world, and they show that Nabokov was introduced to these practices at a very early age.  
 ese were habitual, rather than just occasional, practices: painting and butterﬂy collecting were the 
twin passions of his youth, the activities that occupied him for “most of the day” as a child; and his 
whole early milieu seems to have been one in which little things routinely showed up as having 
existential importance, and one in which that importance was routinely pointed out, especially, but 
not exclusively, by his mother.  
On the whole, these examples suggest that this is an attunement Nabokov found himself in, 
rather than consciously chose, one day, to have; gradually embraced, rather than deliberately willed 
himself into.  His mother’s example, her way of prompting him to notice, love, and remember the 
things around him, his whole meaning-oriented milieu, were there for him from the beginning.  So 
were butterﬂies: he caught his ﬁrst butterﬂy in 1906, just a few years after “the birth of sentient life” 
(SM 22), following in the footsteps of his father, who had been a passionate collector himself.  “ ey 
chose me, not I them,” Nabokov once responded in answer to the question of why he had chosen 
butterﬂies to study (qtd. in Boyd, Russian 68).  Art lessons began just a year or two later, with his 
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path laid out for him years before, ﬁtting his life into a pattern drawn long ago, like that adorning 
the ancient, “complete...absolutely complete” majolica bowl he envisions in the ﬁnal pages of his 
memoir.  Nabokov never resents or denies the fact of this inheritance, this sense of his life’s 
conformation to some larger whole.  On the contrary, the idea that his life might ﬁt into to some 
much larger pattern, some larger design, is for him a source of comfort, pleasure, and speculation.  
Finding evidence of such design -- in, say, the similarity of a piece of pottery found by his son to one 
found by himself, or to one found by his mother -- is, after all, an explicit goal of Speak, Memory: 
Nabokov identiﬁes the “following of such thematic designs through one’s life” as “the true purpose of
autobiography” (27).
14 
It’s important, though, to see that that inheritance doesn’t make his attunement any less 
individual: Nabokov’s circumstances are still peculiarly his own, di erent even from those of his 
14. Michael Wood, for whom Speak, Memory is ﬁnally a dark book, more about what pattern and 
memory cannot redeem than what they can, notes that “[w]hat is striking about these ‘thematic 
designs,’ as Nabokov calls them, is their ﬂimsy and incidental nature”:
Or at least this is what strikes us if we resist Nabokov’s stylish insistence on their importance, 
and our own attraction to the elegance of the coincidences.  ese coaches and matches and 
gestures are not large moments or bearers of grand meanings, and in the case of the pot there is
not even a coincidence, only an act of the writer’s mind (94).
I think Wood is right about coaches and matches and gestures: there is often something strained 
about these connections, and moving because strained.  But “the pot” -- that imagined majolica bowl
-- is di erent.  It refers to more basic familial and cultural patterns that have nothing fanciful or 
ﬂimsy about them: shared sights, shared experiences, shared lifestyles and habits, shared dispositions, 
shared ways of parenting and of being a child.   e link between his father’s love of butterﬂies and 
his own, or between his mother’s vacation spots and his son’s, are actual connections and not elegant 
coincidences; and it’s these substantive patterns that I have in mind when I refer to Nabokov’s 
position within a larger structure of inheritance and design. 
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responds to his mother’s example, the way he takes to drawing and painting and collecting 
butterﬂies, the ease with which he adopts these early habits of loving and learning and looking -- 
that’s his own, too, part of the “individual mystery” that makes him who he is (SM 25).  Nor does it 
mean that this attunement is merely a passive, inevitable way of being for him, one that Nabokov 
just unthinkingly and unwillingly stumbles into.  He energetically embraces the path he ﬁnds 
himself on; he takes to certain practices and not others; he hones and deepens his “capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes” through a passionate engagement in particular activities.  To say that his capacity to
wonder at triﬂes is entirely given to him would be too simplistic, just as describing it as something 
chosen by him would be wrong.  It’s a little of both, something between a gift and a choice.
It's worth noting that this implies a somewhat di erent answer from " e Art of Literature and 
Commonsense" to the question of how easy this attunement is for others to acquire.  As we noted in 
Chapter One, Nabokov’s lectures portray the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” as a cultivable 
attunement: his lectures on literature are generally predicated on the idea that his students can come 
to dispose themselves in this way toward texts, and the exhortative stance of “ e Art of Literature 
and Commonsense” implies that his audience can come to dispose themselves in this way toward 
things in the world.  But Speak, Memory, by linking Nabokov’s own “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” to 
a whole rich familial and cultural context, to particular childhood practices and the natural features 
of Nabokov’s temperament, suggests just how much more must be involved in developing such 
attunement than sitting in on a few lectures.   e memoir shows us that Nabokov didn’t simply 
decide to start wondering at triﬂes one day, to start imbuing little things with importance, to start 
allowing things to matter deeply to him, to take up arms against commonsense.  And so, it would 
77seem, neither can we.  
 at doesn’t mean that coming to dispose oneself to the world in this way is impossible.  It just 
means that it’s harder, that it takes more time and e ort, than “ e Art of Literature and 
Commonsense” suggests.  Just what sort of e ort might be involved, then, in adopting these 
irrational standards for ourselves?  Nabokov doesn’t o er any explicit guidance here, but one answer 
might be to adopt the postures associated with this way of being, the habits of attention, the 
standards of value, and -- importantly -- to practice them for a sustained period of time.   is would 
also involve engaging deeply with the work of those who seem to enjoy a “capacity to wonder at 
triﬂes” -- Nabokov, most obviously, but other artists as well: some novelists; some painters; many 
poets -- in order to ﬁnd out what those postures are, to discover what it looks like and feels like to 
experience things in this way.  Nabokov’s own example suggests that it might not be possible to 
develop such an attunement out of nothing; it may be that some basic capacity for wondering at 
unlikely things, some basic experience with allowing things to show up as “important,” and some 
basic skepticism about the authority of commonsense, must already be in place before that 
attunement can take hold.  But while the full enjoyment of that attunement might only belong to 
Nabokov and the few thousand “fellow dreamers” he names in “ e Art of Literature and 
Commonsense,” the number of those capable of acquiring it, with time and exposure and practice, is
surely larger.
 e Highest Form of Consciousness
 us far, we’ve shown the “capacity to wonder at triﬂes” to be a whole, rich, deep way of being in the
world; a way of disposing oneself that could plausibly be understood as the “highest form of 
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childhood; an attunement partly given and partly made.  I've also argued that Speak, Memory shows 
what the world looks like to someone with this attunement, a world revealed by the "capacity to 
wonder at triﬂes."   is is di erent from saying that Speak, Memory shows us a lost and lovingly 
remembered world, whose details show up as important simply because they've been recovered, or 
else a childhood world reorganized and enhanced by an artist's mature imagination.  It's true that the
memoir also shows us these things; the world of Speak, Memory is, of course, a restored world, and it 
is illuminated by memory and by art.  But there's also an e ort here to capture something about, or 
persuade us of something about, Nabokov's present-tense experience of the world: how things show 
up for him, how they showed up for him in the present-tense of the past, how the world reveals itself
in the light of the "highest form[] of consciousness."  As it's important that we see this before 
moving on to the next chapter, I want to o er one ﬁnal example here.
Early in Speak, Memory, Nabokov describes one of his mother's "greatest pleasures" -- hunting 
for mushrooms at Vyra.   e scene anticipates Nabokov's description of the pleasure he takes in 
hunting butterﬂies, and his description, examined earlier, of the pleasure his son Dmitri takes in 
collecting bits of pottery by the sea.  Elena, her son, and her grandson share the same irrational 
passion, surely incomprehensible to common sense, for hunting and ﬁnding, collecting and 
discarding, curating and admiring for its own sake, for the pleasure of it.  Here is Nabokov's 
description of his mother's own enchanted hunting:
Rainy weather would bring out these beautiful plants in profusion under the ﬁrst 
birches and aspens in our park, especially in its older part, east of the carriage road 
that divided the park in two.  Its shady recesses would then harbor that special 
boletic reek which makes a Russian's nostrils dilate - a dark, dank, satisfying blend 
of damp moss, rich earth, rotting leaves.  But one had to poke and peer for a 
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family of bonneted baby edulis or the marbled variety of scaber, could be discovered 
and carefully teased out of the soil.
On overcast afternoons, all alone in the drizzle, my mother, carrying a basket 
(stained blue on the inside by somebody's whortleberries), would set out on a long 
collecting tour.  Toward dinnertime, she could be seen emerging from the nebulous 
depths of a park alley, her small ﬁgure cloaked and hooded in greenish-brown wool, 
on which countless droplets of moisture made a kind of mist all around her.  As she 
came nearer from under the dripping trees and caught sight of me, her face would 
show an odd, cheerless expression, which might have spelled poor luck, but which I 
knew was the tense, jealously contained beatitude of the successful hunter.  Just 
before reaching me, with an abrupt, drooping movement of the arm and shoulder 
and a "Pouf!" of magniﬁed exhaustion, she would let her basket sag, in order to 
stress its weight, its fabulous fullness.
Near a white garden bench, on a round garden table of iron, she would lay out 
her boletes in concentric circles to count and sort them.  Old ones, with spongy, 
dingy ﬂesh, would be eliminated, leaving the young and the crisp.  For a moment, 
before they were bundled away by a servant to a place she knew nothing about, to a 
doom that did not interest her, she would stand there admiring them, in a glow of 
quiet contentment.  As often happened at the end of a rainy day, the sun might cast 
a lurid gleam just before setting, and there, on the damp round table, her 
mushrooms would lie, very colorful, some bearing traces of extraneous vegetation -- 
a grass blade sticking to a viscid fawn cap, or moss still clothing the bulbous base of 
a dark-stippled stem.  And a tiny looper caterpillar would be there, too, measuring, 
like a child's ﬁnger and thumb, the rim of the table, and every now and then 
stretching upward to grope, in vain, for the shrub from which it had been dislodged
(43-44).
 ere is much to say here, but I'll conﬁne myself to pointing out what are, for our purposes, the 
three most important aspects of the passage.  First, the activity it represents is entirely in keeping 
with "irrational standards" and deliberately, even polemically, opposed to common sense.  Elena 
Nabokov values the mushrooms in an utterly non-instrumental way.   ough "delicious," as 
Nabokov notes a little earlier, "the gustatory moment" doesn't "matter[] much" to her (43); their 
transformation from ﬁnd to food doesn't "interest her."   ey matter to her in a deeper way, as part 
of a game, a "delight[ful]" quest, that brings her a great deal of personal pleasure, and which she 
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common sense -- that is, in their "gustatory" aspect -- then the speed of the hunt would matter more
than the art of it, and the quantity of her ﬁnds more than their quality, and agarics would not be 
ruled out, and the mushrooms would likely seem largely the same, and neither the hunt nor the ﬁnds
would mean much to her, or, at least, not nearly as much.  She sorts out the old boletes from the 
younger, crisper, presumably tastier ones, but Nabokov tells us that this, too, is for her a kind of 
game, and that the game has more to do with the pleasure of arranging, admiring and perfecting her 
ﬁnds than with their consumption.   e color and form and uniqueness of the mushrooms, and the 
delight she takes in hunting them, matter more to her than any material use she could ﬁnd for them.
 at's it, and that's everything.  
Next, and most importantly, Nabokov presents the scene as it appears to him in the light of the 
"highest form[] of consciousness."   e scene isn't a photograph; Nabokov tells us how things would
have been, what might have shown up, what sort of thing would have happened and how things 
were likely to have appeared.  And, he implies, they would have appeared distinct, unique, weighty, 
wonderful.  Memory, certainly, casts its own illumination: the details of the scene are especially 
precious to him now that his mother, and Vyra, and his childhood, and the whole world to which 
they belonged, are gone.  But there's also a sense that that illumination, that sense of delight and 
importance, isn't just the work of memory.   ere's a sense that this is also, to some extent, how 
things would have, might have, shown up then -- maybe a somewhat intensiﬁed and idealized 
version of how, but still how -- in the light of the highest form of consciousness.  
Above all, in this scene, triﬂes stand out as occasions for wonder.  His mother's basket shows up 
as an occasion for surprise, delight, curiosity, and speculation: why is it blue? stained with what? 
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just to render the image, and the memory, precise; and not just to call up for the reader a whole 
happy, pastoral family context in which the same objects are used and reused, by di erent people, 
season after season, the same fruits and fungi collected and shared; but also, and I think primarily, to 
invoke the attunement we've been describing, this way of orienting oneself toward things and 
allowing them to show up in certain ways.  In every instance this wondering vision draws attention 
to the common sense vision it deﬁes.  Nabokov's parenthesis here -- "(stained blue on the inside by 
somebody's whortleberries)" -- has a faint aura of insistence about it; it seems to assert itself against 
the common sense perspective that would have it ignored or excised.   is is true, too, of his 
observations about the particular way his mother looked in her cloak, or the very particular face she 
made, both presented as surprising, charming, curious features of the scene, and which show up for 
him as causes for speculation.  It's true of the needlessly precise vision of those mushrooms, "very 
colorful, some bearing traces of extraneous vegetation -- a grass blade sticking to a viscid fawn cap, or
moss still clothing the bulbous base of a dark-stippled stem," which commonsense would neither see 
nor represent so distinctly.  
Finally, it's worth noticing how this scene evokes, not only in an actual but in a ﬁgural way, what
it is to be attuned to things in the way we've been describing.   e image of the rain "bring[ing] out"
the "beautiful mushrooms" from the dark earth, as if out of nowhere, is a lovely image for how the 
capacity to wonder at triﬂes allows things to show up and present themselves as occasions for 
surprise, delight, and speculation.   e image of his mother stressing the "weight" of her basket, its 
"fabulous fullness," is an potent image for the sense of weightiness and solidity, of meaningfulness 
and mattering, that this wondering form of consciousness confers on the objects it attends to.  And, 
82ﬁnally, the tiny looper caterpillar helps us to see the scene as being about more than his mother and 
her mushrooms.  It helps us to see it as being about existential importance, about the things that 
matter to us so deeply that without them we would cease to be who we are, inasmuch as it links his 
mother's pursuit of boletes to Nabokov's pursuit of butterﬂies, which we know to be, especially at 
this stage in his life, more important to him than almost anything else. 
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Knowing the World to Be Good:  e Riddle of Lolita
Nabokov rounds out his description of "the highest form[] of consciousness" with an assertion of its 
moral import:
...and it is in this childishly speculative state of mind, so di erent from 
commonsense and its logic, that we know the world to be good (LL 374; my italics).
Nabokov's readers have questioned the plausibility of this last clause, what it means, whether 
Nabokov really believed it to be true.  Richard Rorty in particular has asked why, if Nabokov truly 
did believe in some connection between triﬂes and goodness, he went out of his way to create 
"characters who are both...noticing and heartless..., obsessives who are as sensitive as they are callous"
(160), fastidious, "artistic" observers like Humbert Humbert (168).  To Rorty and others, Lolita is in
this respect a puzzle, an open contradiction of the claim above.  What should we make of it?  Why 
does Nabokov contradict, or seem to contradict, himself in this way?
Rorty solves the puzzle by seeing Humbert Humbert as a kind of self-critique.  In Lolita, he 
argues, we see Nabokov correcting himself, moderating his sense of what "artistic gifts" like "noticing
things that most other people do not notice, being curious about what others take for granted, seeing
the momentary iridescence and not just the underlying formal structure" can do (168; 159).  
Humbert's narrative conﬁrms that these gifts don't have any "special connection" with goodness and
that, at the end of the day, Nabokov knows it.  From this perspective, Nabokov's assertion of a 
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is ﬁnally an aesthete's fancy, a bit of posturing or wishful thinking.  "Nabokov's best novels," Rorty 
concludes, "are the ones which exhibit his inability to believe his own general ideas" (168).  
Other critics, too, have seen in Lolita a refutation, or complication, or moderation of the 
opinions Nabokov expressed so strongly in his lectures, interviews, prefaces and afterwords.  
Nabokov the lecturer insists on the authority of the subjective view, the primacy of one's own unique
vision; but the novelist warns us about what can happen if we cherish that vision too much.   e 
interviewee prizes, above all, personal freedom, independence, individualism, self-determination; but
the novelist shows us how the pursuit of personal autonomy can be destructive if left unchecked.  
 e aesthete celebrates the imagination and the senses, but the novelist teaches us that "the 
imagination and the senses that ﬁre it must be reined in, must learn to limit themselves to the artistic
sphere so that they may remain an instrument of widening and deepening perception, not of pain 
and loss" (de la Durantaye 187).  In his novels, and especially in Lolita, we ﬁnd Nabokov checking 
himself, softening his strong opinions, emphasizing the distinction between artistic gifts and moral 
ones, and telling us that "the artist cannot live in the world as he lives in the world of words" (de la 
Durantaye 95).
Another way of resolving the apparent contradiction between, on the one hand, Nabokov's claim
that the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" gives us access to the good, and, on the other, his creation of a
heartless noticer like Humbert Humbert, is to say that Humbert is actually not a very good noticer at
all.  David Andrews takes this approach, arguing that Humbert's moral failure is in fact tied to a 
failure of noticing: his "failure to notice the pain of others":
[Humbert] concentrates on his own uniqueness and pleasure to such a degree that 
85he loses sight of people who are likewise unique but often su ering.   is idea 
inverts " e Art of Literature and Commonsense" in that Humbert's incapacity to 
notice triﬂes, i.e., external details, is connected to his incapacity for pity.  While his 
self-indulgent aestheticism does not destroy his talent...it does ﬁnally destroy his 
capacity for joy.  Talent may exist independently of pity, but over the long term, 
internal pleasure is contingent on external pity, and pity is in turn contingent on 
attention to detail (62).
But this seems too easy a solution.  After all, Humbert is quite a good noticer and narrator of 
"external details."  And he does notice Lolita's su ering -- "her sobs in the night -- every night, every 
night" (Lolita 176), the many shades of her unhappiness: her "childish despair" (171) and 
"distract[ion]" (174), her "limp[ness]" (159) and "moodiness" (169), her anger and "helplessness" 
(283), her "bored[om]" (161) and "hopeless[ness]" (157).  He just doesn't take that su ering 
seriously.  Or else he does, and takes pleasure in it, as when he recalls the "smooth tender bloom" of 
her face, "so bright with tears, when I used to roll, in play, her tousled head on my knee..." (204; my 
italics).  It is, in fact, his ability to notice these things about Lolita even while "terrorizing" her that 
makes him so darkly and dazzlingly diabolical (151).
Both Rorty and Andrews seek to resolve the contradiction between what Nabokov says in " e 
Art of Literature and Commonsense" and what he shows in Lolita by declaring one of those 
propositions to be false.  Either Humbert Humbert is a bad man and good noticer, and Nabokov 
doesn't really believe his own claim; or else Humbert Humbert is bad man and a bad noticer, and he 
really does believe it.  I want to suggest another way of resolving the problem, one that shows the 
character to be compatible with the claim without denying Humbert's skillfulness as an observer.  
My argument can be summed up in a simple way.  Lolita corroborates Nabokov's claim that the 
"capacity to wonder at triﬂes" is a state of mind in which we "know the world to be good," but it 
86does so by o ering us a vision of how the world shows up for someone without access to that 
"highest form[] of consciousness," someone for whom the world does not show up as good, and 
someone who actively compromises, moreover, another person's access to that vision.  In this 
reading, Lolita doesn't undermine the central thesis of " e Art of Literature and Commonsense."  
Rather, it deepens our understanding of it, by helping us to see the di erence between Nabokov's 
"artistic gifts" and Humbert's linguistic ones; between wondering at triﬂes and merely noticing 
them; between tuning in to the world in a particular way and imposing a particular vision upon it; 
between encountering a style that tells us something about the stylist, and encountering a style that, 
perhaps, only tells us about itself.   
From Speak, Memory to Lolita
What exactly does Nabokov mean when he says that "in this childishly speculative state of mind" we 
"know the world to be good"?  I think he simply means what we've been saying he means all along: 
that the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" is a special way of disposing ourselves toward things that 
allows those things -- even the most apparently trivial, least obviously wonderful among them -- to 
show up as sources of wonder, joy, value and meaning.  Surely another way of putting this would be 
to say that, in disposing ourselves to the world in this way, we allow it to show up as "good" -- more 
ﬁnally a source of wonder than of fear, joy than of pain, meaning than of meaninglessness, or 
indi erence, or confusion.  Nabokov's claim, of course, is slightly stranger than this, for he suggests 
that in experiencing the world in this way, we're actually recognizing a deep truth about it, how it 
really "is," how things really "are."  He describes the goodness we apprehend as something already 
present, something we reveal or conﬁrm about the world by tuning in to it in the right way, rather 
87than something we merely project onto it.  In this specially attuned state of mind, he says, we don't 
feel that the world is good, or believe the world to be good; it doesn't seem or appear to us as though 
the world were good.  Rather, we know the world to be good -- "fundamentally good," as he says, a 
little later -- war gods, police states, Humbert Humberts notwithstanding (LL 377) .
To really understand what Nabokov means by "know[ing] the world to be good" we'll need to 
understand what, exactly, he means by "the world" -- a question that remains a source of debate 
among his readers.  For now, though, we can say that the phrase describes the "highest form[] of 
consciousness" as a moral phenomenon as well as an aesthetic one.  "Wondering at triﬂes" is a moral 
act inasmuch as it gives us access to certain kind of moral knowledge, and inasmuch as that 
knowledge has moral e ects.  Nabokov proposes that that knowledge can, for example, serve to 
reassure us, give us solace and strength, at precisely those moments when the "goodness" of the 
world seems most obscured, that is, "during the darkest and most dazzling hours of physical danger, 
pain, dust, death" (LL 373).
In " e Art of Literature and Commonsense," Nabokov's provocative connection between triﬂes 
and goodness remains, for the most part, a matter of faith and assertion.  In support of it Nabokov 
doesn't and, perhaps, can't, o er any formal proof.  But he does something much better.  He 
dedicates his two best books -- Speak, Memory and Lolita -- to exploring the connection between the 
special attunement we've been describing and its relationship to the good.   ese books, two 
memoirs of roughly the same length, one written right after the other, in the very middle of his 
career, form a pair.   ey're paired approaches to the same theme, twinned investigations into the 
nature of the "highest form[] of consciousness" and its moral import.
Speak, Memory, as we've already seen, o ers a positive account of this connection between triﬂes 
88and goodness.  It shows us how the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" locates us in a world in which 
things are revealed as important, as capable of making demands on us, as mattering.  It expresses 
what Nabokov says all poetry expresses -- "one's position in regard to the universe embraced by 
consciousness" -- and it reveals that "embraced" universe to be a rich, complex, inexhaustible source 
of joy and meaning (SM 218).  Speak, Memory also proves, or is, at least, designed to prove, the 
durability of that vision in the face of "danger, pain, dust, death," for it insists on the truth of that 
account even while chronicling some of the very "darkest and most dazzling hours" a person could 
be made to endure: the loss of home and homeland; twenty years of ﬂight and exile; and, most 
painfully and senselessly of all, the assassination of a beloved parent (LL 373).
15 Yet more than it 
15.  is is a hard thing to do, and at least one critic -- Michael Wood -- suggests that Nabokov 
doesn't quite succeed in the e ort.  To Wood, the record of pain and loss in Speak, Memory ﬁnally 
undercuts its vision of redemption and joy, in spite of Nabokov's wish that it should not:
[Nabokov] is saying, I think, and may himself half-believe it, that pattern is a 
redemption of loss, and perhaps the only redemption of loss there is, however fragile
and unlikely and insigniﬁcant that pattern may be.  But he is also saying, or his text 
is saying, that loss is irredeemable, that loss goes on and on, an endlessly 
discomposed face in the mirror... e purpose behind the purpose of autobiography, 
perhaps, is to tell us what the tracing of designs can't do for us (94-96).
Wood's reading is illuminating inasmuch as it sensitizes us to the currents of pain and loss that run 
beneath Speak, Memory's sparkling surface.  But he goes too far, I think, in implying that the record 
of "danger, pain, dust, death" preserved in Speak, Memory is ﬁnally bigger than, or more central than,
its vision of meaning and joy.  Wood suggests that no amount of noticing, and wondering, and 
remembering, and tracing could be equal to the loss Nabokov describes; that these e orts could only 
ever be "ﬂimsy and incidental" in comparison with the pain they aim to redeem; and that this 
something that Nabokov -- or, at least, Speak, Memory -- knows (94).  We need to be wary of this 
conclusion, I think, not least because it's a conclusion with which commonsense would agree.  
Nabokov surely isn't saying this: he opens Speak, Memory, after all, by rejecting commonsense, and 
with it, implicitly, the commonsense interpretation of what his experience of "danger, pain, dust, 
death" ﬁnally means.  Is "his text"?   is argument is more subtle and more di cult to refute, but as 
a start I would point to the structure of Nabokov's memoir, the way it begins and ends with scenes of
surprise, delight, wonder, discovery, revelation: the surprise of consciousness appearing, out of 
89expresses and proves and insists on all this, it shows it.  Speak, Memory shows what the world looks 
like when one relates to it in the right way, in the light of the "highest form[] of consciousness."  It 
shows a world whose smallest components are full of interest, surprise, delight, meaning, value, 
importance -- a world that is, in a word, good. 
Lolita shows us something very di erent.  Nabokov had been thinking about and making notes 
toward Lolita even while he was composing, in the late 1940s, the pieces that would become the 
chapters of Speak, Memory; the creation of those two memoirs overlapped, the way Nabokov's 
Onegin commentary would later overlap with the generically similar Pale Fire.  In 1951, he 
exchanged his own bright memoir for Humbert Humbert's darker one.  Here he continued to 
explore the meaning, especially the moral meaning, of ﬁnding the right attunement to the world, 
only now he explored it from a wholly di erent angle.  In his lectures he had deﬁned "the highest 
form[] of consciousness"; in his autobiography he had shown what it meant to attune oneself to the 
world in this way; now, in Lolita, he would show what it meant to be wholly cut o  from this 
attunement.  Lolita, like Speak, Memory, helps us to understand what the "highest form[] of 
consciousness" is and what it means, but it does so by showing us a world utterly untouched by its 
light.   e novel is, in this sense, the obverse of the book that comes before it, its haunting negative 
image, Speak, Memory shown from the "queer mirror side" (Lolita 306). 
nowhere, between two eternities of darkness in the book's beginning, the surprise of a "splendid 
ship's funnel" suddenly appearing between two buildings at its end (310), both phenomena ﬁgured 
as "blissful" occasions for wonder ("shock...enchantment and glee") (309).  And I would point to the
rainbow theme discussed in Chapter One, by means of which Nabokov subtly and repeatedly 
presents ordinary experience as a continual source of wonder and joy.
90A World Gone Dark
So the "wonderland" of Speak, Memory gives way to the "umber and black Humberland" of Lolita, 
Nabokov's lucid vision to Humbert's lurid one (SM 136; Lolita 166).  Humberland is very, very 
dark, "a world," as Humbert says, "of total evil" (Lolita 284).  Nabokov tends to use a less 
theological vocabulary when describing Humbert -- he describes him as "hateful," "a vain and cruel 
wretch who appears to be 'touching'" (SO 26; 94) -- but these epithets seem to understate the case.  
Nabokov's portrait of Humbert is about as close to a portrait of evil as anything we get in Nabokov's 
work, and, indeed, in literature.
"Which is the worst thing men do?" an interviewer once asked Nabokov.  "To stink, to cheat, to 
torture," he replied (SO 152).  Humbert cheats and tortures; he also kills.  He doesn't "stink," but 
then, evil rarely presents itself this way, "in some sort of red glow," as the Devil says to Ivan 
Karamazov, "'in thunder and lightning,' with scorched wings" (Dostoevsky 647)
16.  And, of course, 
in a ﬁgurative sense, a moral sense, Humbert does "stink": this, after all, is part of the joke of his 
going into the perfume business.   e list of his crimes against Lolita is long,
17 but we can sum them 
16. Humbert Humbert, in fact, resembles Ivan's hallucination in many ways: middle-aged, single, of 
modest means, fastidious, elegantly dressed, old-fashioned, eloquent, manipulative, self-
contradictory, given to visiting doctors' o ces and peppering his speech with fragments of French, 
able to "tell a story or two" (Dostoevsky 636).  It's worth noting that Nabokov, though he famously 
disliked Dostoevsky, once agreed to "a surprising project: a translation of  e Brothers Karamazov, 
with his own introduction and notes, for Pascal Covici of Viking Press" -- possibly, his biographer 
implies, because he was "short of money" at the time (Boyd, American 146).   is, moreover, 
occurred in 1950, while Nabokov was ﬁnishing Speak, Memory and beginning to make notes toward 
Lolita.  Nabokov became ill a few months later and ended up abandoning the translation, but 
something of the encounter with Dostoevsky's Devil lingers, perhaps, in his own diabolical character.
17. Most, though not all, discussions of Humbert's sins center on his crimes against Lolita, and this, 
I think, is the right approach: Quilty's death is too farcical and unreal, and Humbert is too plainly 
mad at the moment of it, for it to occupy the reader's moral imagination in the same way.  
91up by saying that he robs her, during their two hellish years together, of her rightful portion -- 
practically her entire portion -- of joy, freedom, security, and, for a long while, hope.   e shape and 
texture of her life, during their time together, are largely deﬁned by Humbert's breathtaking cruelty 
towards her; and, whatever one makes of his "moral apotheosis," his belated sense of horror at what 
he has done, it's worth noting that he never says that he would not, if given the chance, do it all over
again (Lolita 5).  
 ere are ambiguities here -- where does Humbert's evil come from? could he have acted 
di erently? what is the moral value of contrition? are there some sins that cannot be "reprieve[d]"? -- 
but Nabokov seems less interested in these questions than he is in simply showing us what real, 
human evil looks like, what it sounds like, how it thinks and how it acts.  Most importantly, though,
at least for our purposes here, Nabokov associates Humbert's cruelty with a certain way of orienting 
oneself toward the world, of disposing oneself to things, of allowing things to "show up," and he 
directly opposes that orientation to "the highest form[] of consciousness." In Lolita, Nabokov is less 
interested in asking traditional moral-philosophical questions about evil than he is in bringing us 
fully and persuasively inside an evil consciousness -- in capturing the texture of that consciousness in 
prose and imagining what it would feel like from the inside.  Just as he is interested in the "highest 
form[] of consciousness," he is also interested in the lowest.
Elsewhere Nabokov opposes his highest form of consciousness to the "monster of grim 
commonsense."
18 Here he considers a di erent sort of monster: the strange, private, uncommon 
18. Commonsense is, as we've seen, the explicit target of " e Creative Writer"/" e Art of 
Literature and Commonsense" and the implicit interlocutor of Conclusive Evidence/Speak, Memory.  
It appears again in Bend Sinister, the last novel Nabokov wrote before Lolita, in the form of a 
92dispositions that can inhibit one's access to the radiant vision Speak, Memory describes.  Where 
commonsense inhibits that vision by allowing things to show up in a very limited way, Humbert's 
uncommon sensibility inhibits it by actually distorting what he sees, so that things show up for him 
as something other than what they are.  Where commonsense is easy to tell apart from the 
"irrational" attunement Nabokov depicts in Speak, Memory, Humbert's way of seeing things can 
sometimes look unnervingly -- if only superﬁcially -- like it: singular, precise, ecstatic.  Where 
commonsense is popular and pervasive, Humbert Humbert's way of relating to the world is all his 
own.  And where the origins of commonsense are located, necessarily, in the social world, the origins 
of Humbert's weirder sensibilities are harder to place.  Humbert provides a convoluted history of his 
"nympholepsy" early on in the book (seashore, sea monsters), but his simplest explanation is the 
most convincing: "that is the way I am made" (178).   is, too, we should see in relation to Speak, 
Memory.  If Speak, Memory shows us what it is to be blessed with the gift of a right attunement, 
Lolita imagines what it is to be cursed with a wrong one.
Humbert insists that the world shows up very di erently for him than it does for other people.  
He might, of course, be lying about this, but the idea is woven very deeply into his narrative, and 
I'm not sure why we should doubt him.  It is possible, after all, to accept his basic claim without 
accepting the aura of glamor and dark romance he attaches to it:
Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain 
bewitched travelers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their true nature 
which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac); and these chosen creatures I 
murderous political regime that, with its lack of imagination, its literalism and materialism, its 
dismissal of detail, and its contempt for di erence resembles nothing so much as "modern 
commonsense" gone amuck.
93propose to designate "nymphets"...
A normal man given a group photograph of school girls or Girl Scouts and asked to 
point out the comeliest one will not necessarily choose the nymphet among them.  
You have to be an artist and a madman, a creature of inﬁnite melancholy, with a 
bubble of hot poison in your loins and a super-voluptuous ﬂame permanently aglow
in your subtle spine (oh, how you have to cringe and hide!), in order to discern at 
once, by ine able signs -- the slightly feline outline of a cheekbone, the slenderness 
of a downy limb, and other indices which despair and shame and tears and 
tenderness forbid me to tabulate -- the little deadly demon among the wholesome 
children; she stands unrecognized by them and unconscious herself of her fantastic 
power (16-17). 
Humbert tells us that his nympholepsy "reveal[s]" the world to him in a certain way, just as 
Nabokov's "highest form[] of consciousness" reveals it in another.  Most obviously, it reveals, as 
Humbert puts it, the deadly daemon among the wholesome children, the demoniac nymphet within 
the wholesome child, Lolita within Dolores Haze; but it also makes men and women, places and 
things show up for him in peculiar ways.  Parks and playgrounds, from Paris to New York, show up 
for him as places of special interest.  Men show up mainly as potential threats, as practical 
impediments (John Farlow) or romantic rivals (Clare Quilty).  Even Gaston Godin shows up not so 
much as a friend as someone Humbert knows will not get in the way of his desire for nymphets.  
Ordinary ("terrestrial") women show up for him as generally repulsive and beside the point, more 
vegetable or animal or perhaps mineral than human, with their "pumpkins or pears for breasts" (18),
their "long, brown" "chestnut mare" legs (89), their "phocine" thighs (42), their dyed hair and 
coarse skin, their "big," "fat," "pu y" "large-as-life" bodies (54; 43; 26; 76).   e most 
conventionally attractive among them are all "hopelessly unattractive" to him (104), and college girls
are especially repellent.  "[T]here are few physiques I loathe more," he conﬁdes, "than the heavy low-
slung pelvis, thick calves and deplorable complexion of the average coed (in whom I see, maybe, the 
94co n of coarse female ﬂesh within which my nymphets are buried alive)" (175).  
At ﬁrst, this way of experiencing things seems to have a lot in common with seeing things in the 
light of the "highest form[] of consciousness" -- not thematically, of course, but structurally.   ere's 
a great deal of rapturous attention to detail in Humbert's narrative, albeit to a certain kind of detail 
(the "slightly feline outline of a cheekbone, the slenderness of a downy limb"); and there's what looks
like a familiar, Nabokovian insistence on the primacy of subjective experience, of one's own private 
way of encountering things.  Readers who see Lolita as a complication or retraction of Nabokov's 
claims in " e Art of Literature and Commonsense" do so, I think, in part because they see in 
Humbert Humbert's subjective, ecstatic, detail-oriented approach to the world something very 
similar to the subjective, ecstatic, detail-oriented approach Nabokov seems to endorse in his lectures 
and interviews.  If this "artist[ic]" (as Humbert calls it) way of seeing can be associated with the 
creation of a "world of total evil," then there can't be anything intrinsically good about it; or else 
there must be something wrong with it, or, at least, something in need of restraint.  
Yet if we look closely at Humbert's way of orienting himself to things, what should strike us isn't
the closeness of this orientation to Nabokov's "highest form[] of consciousness," but rather its 
deliberate estrangement from it.  It isn't just that Humbert applies his "artist[ic]" vision to the wrong
objects, or that he approaches things "artist[ically]" but happens to be cruel.  It's that the very 
structure of his way of encountering things is di erent from the form of consciousness Nabokov 
prizes in " e Art of Literature and Commonsense" and shows us in Speak, Memory.   e madman, 
the cruel wretch, the hateful person are ﬁnally more prominent in Humbert than the artist.  And the 
madman, as Nabokov imagines him, is cut o  from the possibility of that superior attunement and 
its higher moral vision of the world.
95Wondering vs. Noticing
How, exactly, is the structure of Humbert's way of orienting himself to things di erent from the 
"irrational," uncommonsensical, detail-oriented attunement Nabokov describes in " e Art of 
Literature and Commonsense"?   e ﬁrst thing to see is that while there is plenty of noticing and 
attending to "triﬂes" in Lolita, there is no wondering at them.  Humbert's universe is, crucially, a 
wonderless universe.   e "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" involves, as we've seen, not just noticing 
things but delighting in them, being surprised by them, being curious about them, speculating about
them.   ree out of four of these components are usually missing from Humbert's interactions with 
the details of his world.  In the end, Humbert's way of disposing himself to the world actually has 
very little in common with Nabokov's.  
Humbert rarely, if ever, responds to things with surprise, or curiosity, or speculation.  Instead of 
surprise we tend to get recognition; instead of curiosity, indi erence or contempt; instead of 
speculation, brief and often cynical explanations.  His responses to Lolita, or at least to her physical 
person, would seem to be an exception to these rules, but a closer look shows that even here what 
appears to be wonder is almost always only delight.  I'll aim to show this by focusing on one such 
scene of passionate attention: Humbert's vision of Lolita when he picks her up at camp after 
Charlotte has been killed, right before her whole world is about to be reduced to the conﬁnes of the 
"family" car.
Humbert's ﬁrst moments at Camp Q capture, in microcosm, how things usually show up for 
him: 
96Let me retain for a moment that scene in all its trivial and fateful detail: hag Holmes
writing out a receipt, scratching her head, pulling a drawer out of her desk, pouring 
change into my impatient palm, then neatly spreading a banknote over it with a 
bright "...and ﬁve!"; photographs of girl-children; some gaudy moth or butterﬂy, 
still alive, safely pinned to the wall ("nature study"); the framed diploma of the 
camp's dietitian; my trembling hands; a card produced by e cient Holmes with a 
report of Dolly Haze's behavior for July ("fair to good; keen on swimming and 
boating"); a sound of trees and birds, and my pounding heart...I was standing with 
my back to the open door, and then I felt the blood rush to my head as I heard her 
respiration and voice behind me.  She arrived dragging and bumping her heavy 
suitcase. "Hi!" she said, and stood still, looking at me with sly, glad eyes, her soft 
lips parted in a slightly foolish but wonderfully endearing smile (110-111).
Humbert presents his alertness to the "trivial and fateful detail[s]" of the scene as an e ect of his 
heightened state of desire, his keen anticipation of Lolita's arrival, his anxiety that something will 
suddenly prevent him from taking her away.  But Humbert is generally attentive to the "trivial" 
aspects of his environments and experiences, and those trivial aspects typically present themselves to 
him in the way they present themselves here.  Triﬂes show up for Humbert; but they typically show 
up as occasions for humor or contempt, and often serve to conﬁrm what Humbert already expects or
knows.  When Humbert, for example, notices, in the bathroom of the Haze house, "the expected 
coils of the rubber snake, and its complement -- a pinkish cozy, coyly covering the toilet lid" (38), 
these triﬂes merely serve to conﬁrm his "expect[ations]": that 342 Lawn Street is the just the sort of 
shabbily genteel place that "you know will have a rubber tube a xable to the tub faucet in lieu of a 
shower" and a cover for the toilet (36).  ("Pinkish" is an inspired touch, conveying both Humbert's 
squeamishness -- is the toilet cover, like the "more gray than white" house (36), not quite clean? -- 
and his sense that everything about Charlotte Haze is approximate: her face like a "weak solution of 
Marlene Dietrich" (37), her indirect gaze, her ersatz tastes and uncommitted conversation.)  Here, 
97too, the camp o ce conﬁrms Humbert's low expectations for it, with its not-too-"bright" camp 
mistress, scratching her head, wasting his time, (and oblivious, as Humbert later learns, to what her 
charges are up to, to what all that "keen[ness] on swimming and boating" is really about); its useless 
report cards and silly diplomas; its self-important procedures and e ciencies.  Other triﬂes are of a 
kind that always show up for him in the same way: photographs of girl-children are always 
interesting; women over thirty-ﬁve always have a haggard look.  Even the "gaudy moth or butterﬂy," 
still alive and "safely pinned" to the wall, seems strangely expected, a "fateful" conﬁrmation of the 
live capture Humbert himself is about to make.   
 is is how triﬂes tend to show up for Humbert Humbert: as the ﬂotsam and jetsam of a fallen, 
predictable, ridiculous, amusing but mostly un-wonderful world.   e e ect here is often darkly, 
splendidly comic, and it's true that some of part that comic vision, that sense of the "exhilarating" 
nature of "philistine vulgarity," coincides with Nabokov's own view of things (315).  But the 
orientations of their views are, ultimately, very di erent.  For the most part, Humbert's perspective 
tells us more about how Humbert sees things than it does about the things he sees.  Of course, 
Humbert wants us to see that the world shows up for him in this way, especially before Lolita enters 
it.   ese fallen details, after all, perform a polemical function within his narrative, inasmuch as they 
emphasize the di erence between the "dull, dingy," colorless world of "stock characters" and "deadly 
conventionalit[ies]" Humbert lives in most of the time and the resplendent world Lolita opens up for
him (27; 27; 37).  In the passage above we ﬁnd Humbert negotiating the transition from one world 
to the other, from the musty old world of framed and frozen things to a fresh world of "rosy 
sunshine" (119), of swaying trees and singing birds, a "wonderful[]" world with Lolita in it.   e 
scene of his ﬁrst vision of her at camp rehearses the scene of his ﬁrst vision of her at home, in which 
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gingham-clad girl-child) stepping out into the Land of Oz (40).   ere is wonder in Humberland, 
but it's maddeningly, demoniacally wrapped up in the smile of a twelve-year-old girl.
So Humbert argues, both on the surface of his text and more deeply, in the way he presents his 
experience of things, in the line he draws between the dingy, if amusing, details of everyday life and 
the radiant details of Lolita's person.  Yet even here, where we might expect to ﬁnd it, Humbert's 
narrative o ers little evidence of what Nabokov describes as the "highest form[] of consciousness."  
Humbert takes pleasure -- "unspeakable" pleasure (59) -- in the smallest details of Lolita's demeanor 
and her dress, but he never wonders at them.   e scene continues:
She was thinner and taller, and for a second it seemed to me her face was less pretty 
than the mental imprint I had cherished for more than a month: her cheeks looked 
hollowed and too much lentigo camouﬂaged her rosy rustic features; and that ﬁrst 
impression (a very narrow human interval between two tiger heartbeats) carried the 
clear implication that all widower Humbert had to do, wanted to do, or would do, 
was to give this wan-looking though sun-colored little orphan aux yeux battus (and 
even those plumbaceous umbrae under her eyes bore freckles) a sound education, a 
healthy and happy girlhood, a clean home, nice girl-friends of her age among whom
(if the fates deigned to repay me) I might ﬁnd, perhaps, a pretty little Mägdlein for 
Herr Doktor Humbert alone.  But "in a wink," as the Germans say, the angelic line 
of conduct was erased, and I overtook my prey (time moves ahead of our fancies!), 
and she was my Lolita again -- in fact, more of my Lolita than ever.  I let my hand 
rest on her warm auburn head and took up her bag.  She was all rose and honey, 
dressed in the brightest gingham, with a pattern of little red apples, and her arms 
and legs were of a deep golden brown, with scratches like tiny dotted lines of 
coagulated rubies, and the ribbed cu s of her white socks were turned down at the 
remembered level, and because of her childish gait, or because I had memorized her 
as always wearing heelless shoes, her saddle oxfords looked somehow too large and 
too high-heeled for her.  Good-bye, Camp Q, merry Camp Q. Good-bye, plain 
unwholesome food, good-bye Charlie boy.  In the hot car she settled down beside 
me, slapped a prompt ﬂy on her lovely knee; then, her mouth working violently on 
a piece of chewing gum, she rapidly cranked down the window on her side and 
settled back again.  We sped through the striped and speckled forest (111).
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apples on Lolita's bright gingham dress, the tiny scratches on her arms, the ribbed cu s of her socks, 
the slightly foolish but endearing smile.  Yet there's little surprise here, little curiosity or speculation. 
Lolita seems a little thinner and taller to Humbert, her shoes a little larger; but he doesn't spend 
much time dwelling on these changes, and quickly declares her "more of [his] Lolita than ever."  
Instead of surprise there's mainly recognition: her socks are turned down to the "remembered level," 
and even the pattern on her dress has a strangely familiar feeling about it, recalling as it does the 
"Eden-red apple" she once ate while he "safely solipsized" her on the sofa (60).  He doesn't wonder 
how she came to get those precious, ruby-like scratches, though he probably should; he doesn't 
speculate about her thoughts as she settles down next to him.  Humbert's madness, in short, disposes
him to Lolita in a way that allows the details of her person to show up for him as objects of intense 
pleasure, ecstatic fascination, irrational delight, but never more than this, never wonder.  
For a sense of what's missing here, consider Nabokov's equally rapturous description of his ﬁrst 
love "Tamara" in Speak, Memory: 
Seen through the carefully wiped lenses of time, the beauty of her face is as near and
as glowing as ever.  She was short and a triﬂe on the plump side but very graceful, 
with her slim ankles and supple waist.  A drop of Tatar or Circassian blood might 
have accounted for the slight slant of her merry dark eye and the duskiness of her 
blooming cheek.  A light down, akin to that found on fruit of the almond group, 
lined her proﬁle with a ﬁne rim of radiance.  She accused her rich-brown hair of 
being unruly and oppressive and threatened to have it bobbed, and did have it 
bobbed a year later, but I always recall it as it looked ﬁrst, ﬁercely braided into a 
thick plait that was looped up at the back of her head and tied there with a big bow 
of black silk.  Her lovely neck was always bare, even in winter in St. Petersburg, for 
she had managed to obtain permission to eschew the stiﬂing collar of a Russian 
schoolgirl's uniform.  Whenever she made a funny remark or produced a jingle 
from her vast store of minor poetry, she had a most winning way of dilating her 
nostrils with a little snort of amusement.  Still, I was never quite sure when she was 
serious and when she was not.   e rippling of her ready laughter, her rapid speech, 
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all her features were ecstatically fascinating to me, but somehow or other, instead of 
divulging her person, they tended to form a brilliant veil in which I got entangled 
every time I tried to learn more about her.  When I used to tell her we would marry 
in the last days of 1917, as soon as I had ﬁnished school, she would quietly call me a
fool.  I visualized her home but vaguely.  Her mother's ﬁrst name and patronymic 
(which were all I knew of the woman) had merchant-class or clerical connotations.  
Her father, who, I gathered, took hardly any interest in his family, was the steward 
of a large estate somewhere in the south (231).
Superﬁcially, the two descriptions look very similar.  Indeed, Humbert might easily have written the 
following:
Seen through the carefully wiped lenses of time, the beauty of her face is as near and
as glowing as ever.  She was short...but very graceful, with her slim ankles and 
supple waist...A light down, akin to that found on fruit of the almond group, lined 
her proﬁle with a ﬁne rim of radiance...Her lovely neck was always bare...Whenever 
she made a funny remark...she had a most winning way of dilating her nostrils with 
a little snort of amusement... e rippling of her ready laughter, her rapid 
speech...the tender, moist gleam on her lower eyelid -- indeed, all her features were 
ecstatically fascinating to me...
But the excised passages make all the di erence, because that's where all the wondering is.  Nabokov 
doesn't just delight in these details, he's curious about them; he's capable of being surprised by them,
even resisted by them.  He wonders where the "slight slant of her merry dark eye" and the "duskiness
of [Tamara's] blooming cheek" might have come from; about what her home life is like; whether, at 
times, she's serious or joking.  Her features fascinate him, but rather than conforming to some 
remembered or idealized image of her, some ﬁxed notion of what she is or ought to be like, they 
ﬁnally resist him, so that Tamara always remains somewhat mysterious to him, out of reach.  Above 
all the passage emphasizes that Tamara has a will, a history, a mind, a world of her own, as 
Humbert's descriptions of Lolita never do, so that she can threaten to bob her hair, against 
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bring him down to earth when he starts to speak to her of marriage.
Humbert, in short, delights in Lolita but never "wonders at" her, and never really wonders at 
anything else, either.  Lolita's features are "ecstatically fascinating" to him, as Tamara's are to 
Nabokov, but he never "trie[s] to learn more about her," as Nabokov tries to learn more about 
Tamara.   is incapacity for wondering-at is very much a part of his disease.  Nabokov seems to 
imagine that Humbert doesn't wonder because Humbert can't wonder, because wondering would get
in the way of his desire.   ere's a great moment near the end of their journey together in which we 
see Humbert starting to wonder at some triﬂing thing Lolita has said, and then instinctively pulling 
back as if for this reason.  Humbert and Lolita are on the road again, and Humbert's begun to 
suspect that Lolita is in communication with the man who's been following them all day.  She denies
it; he presses her; then, suddenly, she changes the subject:
"Perhaps he is Trapp.  If I were you -- Oh, look, all the nines are changing into the 
next thousand.  When I was a little kid," she continued, unexpectedly, "I used to 
think they'd stop and go back to nines, if only my mother agreed to put the car in 
reverse."
It was the ﬁrst time, I think, she spoke spontaneously of her pre-Humbertian 
childhood; perhaps, the theatre had taught her that trick; and silently we travelled 
on, unpursued (219).
"It was the ﬁrst time, I think, she spoke spontaneously of her pre-Humbertian childhood": here, 
ﬁnally, is a triﬂe that does take Humbert by surprise.  But Humbert doesn't welcome these kinds of 
surprises, and though he begins to wonder at what Lolita's just said, he quickly interrupts that 
process of wondering.  Her unexpected anecdote alerts him to the fact that she's never talked of her 
"pre-Humbertian childhood" to him before, and that merits thinking about further.  It invites him 
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too, merits further reﬂection.  And it suggests that Lolita has an inner life of her own that includes 
more than loving movie stars and wanting to have parties with boys and being angry with Humbert 
Humbert: an inner life full of memories, reﬂections, longings, even the pleasure of wondering at 
triﬂes, such as the satisfactory and, to a child, mysterious moment when the numbers on a car's 
odometer settle into the next round thousand.  Finally, it suggests Lolita's desire to go back to that 
pre-Humbertian era, to put the car in reverse and travel back in time, even while it aligns that desire 
with a child's impossible fantasy.  Some or all of these thoughts and questions, these opportunities 
for curiosity and speculation, present themselves to Humbert and hang there after that ﬁrst clause.  
But he balks: he writes her comment o  to duplicity; he converts a rare moment of surprise into a 
moment of recognition: "perhaps...the theatre had taught her that trick."   at's Lolita: just 
shamming, just conniving, just trying to distract him.  But he stops arguing with her, and his silence 
seems to belie his skepticism, to acknowledge both the weight of what she's said and his inability to 
wonder at it further.
 e absence of surprise, curiosity, and speculation from Humbert's encounters with Lolita, and, 
moreover, the world, are part of a general disposition that turns away from the world, and this 
Nabokov imagines as a kind of hell.  Humbert's obsession keeps him from fully encountering or 
truly caring about anything other than himself.  Everything other than Lolita seems meaningless, 
interchangeable -- not because, as under the regime of commonsense, he sees only its instrumental 
value, but simply because it isn't Lolita.
19  Lolita matters -- Humbert's great theme is that she has 
19. Humbert has a tendency to generalize: Valeria, his ﬁrst wife, is just a "short-legged, big-breasted 
and practically brainless baba," a "stock character" (26; 27); Maxovich, the taxi driver who takes her 
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who he is.  "I knew...that I could not live without the child," he says, early on, and this turns out to 
be true (64).   e problem is that "existential importance" is the only kind of importance Humbert 
Humbert can recognize.  Lolita is, to Humbert, unique and irreplaceable, but the uniqueness he 
prizes is the uniqueness of her e ect on him.  And the triﬂes that produce these e ects -- the 
movements he ﬁnds so uniquely delightful, the features he ﬁnds so ecstatically fascinating -- are the 
only aspects of her that show up for him, that he is capable of allowing to show up for him, that he 
wants to show up for him.  Consequently they tell us more about Humbert than they tell us, or 
show us, about Lolita.   ey lead not to her but to Humbert and his "maniacal gaze," as Nabokov 
emphasized in one of his many interviews:
It is this sad satyr's imagination that makes a magical creature of this young 
American schoolgirl, as normal and banal in her genre as Humbert the poet is in his
own.  Outside of the maniacal gaze of Humbert, there is no nymphet.  Lolita the 
nymphet exists only through the obsession that destroys Humbert.  An essential 
aspect of this singular book (Nabokov, qtd. in de la Durantaye 70)
20.
away from him, is "a stocky White Russian ex-colonel with a bushy mustache and a crew cut," one 
of "thousands...plying that fool's trade in Paris" (28); Charlotte is "one of those women whose 
polished words may reﬂect a book club or bridge club, or any other deadly conventionality, but never
her soul" (37); and though he makes an "artistic" e ort to properly identify animals, trees and 
wildﬂowers, he never gets very far.  "Some little animal or other" crosses his path (141); "some gaudy
moth or butterﬂy" is pinned to the camp o ce wall.  (He's especially bad at identifying lepidoptera, 
as Alfred Appel's annotations to Lolita make clear.)  Of a grove of trees: "oaks, I thought; American 
trees at that stage were beyond me" (140).
20. For this quotation I'm indebted to Leland de la Durantaye, who transcribes parts of the 
interview in his study Style is Matter.  De la Durantaye quotes from Apostrophes: Bernard Pivot 
rencontre Vladimir Nabokov (Apostrophes: Bernard Pivot meets Vladimir Nabokov).  May 30, 1975.  
Interviewer: Bernard Pivot.  Live broadcast by: Antenne 2, Paris. Video version (VHS SECAM): 
Visions Seuil, Paris.     
104 is, then, is a crucial di erence between Nabokov's delighted wonder and Humbert's wonder-
less delight.  Nabokov's "highest form[] of consciousness" turns outward, toward the world, as the 
chimney sweep turns toward the signboard and Alice turns toward the patterns of the passing wall.  
Humbert, on the other hand, for all his ecstasy and delight, is ﬁnally turned inward, trapped within 
his own maniacal gaze, cut o  from the world around him -- even, especially, from Lolita.  
 e distance, moreover, between Nabokov's open attunement and Humbert's cramped obsession
is "artistically" conﬁrmed by the fate of the rainbow theme in Lolita.   e rainbows of Speak, 
Memory appear in Lolita, too, but in an utterly changed form.  In Speak, Memory, the rainbows that 
show up for Nabokov are most often "really there," that is, available for others to encounter as well, 
if they would only open themselves up to the world in the same way -- there in some lovely 
watercolors, or a carefully arranged set of leaves, or a box of colored pencils, or a cloud, or a dew 
drop, or, once, in the colors of a genuine rainbow, tenderly, gloriously spreading itself out against the
sky.   ese are all extant parts of a world that, encountered in a certain way, reveals itself as a source 
of beauty, joy, and wonder.  In Lolita, on the other hand, the rainbows that appear are often merely 
imagined by Humbert, elements of strange metaphors or ﬂights of fancy, and they are almost always 
gruesome, grotesque, or otherwise unnerving.  Humbert envisions Lolita from the inside out: 
unknown heart, comely kidneys, "nacreous liver" (165).  He recounts how he once tried to "attain a 
beggar's bliss" by staring at her "through prismatic layers of light" ("dry-lipped, focusing my lust and
ricking slightly under my newspaper") (42).  He waits for her to succumb to a sleeping pill, and feels
his "rainbow blood" pulsing through his veins (126).  He imagines painting, in the dining room of 
 e Enchanted Hunters, an "opalescent" mural: " ere would have been those luminous globules of 
gonadal glow that travel up the opalescent sides of juke boxes... ere would have been a ﬁre opal 
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sigh, a wincing child" (134-135).  He sees the hot springs and "baby geysers" of Yellowstone Park as 
"rainbows of bubbling mud -- symbols of my passion" (158). He mocks the "rainbow" "mess" of his 
ﬁrst wife's make-up, a mixture of cosmetics and tears (she's leaving Humbert and he's thinking, at 
that moment, of "hurting her very horribly") (29).  He practices shooting and kills a hummingbird 
(he'll later kill Quilty with the same gun): "though I must say not much of it could be retrieved for 
proof -- only a little iridescent ﬂu " (216).  He prepares himself for murder by donning some 
"exquisite clothes -- a waistcoat with nacreous buttons, for instance..." (268). 
Nabokov includes his "tender[] and...glor[ious]" rainbows in Speak, Memory in part to convey a 
certain tone, a certain atmosphere, a certain mood of limpid wonder.  Humbert, too, is aiming for a 
particular tone, and his lurid rainbows largely serve its purpose.  Humbert wants to evoke for his 
readers an atmosphere of perversity and decadence, of unhinged ecstasy, an atmosphere he 
simultaneously relishes and deplores, and relishes deploring.   is is what happens to wonder in 
Humberland.  It's pared down to delight, twisted in on itself, rendered grotesque.  It's ﬁtting, then, 
that the most dramatic rainbow in the book, the counterpart to the central rainbow of Speak, 
Memory, isn't a natural phenomenon at all.  Instead, it's a "self-conscious" image of Humbert's 
disease, rigged up by Quilty, a rainbow made up of -- what else? -- little girls:
I really could not tell you the plot of the play we saw.  A trivial a air, no doubt, 
with self-conscious light e ects and a mediocre leading lady.   e only detail that 
pleased me was a garland of seven little graces, more or less immobile, prettily 
painted, bare-limbed -- seven bemused pubescent girls in colored gauze that had 
been recruited locally (judging by the partisan ﬂurry here and there among the 
audience) and were supposed to represent a living rainbow, which lingered 
throughout the last act, and rather teasingly faded behind a series of multiplied 
veils...two of the colors were quite exasperatingly lovely -- Orange who kept 
ﬁdgeting all the time, and Emerald who, when her eyes got used to the pitch-black 
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(220-221).
Subjective Realities vs. Projected Realities
So far, we've seen two major di erences between the Nabokovian form of consciousness and the 
Humbertian one. First, while triﬂes do show up for Humbert, they show up only sometimes as 
occasions for delight, and never as occasions for wonder.   is is the ﬁrst important di erence 
between Humbert's ecstatic, detailed-oriented vision and Nabokov's "highest form[] of 
consciousness."   e second is that Humbert's vision cuts him o  from the world, while Nabokov's 
embraces it; Humbert colors the world in the lurid hues of his own obsession, while Nabokov opens 
himself up to seeing the colors that are already there.   is second point requires further 
examination, though, because many critics have seen Humbert's self-involvement as an extension, 
rather than an inversion, of Nabokov's own vehemently individual, subject-centered way of 
approaching the world.  Nabokov, after all, repeatedly emphasizes the primacy of subjective 
experience in his lectures and interviews, sometimes going so far as to deny that there is such as thing
as "objective reality" at all; and for many readers this position looks perplexingly, or perversely, 
similar to the terrible, mad solipsism of a Charles Kinbote or a Humbert Humbert (LL 253).  If, as 
I've been arguing, we're to see Humbert's way of relating to the world in Lolita as a dramatic 
negation of Nabokov's way of relating to the world in Speak, Memory, rather than as a dark extension
or ironic misapplication of it, we'll have to carefully distinguish his emphasis on the primacy of 
subjective experience from Humbert's solipsism and selﬁshness.
In the interviews collected in Strong Opinions, Nabokov consistently denies the existence of 
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subjective a air" (10).  At times this argument seems relatively tame.  When, for example, he deﬁnes 
"average reality" as "the reality of general ideas, conventional forms of humdrummery, current 
editorials," his dismissal of it in favor of a more "subjectively perceived" reality seems merely to assert
the authority of individual experience over "commonsense," an assertion with which many readers 
would probably agree (118). At other times, though, he appears to be saying something more radical,
as when he argues that "the very term 'everyday reality' is utterly static since it presupposes a 
situation that is permanently observable, essentially objective, and universally known" and that no 
such "situation...exists" (94).   is really does sound like a radical denial of "objective reality."  
 at denial is confusing, if not problematic, in light of Nabokov's pointed condemnation of 
those who, like Humbert Humbert, have trouble acknowledging that something other than their 
own "subjective reality" does, in fact, exist; and in light of Nabokov's infatuation with the material 
world and his penchant for describing its contents as minutely, precisely, vividly, and accurately as 
possible.   ose who perceive a puzzle here tend to frame the problem in either-or terms.  Nabokov 
ﬁnally puts his "ﬁrst emphasis" on either one or the other: either objective experience or subjective 
experience; "external reality" or internal reality (Andrews 53); the world or our individual experience 
of it.  But this is a false choice, as I hope to show, one that leads Nabokov's critics into positions that 
are, very often, implausible, and forever vulnerable to attack from the other side.
Brian Boyd, in his criticism and his critical biography, tends to emphasize the ﬁrst of these two 
terms.  Nabokov, he argues, as against those who would deny it, is ﬁrmly committed to the idea of a 
real, objective world that exists apart from our experience of it.  Nabokov's narrative style, moreover, 
expresses that commitment and serves to conﬁrm the "independence" of things from our thoughts 
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Nabokov particularly values the autonomy, the separate vitality of what he creates, 
an object or an instant or a character suddenly there and itself, with no purpose 
whatever in the development of a story or in the assignation of its meaning.  In a 
sense, this is a special kind of realism, a challenge to the principle of artistic 
selection.  Reality is not chosen, it is inﬁnitely detailed, each part of it has its own 
life whether it a ects us or not, and in the same way a ﬂash of light, a gesture, a 
character is allowed into a Nabokov novel even if it has no part in the protagonists' 
lives.
Nabokov's style, according to Boyd, suggests the very opposite of a solipsistic approach to the world. 
It places its "ﬁrst emphasis" on what lies outside of and beyond us, what exists apart from our 
experience of it.  Here Nabokov's "details of visual description" have an especially important role to 
play, inasmuch as they help to convey, in their vividness and, often, strange irrelevance, "the crisp 
autonomy of the thing described" (Nabokov's Ada 29-31).  
What of Nabokov's denial of "everyday reality" -- his insistence that the notion of a 
"permanently observable, essentially objective, and universally known" "situation" is just a fantasy?  
For Boyd, such a claim doesn't deny the autonomy of the real; it just describes the limits of our own 
access to that autonomous reality.  It's true, he says, that Nabokov "ﬁnds the reality of the external 
world elusive," but this isn't "at all because he doubts its existence outside the mind":
What makes reality so elusive is that it is inﬁnitely richer than any single person's 
knowledge of it, or even the sum of science's speciﬁcations.   e world is so real that
it always exceeds our knowledge of its reality...Reality is so elusive not because it is 
doubtful whether it exists outside the mind, but because it exists out there so 
resolutely, so far beyond human modes of perception and explanation in its 
endlessly detailed complexity, so real even in its minutest parts (Nabokov's Ada 68).
In sum, Nabokov isn't saying that that the world isn't real: he's telling us it's too real, too richly and 
complexly "there and itself," to be permanently, objectively observed and known by us.  
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the "crisp autonomy" of what it describes, and his intense attention to the outside world -- both 
artistic and scientiﬁc -- belies any attempt to describe him as an idealist.  Of course Nabokov believes 
in an external world that "exists outside the mind": it was, after all, for the sake of getting to know 
that world better that he spent all those thousands of hours in the Museum of Comparative Zoology,
at a microscope, counting the scales on butterﬂy wings.  On the other hand, though, Boyd's 
identiﬁcation of "reality" with the world that exists outside the mind, "far beyond human modes of 
perception and explanation," seems simply to ignore Nabokov's many, clear, consistent statements to
the e ect that "reality" is only ever subjective, that "[l]ife does not exist without a possessive epithet,"
and so on.  Even if, as Boyd argues, Nabokov's style seems to testify to the "independence" of 
"reality" from the mind, his many statements on the subject of "reality" testify to something di erent.
 e fact is that most of these statements locate "reality" ﬁrmly within "human modes of perception 
and explanation" and suggest that "reality" is undetachable from our encounters with it.
Leland de la Durantaye takes Boyd to task for precisely this reason in his own discussion of the 
subject in Style is Matter.  De la Durantaye represents the other point of view: where Boyd 
emphasizes the primacy and solidity of the world "outside the mind" in Nabokov's conception of 
"reality," de la Durantaye emphasizes the primacy of the self.  Nabokov, he points out, repeatedly 
and consistently tells us that "[e]verything that is worthwhile is to some extent subjective" (LL 4), 
and de la Durantaye insists that we take these statements seriously.  He suspects that Boyd avoids 
Nabokov's "numerous statements asserting reality's completely subjective aspect" in order to avoid 
the dark fact that there is something "extreme[ly] solipsis[tic]" about Nabokov's conception of 
reality, or something dangerously close to solipsism (45).  Nabokov, de la Durantaye argues, was 
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Humbert and Charles Kinbote is all about.  By means of such characters, Nabokov explored "a 
simple and potent danger contained [within his own] aesthetics: solipsism":
What we see reﬂected in Nabokov's reality is a robust absence of interest in shared 
visions of the world.   is is not simply the ivory tower as aesthetic model, but also 
as a perceptual one.   is position carries with it, however, a certain danger -- and 
one that ﬁnds its place at the center of many of his ﬁctions...Nabokov happily exiles
himself to the ivory tower of his singular reality and focuses with rare intensity on 
the passionate pursuit of an inner vision.  But what the case of Kinbote -- as well as 
other characters in his ﬁction -- illustrates is the danger of climbing too high or 
descending too deeply into one's own singular reality.   e consequence of such 
may be innocuous -- such as misreading a poem.  But they might also prove more 
sinister (47).
Here de la Durantaye's argument goes farther than Rorty's.  Rorty argues that there's no necessary 
connection between artistic gifts and moral ones, and that Nabokov knows it; de la Durantaye argues
that there is a connection between these things, but it's not necessarily, not always, a positive one. 
 is is what Nabokov knows, and what we see him worrying about, in books like Lolita, Pale Fire, 
and Despair.   ese books, de la Durantaye writes, call attention to the "convertible" nature of 
artistic gifts, the way they can be used for both good ends and bad, and they warn us against 
applying the "'methods' destined for art to life."  In these novels, "the imagination, courage, 
dexterity, and single-minded, even solipsistic, focus required for art," he writes, "are exercised 
elsewhere -- and with disastrous results" (51).  Lolita is thus "an experiment...an exercise and a lesson
in the dangers of art" (53): a vision of what can happen when the imagination, the senses, and, 
especially, the singular vision of the artist are indulged too much, and in the wrong contexts.  It 
ultimately encourages us to remember how important it is to "draw the ﬁne line between art and 
life" (192).
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idea of "reality" unfold.  Boyd argues that Nabokov's aesthetics and metaphysics ﬁnally privilege the 
"reality" of the world "outside the mind"; de la Durantaye argues that they ﬁnally privilege the 
"reality" of the self -- and that Nabokov is very much aware of the dangers involved in such 
privileging.   ey each get something right here, and they each get something wrong, for Nabokov's 
"ﬁrst emphasis" falls on both things at once: both the "endlessly detailed" external world and our 
subjective experience of it.  Nabokov's "idea of reality" isn't a realist's idea of reality, and it isn't a 
solipsist's, either.  Nabokov has his own unique way of imagining the relation between the self and 
the world, between consciousness and its objects; and it is utterly unlike Humbert Humbert's way of
imagining the relation between these things.  
Let's step away from Lolita for a moment, then, to consider more closely the question of what 
Nabokov's "idea of reality" really is.  We'll then contrast this idea with Humbert's own, in order to 
show that his solipsism exists not on a continuum with Nabokov's "idea of reality," but in marked 
contrast to it. 
 e Universe Embraced by Consciousness
We should start by recognizing that Boyd and de la Durantaye, for all their disagreement, each 
approach Nabokov's "idea of reality" from what is an essentially Cartesian perspective.   ey each 
frame the question in dualistic terms, as a contest between two alternatives.  Does "reality," for 
Nabokov, inhere more ﬁnally in "human modes of perception and explanation" or in "the world 
outside the mind" (Boyd, Nabokov's Ada 68)?  Is it more properly thought of as an "adventure in the 
world" or an "adventure within the self" (de la Durantaye 45)?  Which does Nabokov care about 
112more?  Which is more important to him, more "real"?  
Boyd emphasizes one side, de la Durantaye the other, and neither is right because the terms of 
the question are wrong.   e fact is that Nabokov associates "reality" with neither "human modes of 
perception" nor "the world outside the mind" but, rather, with both.  He thinks of it as a kind of 
meeting place between these two things, or as a kind of combination.  And yet even this way of 
talking isn't quite right, for it suggests, as Boyd and de la Durantaye do, that there are two distinct 
entities -- the self and the world -- ready and waiting to be combined.  It isn't that Nabokov doesn't 
believe that these things exist.  It's just that, for him, they're so utterly uninteresting in themselves, so
utterly meaningless, as to be practically unreal.  For him, what's "real" is, as he says, the "universe 
embraced by consciousness" (SM 218), and the embracement is the most important thing. 
Compared to this, Boyd's "world...beyond human modes of perception" is just meaningless matter, 
and de la Durantaye's "adventure within the self" a groundless fantasy, little better than the "frightful
nightmares" Nabokov struggled to avoid, each night, in sleep (SM 108).
A good way to imagine that "embrace[ment]" is as a kind of illumination.  Nabokov opens 
Speak, Memory by describing conscious existence as a "crack of light" in "darkness," and though he 
quarrels with the tendency of commonsense to emphasize the permanence of the darkness and the 
brevity of the light, the metaphor itself is useful.  Let's begin, then, by imagining the un-embraced 
universe as a ﬁeld of darkness, and consciousness -- say, Nabokov's consciousness -- as a source of 
light within it.   at light illuminates certain things around it, drawing them out of darkness and 
into the light.  It does this in a unique way, shining on some things and not others, and on some 
things more brightly than on others.   is uniquely-lit world constitutes Nabokov's particular reality 
-- the only kind of "reality" Nabokov believes there is.  
113What determines the particular pattern of that illumination, that particular reality?  One's 
circumstances, experiences, capacities, inclinations, moods, interests, knowledge, habits of attention -
- everything that dictates the kinds of things that are presented to you and how they are presented, 
and the kinds of things you care about and how you care about them.  Nabokov's passion for 
butterﬂies, for example, illuminates his world in a very particular way:
It is astounding how little the ordinary person notices butterﬂies.  "None," calmly 
replied the sturdy Swiss hiker with Camus in his rucksack when purposely asked by 
me for the beneﬁt of my incredulous companion if he had seen any butterﬂies while
descending the trail where, a moment before, you and I had been delighting in 
swarms of them.  It is also true that when I call up the image of a particular path 
remembered in minute detail but pertaining to a summer before that of 1906, 
preceding, that is, the date on my ﬁrst locality label, and never revisited, I fail to 
make out one wing, one wingbeat, one azure ﬂash, one moth-gemmed ﬂower, as if 
an evil spell had been cast on the Adriatic coast making all its "leps" (as the slangier 
among us say) invisible (SM 129-130).
Nabokov and Véra notice the butterﬂies, and the hiker doesn't.   eir interest in and knowledge of 
butterﬂies highlights the butterﬂies, allows the butterﬂies to show up for them; whereas the hiker's 
ignorance of, or lack of interest in, butterﬂies keeps them in the dark.  For the hiker the butterﬂies 
remain "invisible."  
Nabokov's point isn't just that the hiker doesn't see the butterﬂies: it's that, inasmuch as he 
doesn't see them, inasmuch as they fail to show up for him, they aren't a part of his reality, just as 
they weren't a part of Nabokov's own reality before 1906.  Nabokov considers this an ontological 
di erence, and not just a perceptual one.  What's at stake in the incident, for the hiker and for 
Nabokov, isn't just the content of experience but the very composition of reality.  From the hiker's 
failure to notice the butterﬂies Nabokov infers a di erence not just in how things look to him but in 
what they actually are for him, and he attributes that di erence, moreover, to a di erence in 
114consciousness.  
 e hiker's reality is di erent because his consciousness is di erent, because his particular 
interests, knowledge, moods, memories, reading habits, projects, and commitments are all di erent 
from Nabokov's own.  He might have missed the butterﬂies because he was lost in thought, mulling 
over the latest chapter of Camus; or he might have missed them because he is, lepodopteroleptically 
speaking, an "ordinary person," that is, because he doesn't share Nabokov's extraordinary mania for 
butterﬂies.  Nabokov draws our attention to the way his own reality changed between the summer of
1905 and 1906, with the advent of that particular passion.  One year there were butterﬂies where 
there had been none before, and all because Nabokov had suddenly begun to know and care about 
them.  So marvelous is this fact to him that he tells us about it twice: "Retrospectively," he notes 
elsewhere, "the summer of 1905, though quite vivid in many ways, is not animated yet by a single 
bit of quick ﬂutter or colored ﬂu  around or across the walks with the village schoolmaster..." (SM 
122).  One thing Chapter Six of Speak, Memory makes clear, though, is that the di erence between 
the Nabokov of 1905 and the Nabokov of 1906, or between Nabokov and the hiker, isn't just a 
matter of "knowing and caring" more about butterﬂies than he did before, or more than the hiker 
does.  It isn't, in other words, just the result of having made some simple, internal, mental change.  
 e universe begins to show up di erently for him, to be embraced di erently by him, not only 
because he starts thinking and feeling di erently about it, but because he begins engaging with it in 
particular, complex, active, outward-facing ways: purchasing equipment, carrying around a net, 
going on excursions, subscribing to periodicals, fashioning locality labels, corresponding, even as a 
child, with some of the greatest "lepidopterists of all time" (SM 133), and attempting to add his own
discoveries to the store of what is known.   ese are intellectual practices, but also physical practices, 
115and even social practices, and they all contribute to the way the world shows up for him, to why 
those butterﬂies are so real to him and so unreal to "ordinary” people. 
 ese examples suggest that consciousness is like a spotlight, that either shines on something and
allows it to show up, or not.  But elsewhere Nabokov describes that illumination as something much 
subtler and ﬁner.  He shows us how the light of consciousness can illuminate certain aspects of things
and not others, so that, for example, the beauty of a moth might show up for Mademoiselle, but not 
its relative commonness or rarity.  He also tells us that that illumination can vary in intensity, so that 
some things show up for us more brightly than other things.   is might be because they matter 
more to us, or because we know more about them, or because we've made room for them in our lives
in a way that we haven't made room for other things.  Moths and butterﬂies, for example, are always 
more brightly lit for Nabokov than other things, or than they are for other people:
On the bark of that birch tree, the stout one near the park wicket, I had found last 
spring a dark aberration of Sievers' Carmelite (just another gray moth to the reader).
In the ditch, under the bridgelet, a bright-yellow Silvius Skipper hobnobbed with a 
dragonﬂy (just a blue libella to me) (SM 132). 
Nabokov tends to equate increased speciﬁcity with increased "reality," so that, as we move from the 
"gray moth" to the "blue libella" to the "bright-yellow Silvius Skipper" to the "dark aberration of 
Sievers' Carmelite," from the order to the genus to the species to the freak aberration, we're moving 
from the dim to the brilliant, the real-ish to the super-real.  
Here Nabokov doesn't just tell us that moths and butterﬂies show up more brightly for him than
dragonﬂies do.  He shows us that he's aware of just how brightly they show up for him, and also of 
how faintly the dragonﬂies show up, and of how still more faintly the Sievers' Carmelite shows up 
for the reader.  In other words, he shows us that he's "aware of being aware of being" -- a kind of 
116awareness, he says elsewhere, that is unique to human beings (SO 142).  Importantly, his 
observations suggest that "being aware of being aware of being" also means being aware that other 
people might be more aware of the being of certain things than you.  Nabokov knows that the 
Carmelite is more than just a gray moth to him, and so he assumes that the dragonﬂy is more than 
just a blue libella to someone else.  Acknowledging that the dragonﬂies are less real for him than 
butterﬂies, in other words, doesn't lead him to solipsistically deny that the dragonﬂies are less real in 
some ultimate sense.  Quite the opposite: his observation prompts him to acknowledge that the 
dragonﬂy is very likely much more real than he himself can appreciate, and that it has, as Boyd says, 
an existence "independent" of his awareness of it, on the basis of which it can show up as a part of 
someone else's bright, brimming, "robust reality" (SM 77).  
In Nabokov's conception of things, people want to -- or should want to -- enrich their realities, 
to render them brighter and more robust.  At the same time he acknowledges that some -- indeed, 
most -- of what might be lit up for us will remain in darkness, or at least dimness, and that our 
e orts at illumination will tend to bring us up against these limitations.  He elaborates on this point 
in Strong Opinions:
Reality is a very subjective a air.  I can only deﬁne it as a kind of gradual 
accumulation of information; and as specialization.  If we take a lily, for instance, or
any other kind of natural object, a lily is more real to a naturalist than it is to an 
ordinary person.  But it is still more real to a botanist.  And yet another stage of 
reality is reached with that botanist who is a specialist in lilies.  You can get nearer 
and nearer, so to speak, to reality; but you never get near enough because reality is 
an inﬁnite succession of steps, levels of perception, false bottoms, and hence 
unquenchable, unattainable.  You can know more and more about one thing but 
you can never know everything about one thing: it's hopeless.  So that we live 
surrounded by more or less ghostly objects -- that machine, there, for instance.  It's 
a complete ghost to me -- I don't understand a thing about it and, well, it's a 
mystery to me, as much of a mystery as it would be to Lord Byron (10-11).
117 is is the passage Boyd has in mind when he writes that Nabokov believes that "[t]he world is so 
real that it always exceeds our knowledge of its reality...Reality is so elusive not because it is doubtful 
whether it exists outside the mind, but because it exists out there so resolutely, so far beyond human 
modes of perception and explanation in its endlessly detailed complexity, so real even in its minutest 
parts.”  Now, something exists "outside the mind," but it isn't, as far as Nabokov is concerned, quite 
deserving of the name "reality" -- anything worth thinking of in terms of "reality," is after all, as 
Nabokov says, "a very subjective a air."   ere is a world out there, "outside the mind," a universe 
un-embraced by consciousness; but it doesn't really make sense to think of it as "resolute" or 
"complex" or "detailed," because these are attributes that it only acquires in the light of "human 
modes of perception and explanation."  And yet the spirit of Boyd's point is, I think, at least partly 
correct.  Nabokov is saying that our realities could always be brighter than they are, that things could
always show up for us more brightly than they do; there are always other aspects of things to be 
revealed, fuller or more speciﬁc visions to be had.  Our realities are constantly humbled by the 
"ghostly objects" at their edges.   is is partly because our own capacity for revealing things, for 
illuminating them, is limited, by time if nothing else.  Our realities come into being gradually, and 
are the result of many concrete steps: studying ﬁeld guides, going on hikes, comparing specimens -- 
and we can only cultivate that knowledge and speciﬁcity in so many domains.  But it's also partly 
because, as Boyd suggests, there is always more out there, waiting to be illuminated, waiting to 
become "real," that is, to become a part of our or someone else's reality.  Nabokov's tone is a little 
hard to read here, but I think it would be wrong to hear too much pessimism or frustration in what 
he says.  After all, it's that apprehension of mystery, of darkness even in the things we know, that 
motivates us to attend and discover, to make the things around us show up more brightly.  It's what 
118motivates Nabokov to spend all those hours at the microscope, to devote so much e ort to his 
Onegin commentary, to wonder whether Tamara is serious or joking.  
Nabokov's "reality," in short, is totally di erent from that of the sturdy Swiss hiker, but in many 
subtle ways.  It isn't just that some things are included, while others are excluded; it's that Nabokov's
reality emphasizes di erent things to varying degrees, and has, over time, developed its own 
particular texture and character.  Nabokov has certain experiences, he involves himself in the world 
in certain ways, he undertakes certain projects and not others, and, as a result, some things are 
brightly lit for him, other things dark, some things dazzling, other things "ghostly."   e same goes 
for the hiker: his reality is illuminated for him in some whole other way, as he undertakes certain 
projects, like reading Camus or climbing this mountain, while leaving aside others.   is is the 
"universe embraced by consciousness"; this is reality as a "very subjective a air."
Multiple Realities
Reality is only ever subjective: I have mine, and you have yours, and the world will never, ever show 
up for me as it does for you.  Nabokov insists on this -- indeed, celebrates and is fascinated by it.  
But he also insists that reality is multiple.  His discussions of reality almost always involve a 
multiplicity of realities: his, the reader's, and the dragonﬂy expert's; the naturalist's, the botanist's, 
and the expert in lilies'; Véra's, the hiker's, and his own.  Nabokov once jokes to his students, "you 
sitting there may be merely my dream, and I may be your nightmare" (LL 4), but he never actually 
doubts that their realities are as real to them as his is to him.  And he acknowledges, moreover, that 
these realities exist alongside one another in a shared universe.  In his lecture on Kafka, he describes 
how a tourist, a botanist, and a farmer, all "walking through the same landscape," might embrace 
119that landscape in their own way:
Let us take three types of men walking through the same landscape.  Number One 
is a city man on a well-deserved vacation.  Number Two is a professional botanist.  
Number  ree is a local farmer.  Number One, the city man, is what is called a 
realistic, commonsensical, matter-of-fact type: he sees trees as trees and knows from 
his map that the road he is following is a nice new road leading to Newton, where 
there is a nice eating place recommended to him by a friend in his o ce.   e 
botanist looks around and sees his environment in the very exact terms of plant life, 
precise biological and classiﬁed units such as speciﬁc trees and grasses, ﬂowers and 
ferns, and for him this is reality; to him the world of the stolid tourist (who cannot 
distinguish an oak from an elm) seems a fantastic, vague, dreamy, never-never 
world.  Finally, the world of the local farmer di ers from the two others in that his 
world is intensely emotional and personal since he has been born and bred there, 
and knows every trail and individual tree, and every shadow from every tree across 
every trail, all in warm connection with his everyday work, and his childhood, and a
thousand small things and patterns which the other two -- the humdrum tourist 
and the botanical taxonomist -- simply cannot know in the given place at the given 
time.  Our farmer will not know the relation of the surrounding vegetation to a 
botanical conception of the world, and the botanist will know nothing of any 
importance to him about that barn or that old ﬁeld or that old house under its 
cottonwoods, which are aﬂoat, as it were, in a medium of personal memories for 
one who was born there.
So here we have three di erent worlds -- three men, ordinary men who have 
di erent realities...Indeed, this subjective life is so strong that it makes an empty and
broken shell of the so-called objective existence.   e only way back to objective 
reality is the following one: we can take these several individual worlds, mix them 
thoroughly together, scoop up a drop of that mixture, and call it objective reality.  
We may taste in it a particle of madness if a lunatic passed through our locality, or a 
particle of complete and beautiful nonsense if a man has been looking at a lovely 
ﬁeld and imagining upon it a lovely factory producing buttons or bombs; but on 
the whole these mad particles would be diluted in the drop of objective reality that 
we hold up to the light in our test tube.  Moreover, this objective reality will contain 
something that transcends optical illusions and laboratory tests.  It will have 
elements of poetry, of lofty emotion, of energy and endeavor (and even here the 
button king may ﬁnd his rightful place), of pity, pride, passion -- and the craving 
for a thick steak at the recommended roadside eating place (LL 252-253).
Nabokov describes three di erent levels of "reality" here.   ere's the level at which things -- let's 
take his example of the tree -- are yet-to-be-lit-up, yet-to-be-"embraced by consciousness," and thus 
120as-yet-unreal.   en there's the level at which the tree is "real," that is, "embraced by consciousness." 
In this example it's embraced by many di erent consciousnesses, and so is an element in many 
di erent "realities."  Finally, there's what Nabokov calls the "objective reality" of the tree, which is 
something like the sum total of all these lit-up aspects, distinct both from the "un-embraced" tree 
and the "real" tree that shows up for the tourist, or the botanist, or the farmer, or the button king.  
We can never experience the tree in its "objective reality," but Nabokov believes that we can at least 
imagine what it would be like if we could.  His willingness to imagine that collective, "objective 
reality" -- and, moreover, to imagine that objective reality as good (complete with "elements of 
poetry, of lofty emotion, of energy and endeavor...") -- speaks to his recognition of the many other 
"realities" that exist alongside his own, and challenges the charge of solipsism.  
 ese other realities, moreover, have an e ect on our own, for some of their light reaches us.  A 
lepidopterist discovers a butterﬂy: he notices it, catches it, catalogs it, and in this sense brings it out 
of darkness and into the light.  Now, perhaps, Nabokov reads about the discovery in a journal, or 
ﬁnds a picture of the newly named species in a book.   at butterﬂy is now lit up for him, too -- 
more faintly than it is for the man who discovered it, but more brightly than it was for Nabokov 
before.  He may even plan a trip to see the butterﬂy for himself.  And Nabokov's own enthusiasm for
butterﬂies lights them up a little for the people around him -- for Véra, for his readers.  A person's 
"reality," in other words, even if it is a "very subjective a air," isn't sealed o  to other realities.  Each 
"reality" exists in one universe alongside others, and these are like candles in a room, not marbles in a
jar.  Together they create a kind of background illumination within which our own brighter and 
more particular reality presents itself.   is background illumination precedes us and succeeds us.  
Nabokov's passion for butterﬂies, for example, develops within an already-illuminated world, as he 
121discovers when, around the age of eight, "in a storeroom of our country house, among all kinds of 
dusty objects," he comes across "some wonderful books acquired in the days when my mother's 
mother had been interested in natural science and had had a famous university professor of zoology 
(Shimkevich) give private lessons to her daughter":
Maria Sibylla Merian's (1647-1717) lovely plates of Surinam insects, and Esper's 
noble Die Schmetterlinge (Erlangen 1777)...Still more exciting were the products of 
the latter half of the century -- Hofmann's Die Gross-Schmetterlinge Europas, the 
Grand Duke Nikolay Mihailovich's Mémoires on Asiatic lepidoptera (with 
incomparably beautiful ﬁgures painted by Kavrigin, Rybakov, Lang), Scudder's 
stupendous work on the Butterﬂies of New England (SM 122).
At eight, Nabokov hoped that he would one day make his own discoveries and add to that 
background illumination himself.  And, eventually, in the Museum and in the ﬁeld, he did. 
Everyone's "reality" is di erent -- does that mean that some "realities" are better?  More valuable?
Yes, to the ﬁrst question; no, to the second.  Nabokov does think that certain ways of "embrac[ing]" 
the universe are better than others, inasmuch as they illuminate the world more fully, more brightly, 
more clearly, or more directly than other ways do.  In the ﬁgures of the tourist, the botanist, and the 
farmer, for example, he presents us with a hierarchy of illuminations, and, therefore, of realities.   e
humdrum, realistic, matter-of-fact tourist takes a "commonsense" approach to the landscape around 
him, but this is a relatively innocuous version of commonsense.  His experience of the landscape is 
mostly animated by his "current project" of getting some lunch.   e trees are a nice, green backdrop
for a "well-deserved vacation," the road is just a way to get to the steak house.   is isn't the richest 
way of experiencing the world, but it isn't the worst way, either.  Better to see the trees as just "trees," 
after all, than as obstacles to be cleared to make way for a bomb-factory, for example, or as resources 
to be harvested and sold.  And, of course, there's the possibility that the tourist experiences other 
122parts of his world in a fuller way: the city, his workplace, the social world of o ce-mates and friends 
and leisurely, expensive lunches.
 e next two ways of experiencing the "reality" of the landscape -- the botanist's way and the 
farmer's -- allow the world to show up more brightly than Nabokov imagines it does for the tourist.  
For the botanist the landscape is, as Nabokov says in Strong Opinions, "more real" because more 
"speciﬁc": not only the trees but also the grasses and ﬂowers show up more brightly for him, as more 
particularly what they are.   e botanist experiences the landscape not only with greater speciﬁcity, 
but in a fuller aspect: he can tell that the tree is an elm or an oak, not an oak or an elm, and also 
what kind of elm or oak it is; how old; whether it's healthy or diseased; how it relates to the plants 
and animals around it; how it responds to the soil and wind; and probably a hundred other things as 
well.  He perceives what Boyd says Nabokov's style helps us to perceive: the intrinsic, autonomous 
worth of things.  His specialized vision allows the trees to show as both "professional[ly]" meaningful
and interesting, and inherently, independently worthwhile.  His reality is more textured, more fully 
and brightly lit, than the tourist's.
Above this, though, Nabokov ranks the farmer's way of lighting up the landscape, of bringing it 
into his "reality."  For the farmer the landscape has a great deal of existential importance.  Of the 
three men, the landscape matters the most for the "one who was born there."  It makes the strongest 
demands on him, and it's the most "real" for him.   He loves it and knows it, intimately and in great 
detail, "every trail and individual tree, and every shadow from every tree across every trail, all in 
warm connection with his everyday work, and his childhood, and a thousand small things and 
patterns which the other two...simply cannot know."   e trees, the trail, the ﬁeld, the house show 
up with particular brightness for the farmer because his connection to them is so "warm," so 
123"intensely emotional and personal."  " is is reality" -- and it's not located "beyond human modes of
perception and explanation," as Boyd proposes, but wholly within it.  And yet it's also not reducible,
as de la Durantaye suggests, to those modes of perception and explanation.  It's located neither in the
landscape, "there and itself," nor in the tourist's appetite, the botanist's curiosity, or even the farmer's
rich feeling.  Instead, it's located, for the botanist, in the landscape illuminated by a "botanical 
conception of the world," and, for the farmer, in the ﬁelds "aﬂoat...in a medium of personal 
memories" (my italics).  Both the landscape and the illumination are important here.   e farmer's 
illumination of that landscape, moreover, which Nabokov ranks highest, involves much more than 
just perceiving and explaining.  It also involves doing, working, encountering, loving, remembering.  
Nabokov might have put a landscape painter here, and implied that the brightest reality is an 
artistically perceived one; but instead, importantly, he associates the boldest reality with practices of 
"everyday" living.   e ﬁelds are more real for the farmer than the others not just because he has 
perceived them or thought about them more or explained them better, but because he has lived 
among them, every day, since he was born.   ey're part of the farmer's reality in the same way that 
Nabokov's estate is part of his reality.
 ough Nabokov believes that some ways of "embrac[ing]" the universe are better than others, 
he doesn't believe that any one person's reality is worth more than another's.  Precisely because 
everyone's "reality" is, in Nabokov's conception of things, so uniquely, completely, and inescapably 
theirs, each reality has a kind of absolute value.  Nabokov is consistent on this point, though his 
characteristic haughtiness, his mandarin posturing, his contempt for "philistine vulgarity" and 
condescension toward the "button king[s]" of the world, can sometimes make this hard to perceive.  
In Speak, Memory he derides the Camus-reading hiker who fails to notice what he and Véra cannot 
124help but see; but in the same chapter he imagines how a dipterist, an odonatologist, and a botanist 
might look askance at his own relative unconcern for the objects of their study.  Nabokov concludes 
his Lectures on Literature by acknowledging that all of his students, even the least talented among 
them, are yet "human and divine" (382):
Now the course comes to a close.   e work with this group has been a particularly 
pleasant association between the fountain of my voice and a garden of ears -- some 
open, others closed, many very receptive, a few merely ornamental, but all of them 
human and divine.  Some of you will go on reading great books, others will stop 
reading great books after graduation; and if a person thinks he cannot evolve the 
capacity of pleasure in reading the great artists, then he should not read them at all. 
After all, there are other thrills in other domains: the thrill of pure science is just as 
pleasurable as the pleasure of pure art.   e main thing is to experience that tingle 
in any department of thought or emotion.  We are liable to miss the best of life if 
we do not know how to tingle, if we do not learn to hoist ourselves just a little 
higher than we generally are in order to sample the rarest and ripest fruit of art 
which human thought has to o er (382).
 e sturdy hiker and the stolid tourist might end up "miss[ing] the best of life," and that would be a 
shame; but it doesn't make them any less divine.   e worst sin, in Nabokov's world, isn't missing 
the best of life, but rather failing to grasp this ﬁnal equality.  It's the Humbert Humberts of the 
world who make that mistake, not the Nabokovs.
Reality Happens When You Look Outward
From here it should be clear that "reality," for Nabokov, resides neither in the crisp autonomy of the 
world outside the mind, nor in the peculiar twists and turns of some adventure within the self, but 
rather in the embracement of the universe by consciousness.   e world is made more "real" by our 
embracement of it, and our "realities" are brightened and enhanced by our engagement with the 
world.  Reality is, in this sense, "very subjective" (SO 10); but that subjective emphasis is far from 
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believes that our own realities are the only "reality" we have, he fully acknowledges that these realities
exist alongside those of others; he recognizes that these realities are as "real" and important to those 
people as his own reality is to him; he acknowledges that all of these realities are derived from the 
same, shared universe, which each person embraces in his or her own way; and he insists that those 
individual realities -- those particularly patterned illuminations -- are created not by simply thinking 
about things di erently, or looking out at them di erently from the top of a "perceptual" "ivory 
tower” (de la Durantaye 47), but by actively engaging with those things, in a world shared with 
others: the world of family traditions, art lessons, scientiﬁc expeditions, love a airs, shared spaces, 
knowledge, practices, experiences, habits, rituals. 
Nabokov, it should be underscored, isn't an idealist, and he isn't a skeptic.  He absolutely 
believes that there's a common universe -- or, in Boyd's phrase, an "external world" -- with which 
his, and the hiker's, and the reader's, consciousnesses are involved.  But he also believes that you can 
only ever engage with that external world from a certain position within it, from the center of one 
circle of light or another -- from within, by means of, in terms of, your own reality.  You can't rise up
out of your own consciousness; there's no higher vantage point from which that external world will 
appear "permanently observable, essentially objective, and universally known.”  Even if you can learn
to think impersonally -- like a philosopher, or maybe a novelist -- you can't act, perceive, be involved 
with things impersonally, and so you cannot ever locate your reality in such a place.  You can only 
hunt butterﬂies from one position, your position, on the ground.  Nabokov doesn't ﬁnd this 
disappointing.  On the contrary, he feels that reality as it actually is for each of us, individual, 
various, dynamic, is a far more wonderful thing than any "utterly static...permanently observable, 
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We can sum up Nabokov's portrait of "reality," then, in the following image.  First, there's a ﬁeld
of darkness, reaching out in all directions: this is the unknown, un-"embraced" universe.  Within 
that, a large, subtly illuminated, twilit area: this is the "known," "observed" universe, and, taken in 
all at once, the "objectively real" universe.  Within that, billions of points of light, like stars in the 
night sky, each representing an individual consciousness, shining out on the universe from its own 
unique position, in its own unique way.   It's the light from these stars that creates that faint glow 
between them, that shared world of human knowledge and meaning.  
 is objective view can only be imagined, though; the universe can only ever be experienced 
from within one of those billions of points of light.  What you see from within that light is your 
"reality," and this is the only reality you will ever have access to.  You see whatever shows up, however
it shows up, in the light of your unique consciousness.  Yet you can also make out the presence of 
other consciousness around you.  You can't ever see how, exactly, the world shows up from within 
those other points of light, but you can hear about how it does, read about it, imagine it.  And, 
moreover, much of your own ﬁeld of view is lit up, faintly, by the light from some other 
consciousness or consciousnesses, for whom that part of universe -- that object or that area -- shows 
up much more brightly.  
"Reality," for everyone, comes into being between the human world of knowledge, meaning, and
feeling on the one hand and the dark, non-human world it makes sense of on the other.   ere are 
di erent ways of illuminating that world and allowing it to show up, and in the ﬁgures of the tourist,
the botanist, and the farmer, Nabokov shows us what some of those ways are.   ese di erent ways 
should be familiar to us, for of course we've already encountered them before, in the practices of 
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contribute to, help to form and to enact, what he thinks of as the very best way of allowing the world
to show up: "wonder[ing] at triﬂes."  We can now see that what makes this attunement, this way of 
embracing the world, so valuable is that it allows the whole world to show up as worthy of interest 
and further illumination, not only the big things and the rare things but the "thousand small things 
and patterns" that make up our everyday life (LL 253).   is looking, learning, loving and, in a 
word, living, prompts us to continually reveal more and more of that world, so that "reality" might 
be better thought of as a process than as a structure, as something we are constantly making, rather 
than as something we simply perceive.  
"Wondering at triﬂes" is one version -- in Nabokov's view the "highest" version -- of that process,
that making.  It's a process that occurs neither inside of our heads nor outside in the world, but 
rather in the "embracement" of the two.  In this sense it is not unlike a rainbow.  When we wonder 
at a rainbow, we're not wondering at our own invention, at a hallucination or a dream.  At the same 
time, we aren't wondering at something that exists independently of us, either.  In a universe un-
embraced by consciousness, something would exist in its place -- water droplets and sunlight; but it 
wouldn't be beautiful or wonderful.  It wouldn't be a rainbow.   e rainbow comes into being when 
we embrace the world, and doesn't exist apart from that embracement.  It's this generative 
interaction between world and self that makes the rainbow, for Nabokov, an emblem not only of 
wonder or "the capacity to wonder at triﬂes" but even, perhaps, of "reality" itself.
 e Lunatic and the Businessman
Nabokov is interested in good attunements, in positive ways of illuminating the world and allowing 
128it to show up, but he's also, as I've been arguing, interested in bad, negative, distorted, and deﬁcient 
"realities" and their consequences.  As we've seen, he's interested in two ﬂawed ways of relating to 
the world in particular: "commonsense," and the kind of solipsistic madness exhibited by Humbert 
Humbert.   is interest is never far from Nabokov's mind, as we can see from the details of his Kafka
lecture.   ere, in addition to the neutral-to-good attunements of the tourist, the botanist, and the 
farmer, he glances at two inferior ways of relating to the world:
We may taste in ["objective reality"] a particle of madness if a lunatic passed 
through our locality, or a particle of complete and beautiful nonsense if a man has 
been looking at a lovely ﬁeld and imagining upon it a lovely factory producing 
buttons or bombs (LL 253) [.]
What distinguishes this "madness" and "nonsense" from the other attunements Nabokov describes?
We've already examined "commonsense" at length in Chapter Two.  Here we might simply note 
that the structure of commonsense isn't fundamentally di erent from the "capacity to wonder at 
triﬂes."  It's still an "attunement" to the world in the sense that it "tunes in" to what's there; it just 
does this in a very circumscribed way.  Allowing an oak tree to show up as a tree isn't getting it 
wrong, exactly; but it makes for a very faint illumination.  Just as the particularizing tendency of 
science allows things to show up more brightly, as more fully what they are, so the generalizing 
tendency of commonsense renders things dim or even, as we saw in the case of Kaufman's birder, 
dark.   is is true also of the tendency to see things only in instrumental terms.  Trees are resources, 
but this isn't the only thing they are; and seeing them only in this way also makes for a much 
diminished "reality."  
Nabokov's concern here is that as things become less real for us, they become less meaningful for 
us, less capable of making demands on us.   e negative e ects of this diminishment of meaning 
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"even the button king," as Nabokov concedes (LL 253), might end up creating something of value 
where the farmer's beloved trees once stood, something that enhances the "realities" of the people 
who come to work there.  But Nabokov thinks that the e ects of commonsense are not always so 
mild, and in " e Art of Literature and Commonsense" he alerts us to the dark places where that 
diminishment of reality and meaning can lead.  Mostly he worries about the way commonsense, 
adopted and applied on a large scale, can end up compromising the realities of other people: 
persecuting poets, inhibiting artists, plunging whole nations into war, tearing down a grove of trees 
to make way for a bomb-factory.  He also worries about the ease with which commonsense can take 
root and spread in a world already diminished by commonsense.
 e lunatic's case is di erent.   e lunatic doesn't "allow things to show up" in a peculiar light.  
Instead, his madness prevents things from showing up.  He sees things that aren't there; he distorts 
and invents; he projects his own fantasies onto the world.  He doesn't just "tune in" to the world on 
his own unique wavelength.  And neither does Humbert -- though this is how Humbert seems to 
think about his "nympholepsy," or at least how he seems to want us to think about it.  Humbert 
describes his obsession as a form of special vision that gives him access to something that no one else,
save, perhaps, a few fellow travelers, can see, the way Nabokov's passion for butterﬂies allows him to 
see butterﬂies where "ordinary” people can't (SM 129):
Between the age limits of nine and fourteen there occur maidens who, to certain 
bewitched travelers, twice or many times older than they, reveal their true nature 
which is not human, but nymphic (that is, demoniac); and these chosen creatures I 
propose to designate nymphets (Lolita 16; my italics).
But, as Nabokov says, there are no nymphets to be revealed.  Humbert doesn't reveal something 
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 e butterﬂies, by contrast, are part of a world that exists apart from Nabokov's apprehension of it, 
ready to show up, available for illumination, capable of being a part of someone else's "reality," too --
even if, in Nabokov's terms, that world is only made "real" in its illumination.   e butterﬂies' 
"reality" depends on the illumination of Nabokov's consciousness, but, like a rainbow, isn't reducible
to it.   is is a crucial di erence between Nabokov's singular vision and Humbert's own.
It isn't just, then, that Humbert's "reality" is bad, dark, or overly "subjective"; it's that, in 
Nabokov's terms at least, Humbert doesn't have access to "reality" at all.  Unlike the botanist, the 
farmer, and even the tourist, who each illuminate "the same landscape" but in a di erent way, 
Humbert doesn't illuminate anything.   e world doesn't really show up for him.  He sees a 
nymphet where there is none, only a human being, only a girl.  It's true that something like that 
"human" Lolita shines through Humbert's narrative, in bits of conversation, a couple of letters, 
glimpses into the kinds of things she does and decisions she makes.   is might be artful, or it might 
be accidental, a gift from Humbert's maker; in the sealed-o  world of Lolita, it's impossible to know.
But we can at least say that all of Humbert's deliberate e orts to tell us something about Lolita 
actually tell us nothing about her.   is is obviously the case in those passages in which he complains 
that she was an "exasperating brat," "a disgustingly conventional little girl," "so cruel and crafty in 
everyday life" and so on (Lolita 148; 148; 232).  But it's also true in passages in which he more 
pointedly claims to be revealing something true and important about her, something about her that 
is "really there" and that, moreover, only he can see.  Humbert's well-loved description of Lolita's 
tennis game is an excellent example of this, inasmuch as it shows us very little about Lolita and very 
much about Humbert Humbert.  He doesn't describe her tennis game so much as 
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delirious feeling of teetering on the very brink of unearthly order and splendor 
(230).
In this scene and elsewhere, Humbert shows us not Lolita but his passion for her, the "almost painful
convulsion of beauty assimilation" (231) she "produce[s]" in him.  And, actually, not even so much 
"she" but rather the unearthly nymphet he imagines in her place.  Of the terrestrial girl he knows 
and wants to know very little.  Humbert's "singular...vision" doesn't illuminate Lolita (de la 
Durantaye 47), the way the farmer, through his "intensely emotional and personal" engagement with
the world, lights up the landscape (LL 253).  Rather, it settles like a "prismatic" haze around her 
(Lolita 42), and keeps us from seeing much of her at all.
 e closed-o  quality of Humbert's vision manifests itself, as we've seen, in the lack of 
"wondering" -- of curiosity, surprise, and speculation -- in his narrative, and this lack of wondering 
points us to further di erences between Nabokov's "very subjective" approach to "reality" and 
Humbert's solipsistic approach to the world (SO 10).  Where Nabokov's "reality" is a dynamic 
process, for example, constantly expanding, incorporating new things into itself, pressing in on the 
dark and ghostly edges of things, Humbert's "reality," such as it is, is totally static.  His obsession 
precludes him from really learning about and loving and living among the things around him, 
because it focuses his attention so exclusively on one person, and because it actively keeps him from 
being curious about even her.  In Speak, Memory, Nabokov tells us that his life, too, was, at points, 
"dominated by a single passion" (119); but Nabokov's "mania," his "demon" (126; 127), as we've 
seen, brought him out, butterﬂy net in hand, into the world -- and not only the natural world but 
also the shared, social world of human meaning.  It connects him to his father, who once shared the 
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community, from which he learns and to which he contributes.
21 But Humbert's obsession, by 
contrast, keeps him out of the world.  It isolates him from everyone and everything: he has no 
friends, no family, no home, no job, no real projects or interests outside of nymphets.  By the time 
we meet him, he seems even to have forsaken the company of books, with the exception of volume C
of the Girls' Encyclopedia.
Humbert's way of relating to the world, then, is totally, fundamentally di erent from Nabokov's 
way of relating to it -- not an extension, intensiﬁcation, or misapplication of it.  Nabokov's 
attunement to things, though "very subjective," though uniquely his own, is fundamentally outward-
facing, involved in, and open to the world, as I've aimed to show.  Humbert's way of relating to the 
world, by contrast, is inward-facing, uninvolved, closed to the world and closed in on itself.  It's 
Humbert who "focuses with rare intensity on the passionate pursuit of an inner vision," (de la 
Durantaye 47), not Nabokov.  Nabokov focuses with rare intensity on the passionate pursuit of 
"reality," and that pursuit is directed in an outward direction, toward the world.   e di erence 
between the two is the di erence between the fresh rainbows of Speak, Memory, which, while 
uniquely attended to by Nabokov, are basically available for everyone to see, and the grotesque 
rainbows of Lolita, which exist, like most of Humbert's "reality," entirely within the conﬁnes of his 
own mind.  Only Humbert can see Lolita's "nacreous liver" and his own "rainbow blood," and even 
then only in his mind's eye.  Ultimately, it is doubtful whether Humbert's vision of the world -- 
21. And also, of course, Nabokov's love of butterﬂies took him all over the United States, on those 
road trips and expeditions out of which he would construct the travel scenes of Lolita.  Of their 
journey Humbert says, "We had been everywhere.  We had really seen nothing" (Lolita 175).
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word, "real."  Its e ect on Lolita's reality, however, cannot be doubted.
Attunements and Actions
My aim here has been to characterize Humbert Humbert's solipsistic vision as a radical negation of 
Nabokov's outward-facing attunement to the world.  No serious critic doubts that Humbert does 
bad things and Nabokov does not; but there's a critical tendency, represented here by the arguments 
of Richard Rorty and Leland de la Durantaye, to see Humbert's "artistic gifts" and "passionate 
pursuit of an inner vision" as being uncomfortably similar to Nabokov's own.  Rorty, de la 
Durantaye and others interpret that similarity as a kind of self-critique, a refutation or complication 
of Nabokov's moral claims for the power of those gifts or the primacy of that vision.  And yet, as I've
aimed to show, there's actually no such similarity between them at all.  Humbert notices, but he 
doesn't wonder; and his singular vision turns away from the world, while Nabokov's turns 
emphatically towards it.   us Lolita doesn't, as Rorty suggests, exhibit Nabokov's "inability to 
believe his own general ideas." In particular, it doesn't contradict Nabokov's claim that the "capacity 
to wonder at triﬂes" is a state of mind in which we "know the world to be good."
At the outset of this chapter I suggested that what Nabokov meant by this claim is what he shows
us in Speak, Memory: that the capacity to wonder at triﬂes is a special state of consciousness that 
allows the world to show up for us as a source of wonder, joy, and meaning.  It allows the world to 
show up as more ﬁnally a source of wonder than of fear, joy than of pain, meaning than of 
meaninglessness -- and, in this sense, as "good."  Having examined Nabokov's idea of "what reality 
is" (LL 252), we can now add that this goodness isn't, in Nabokov's view, just something that we 
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project onto it.  Rather, it's a possibility that exists in the world itself, a way the world has of showing
up, just as it can also show up, if we're oriented toward it in a di erent way, as a fearful place, or a 
collection of resources.  In Nabokov's view, though, "reality" isn't located, or doesn't take place, out 
there, in the un-embraced universe that might yet show up as one thing or another.  It takes place in 
the showing up.  Consequently he can claim that "in this state of mind" we not only experience the 
world as good, or even allow the world to show up as good, but that we actually know the world to 
"be" good.  It "is" good because that is what it is for us when we are disposed to it in that particular 
way -- in what Nabokov considers the "highest" way.
It should be noted that this isn't an instrumental claim.  Nabokov isn't saying, for example, that 
in this "state of mind" we do good things, make good decisions, act virtuously, treat people well.  
Nabokov is, in fact, always circumspect in his moral claims about perceptions and attunements and 
"artistic gifts" -- not skeptical, exactly, in the way Rorty suggests, but careful, cautious.  He says, for 
example, that "aesthetic bliss" connects us "somehow, somewhere...with other states of being where 
art (curiosity, tenderness, kindness, ecstasy) is the norm" (Lolita 315), and he suggests that the study 
of literature can help us to "hoist ourselves just a little higher than we generally are" (LL 382) -- but 
this is about as far as he ever goes.  He's just as circumspect about the moral import of a state of 
mind in which we "know the world to be good."   ere's no doubt that that knowledge has a kind of
moral meaning in itself: it can, for example, serve to comfort us in dark times, as Nabokov suggests 
in " e Art of Literature and Commonsense"; and there's a basic way in which, from the perspective
of someone like Nabokov, simply embracing the smallest, most trivial parts of the universe, enriching
"reality," just expanding the boundary of that general illumination -- is good and worthwhile. But 
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knowing the world to be good translate, in any direct way, into doing good in the world? 
It's really Lolita that raises this question.  In Lolita, as I've argued, Nabokov shows us the 
opposite of what he shows us in Speak, Memory: a vision of the world from within the mind of 
someone utterly cut o  from the "highest form[] of consciousness," who doesn't wonder at triﬂes 
and doesn't "know the world to be good."  But Humbert also does terrible things: he stinks, he 
cheats, he tortures.  Is Nabokov positing a relationship between Humbert's defective way of 
orienting himself to things -- his bad "disposition" -- and his actual crimes?  And, if so, is he 
suggesting that the opposite is also true, that the good attunement portrayed in Speak, Memory leads 
to good deeds, good actions?  
Lolita and Speak, Memory do, I think, suggest that there's a connection between our attunements
and our actions.  But they don't go so far as to suggest that that connection is causal, or even 
necessary.  Humbert Humbert doesn't make Lolita's life miserable because he doesn't wonder at 
triﬂes.  And he doesn't fail to wonder at triﬂes because he's made Lolita's life miserable.  Instead the 
two things seem to reinforce one another: Humbert's obsession, his bad disposition, cuts him o  
from the world; it keeps him from being curious about or capable of being surprised by other people;
this makes it easier for them not to matter to him; which makes it easier for him to judge their 
"realities" unequal to his own; which makes it easier for him to do harm to them; which cuts him o 
further from them and from the world; and so on.   e attunements and the actions are related, but 
Nabokov doesn't suggest that either one comes before the other; it may simply be that both things 
just are true for a person like Humbert Humbert.  Perhaps this is simply what it is to be cut o  from 
the highest form of consciousness -- Nabokov's most extreme vision of what is to be without access 
136to that attunement.  But being cut o  from the world, having no "capacity to wonder at triﬂes," 
need not necessarily translate into the kind of things Humbert does.   e lunatic who passes through 
Nabokov's landscape might very well be a harmless soul.
Similarly, then, Nabokov suggests that good attunements and good actions are natural, if not 
necessary, companions.  An attunement that allows things to show up as valuable, as capable of 
making demands on us; that helps us to more fully reveal the world as a source of wonder and joy; 
that encourages us to respect and respond to things, and to acknowledge the “realities” of other 
people; that adds to and enriches their realities by lighting the universe up a little for them: this 
seems like a good foundation, if nothing else, not just for knowing the good but actually being good,
doing good, or at least not doing harm.   e farmer, because he cares for the trees and the ﬁelds, 
because they matter to him in the deepest possible way, is less likely to cut them down than are the 
bomb-maker or the button king, for whom they mean much less.  And yet Nabokov understands 
that knowing the good isn't su cient for doing good; that it's a help and a natural companion for 
virtue but not a guarantee.  Nabokov does think that there's a "special connection" between his 
"gifts" and "pity and kindness," but at the same time he knows it isn't a necessary connection, and 
that it probably isn't as strong a connection as he would like it to be (Rorty 168).  Nabokov shows us
this, not in Lolita and not in the ﬁgure of Humbert Humbert, but in Speak, Memory, in the ﬁgure of 
Sergey Nabokov.  
Nabokov's brother Sergey functions in Speak, Memory as a reminder of how hard, how 
complicated, the translation of attunements into actions can be.  As I argued in Chapter  ree, 
Speak, Memory shows us how the world shows up in the light of the "highest form[] of 
consciousness."  It shows us what it is to wonder at triﬂes, to know the world to be good, to dispose 
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correspondingly, there's lots of noticing, wondering, meaning and mattering, pity and kindness 
captured in the book.  But Speak, Memory is also haunted by the ﬁgure of Sergey Nabokov, whom 
Nabokov, and, in Nabokov's reporting, his whole family, failed to notice, wonder at, value, care 
about, and, in a word, love, enough.  
"For various reasons I ﬁnd it inordinately hard to speak about my other brother," he writes, after 
telling us about Kirill, as though even saying Sergey's name would be painful for him.  Sergey was 
born less than a year after Nabokov and looked very much like him; in the caption to one early 
photograph Nabokov notes that they look practically like twins.  Nabokov describes him as
a mere shadow in the background of my richest and most detailed recollections.  I 
was the coddled one; he, the witness of coddling...We seldom played together, he 
was indi erent to most of the things I was fond of -- toy trains, toy pistols, Red 
Indians, Red Admirables.  At six or seven he developed a passionate adulation, 
condoned by Mademoiselle, for Napoleon and took a little bronze bust of him to 
bed.  As a child, I was rowdy, adventurous and something of a bully.  He was quiet 
and listless, and spent much more time with our mentors than I.  At ten, began his 
interest in music, and thenceforth he took innumerable lessons, went to concerts 
with our father, and spent hours on end playing snatches of operas, on an upstairs 
piano well within earshot.  I would creep up behind and prod him in the ribs -- a 
miserable memory (257).
Nabokov worries that he never really understood his brother, who died "of inanition" in a Hamburg 
concentration camp in 1945, and that the world didn't either.  He worries that Sergey was owed 
something more from the world than he got: "compassion, understanding, no matter what" (258).  
In addition to the di erences Nabokov lists above, Sergey was also homosexual, and some of 
Nabokov's discomfort with that fact lingers, I think, in the "inordinate[]" di culty he has in 
speaking about him.  But much of that di culty seems to have to do with his deep sense of regret -- 
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remembers or imagines it, but especially for his own lack of understanding of and compassion for 
Sergey.  
After speaking of Sergey, in Chapter  irteen, with such di culty, Nabokov doesn't speak of 
him anymore.  And yet he is careful to include him in every chapter of his memoir up to that point.  
Sergey is everywhere in the background of Nabokov's recollections, and though he is most often a 
"mere shadow," stammering, wheezing, meekly obeying, being kicked and prodded and bullied by 
his brother, wiping his glasses, being ignored, he is always there.   ere is one exception: Nabokov 
doesn't include his brother in Chapter Six, his chapter on butterﬂies; though in a way, I think, he 
does.  In that chapter he tells us about a schoolmate of his who once, at a di cult time in his life, 
came to visit him, and whom he ignored:
I remember the visit of a schoolmate, a boy of whom I was very found and with 
whom I had excellent fun.  He arrived one summer night -- in 1913, I think -- from
a town some twenty-ﬁve miles away.  His father had recently perished in an 
accident, the family was ruined and the stouthearted lad, not being able to a ord 
the price of a railway ticket, had bicycled all those miles to spend a few days with 
me.
On the morning following his arrival, I did everything I could to get out of the 
house for my morning hike without his knowing where I had gone.  Breakfastless, 
with hysterical haste, I gathered my net, pill boxes, killing jar, and escaped through 
the window.  Once in the forest, I was safe; but still I walked on, my calves quaking,
my eyes full of scalding tears, the whole of me twitching with shame and self-
disgust, as I visualized my poor friend, with his long pale face and black tie, moping
in the hot garden -- patting the panting dogs for want of something better to do, 
and trying hard to justify my absence to himself (127).
 e incident, which pained Nabokov then and seems to pain him still, is the only real moral 
transgression Nabokov describes from his youth.  It's signiﬁcant in that it demonstrates the 
limitations of the Nabokovian attunement.  Nabokov has no trouble imagining his friend's 
139unhappiness.  But he does have trouble doing what's right, because a person, the scene suggests, is 
more than his attunement.  Here, Nabokov shows a want of willpower and self-discipline; even as he 
has no trouble imagining his friend's hurt feelings, he is overcome by other emotions of his own -- 
fear, desire, shame at his own untroubled existence -- which he is unable to constrain or manage.  
His attuned imagination does, crucially, provide him with a sharpened sense of his own guilt.  But 
there's no easy connection between this imaginative wondering and doing the right thing; Nabokov 
might be attuned to the world in a way that allows things to show up as important, to imagine and 
wonder, but that attunement doesn't prevent him from slighting and neglecting his friend.
 is incident gains more weight in the text when we see it as being part of a much larger 
preoccupation in Speak, Memory with failures, not only of understanding and compassion, but of the
translation of that understanding into action.   e sense of that failure is concentrated almost 
entirely around the ﬁgure of Sergey, whom Nabokov bullies, neglects, and, he worries, just doesn't 
try hard enough to imagine and understand.  Sergey's conspicuous absence from the chapter -- the 
only such absence in Chapters One through  irteen -- calls for explanation, and the explanation, I 
think, is that the schoolmate is meant to stand in for Sergey here.   e association is made stronger 
by the fact that this incident foreshadows a later image in the book involving Sergey.  Nabokov 
recounts how he and Véra ﬂed Paris in haste, leaving Sergey behind:
We again met in the nineteen-thirties, and were on quite amiable terms in 
1938-1940, in Paris.  He often dropped in for a chat, rue Boileau where I lodged in 
two shabby rooms with you and our child, but it so happened (he had been away 
for a while) that he learned of our departure to America only after we had left.  My 
bleakest recollections are associated with Paris, and the relief of leaving it was 
overwhelming, but I am sorry he had to stutter his astonishment to an indi erent 
concierge (258).
140Here again, Nabokov can only imagine his brother's surprise and disappointment at ﬁnding him 
gone, and his e orts to explain, like the schoolmate, Nabokov's unannounced departure to himself.  
 e Sergey theme is subtle but omni-present in Speak, Memory, and in it Nabokov concentrates 
his feelings of regret and shame, of having done other people wrong, of having failed to understand 
where he should have understood, of having not been imaginative enough, compassionate enough, 
and of having failed to follow through on what his imagination did reveal.  It doesn't deny the 
possibility of a connection between good attunements and good actions, but it suggests that that 
connection, whatever it is, isn't simple, causal, or necessary; that human beings, and moral life, are 
too complicated for that.  " e capacity to wonder at triﬂes" might be an instrument of moral good, 
as Shelley said of the imagination; but there are many other instruments as well: moral laws, local 
rules, cultural norms, political action, religious obligations.  Perhaps the will, or reason, plays a larger
role in moral life than attunements do.  Nabokov is interested in the overlap between attunements 
and actions -- but he never imagines that that overlap is total, and there is much to interest him 
about those attunements apart from their role in moral life.
A Riddle with an Elegant Solution
When asked why he wrote Lolita, Nabokov famously answered:
It was an interesting thing to do.  Why did I write any of my books, after all?  For 
the sake of the pleasure, for the sake of the di culty. I have no social purpose, no 
moral message; I've no general ideas to exploit, I just like composing riddles with 
elegant solutions (SO 16).
 is is a statement designed to tantalize readers, and many critics have taken a stab at answering the 
question of what that "elegant solution" might be.  I don't propose to have "solved" Lolita, but, in 
141my reading, the novel does conform to what Nabokov thinks a good riddle, and a good solution, 
looks like.  He describes one such "elegant" riddle in Speak, Memory:
I remember one particular [chess] problem I had been trying to compose for 
months.   ere came a night when I managed at last to express that particular 
theme.  It was meant for the very expert solver.   e unsophisticated might miss the 
point of the problem entirely, and discover its fairly simple, "thetic" solution 
without having passed through the pleasurable torments prepared for the 
sophisticated one.   e latter would start by falling for an illusory pattern of play 
based on a fashionable avant-garde theme (exposing White's King to checks), which
the composer had taken the greatest pains to "plant" (with only one obscure little 
move by an inconspicuous pawn to upset it).  Having passed through this 
"antithetic" inferno the by now ultrasophisticated solver would reach the simple key
move (bishop to c2) as somebody on a wild goose chase might go from Albany to 
New York by way of Vancouver, Eurasia and the Azores.   e pleasant experience of 
the roundabout route (strange landscapes, gongs, tigers, exotic customs, the thrice-
repeated circuit of a newly married couple around the sacred ﬁre of an earthen 
brazier) would amply reward him for the misery of the deceit, and after that, his 
arrival at the simple key move would provide him with a synthesis of poignant 
artistic delight (291-292).
Lolita is a riddle, as the rich and ever-expanding critical conversation around it suggests.   e novel  
pulls us, ever deeper, into the interpretive "torments" prepared for us by Nabokov.  Does Humbert 
love Lolita? Does he at least come to love her?  What should we make of Humbert's powers of 
attention, his appreciation of beauty?  Do they suggest that there's something potentially suspect 
about certain modes of appreciation, certain forms of attention?  Where is his "moral apotheosis" 
located?  In what does it consist?  How credible is it?  Does it matter whether it's credible or not?  
How can we tell, when all we have are Humbert's words?  Is Lolita, ﬁnally, just about language, 
about the power -- or ﬁnal meaninglessness -- of style?   e fact is that there's no ﬁnal way of 
answering most these questions, because the book is so completely Humbert's narrative, so entirely 
sealed o  to views and voices other than his own.  Every interpretation of Humbert's motives and 
142actions is ﬁnally unreliable, because Humbert is ﬁnally unreliable -- and not only unreliable but 
ingenious, and an absolute master of words.  Any conclusion we come to about his narrative is 
necessarily "check[ed]" by the fact that he might have already beaten us to it, that he might have 
already considered, and even guided us into, that particular play.  Hence the interpretive "inferno," 
the "wild goose chase," the "torments" -- "pleasurable" torments, but torments nonetheless.  
And yet, there's a "simple key move" available to us.   at move is to read Lolita alongside the 
book that came before it.   is is the "solution" I'm suggesting: that Speak, Memory and Lolita are 
meant to be read as a pair.  Speak, Memory gives us the outside view we need to see Humbert 
Humbert, and his narrative, for what they are.  It allows us to see Lolita as the "queer mirror side" of 
Speak, Memory, as Nabokov's way of pursuing a topic he'd already pursued in his memoir, but from 
a completely di erent direction.  In his memoir Nabokov had explored the gift of a good 
attunement.  He'd shown what the world looks like in the light of the highest form of consciousness.
He'd revealed what the "capacity to wonder at triﬂes" is all about it.  In Lolita, if only because "[i]t 
was an interesting things to do," he explored the curse of a bad "attunement."  He showed what the 
world looks like to someone cut o  from that highest form of consciousness, and what it is to be 
incapable of wonder.  
From this perspective, all our complicated inquiries into the quality of Humbert's love and 
remorse, and the relation of his "artistic gifts" to Nabokov's own, begin to look like an "illusory 
pattern of play."  If Humbert shares some of Nabokov's verbal brilliance, his wit, his literary 
knowledge; if he appears, at ﬁrst glance, to share his capacity for wonder; if he looks to be, by the 
end of the novel, a moral man, well that's because, as Humbert says, all performances are more 
interesting when they aren't what they seem:
143We all admire the spangled acrobat with classical grace meticulously walking his 
tight rope in the talcum light; but how much rarer art there is in the sagging rope 
expert wearing scarecrow clothes and impersonating a grotesque drunk! I should 
know (249).
And yet that illusion is important, the basis not only of our pleasure, as in the case of the circus-goer,
but also of our understanding.  It's important that Humbert look a bit like Nabokov, that he appear, 
at least at ﬁrst, to share some of his artistic gifts.  For the illusion drives us to ask questions which, 
otherwise, as "unsophisticated" readers, we would never have asked.  As unsophisticated readers, we 
might have been content to declare Humbert uncomplicatedly evil from the outset.  But taking the 
"roundabout route" opens up new vistas.  It helps to appreciate the full extent of what the "simple" 
pairing of Lolita and Speak, Memory can help us to see.  
Seeing Speak, Memory and Lolita as a pair helps us to recognize Speak, Memory as Nabokov's 
picture of paradise, and Lolita as his vision of hell.  It helps us to distinguish wondering from mere 
noticing, and singular realities from solipsism.  And it also helps us to appreciate something else, too:
that Nabokov followed up his celebration of an extraordinary childhood with an elegy for an 
ordinary one, and in this way drew an equivalence between them -- the childhoods of a extra-
privileged, super-gifted, trilingual boy and a middle-class, ordinary, American girl, two children with 
equal claims, but not equal access, to happiness.  If, in Speak, Memory, we see Nabokov's "thetic" 
move, while in Lolita see his "antithetic" one, then in their combination we ﬁnd a "poignant" 
"synthesis" -- a powerful representation of the full range of forms of consciousness available within 
human experience.
144CONCLUSION:
Understanding Nabokov's Details
My ambition, in this study, has been to o er a fuller account than already exists of the meaning of, 
and motivations behind, Nabokov's famous passion for detail.  Nabokov communicates that passion 
directly, in his letters, lectures, interviews, prefaces, and afterwords, in numerous statements 
underscoring the detail's importance and authority; and he occasionally has his characters give voice 
to those views, so that they turn up in his ﬁction as well.
22 But he also, even more famously, 
communicates that passion implicitly, by means of his uniquely vivid, pointedly precise, 
emphatically detailphilic style.   is emphasis on detail is one of the ﬁrst things most readers tend to 
associate with Nabokov, and it's certainly one of the ﬁrst things we tend to associate with his writing.
In the discussion that precedes these pages, I've emphasized the premium Nabokov places on 
"wonder[ing] at triﬂes" not so much in literature, or in art, but in life; and not even so much in 
remembered or imagined life -- though "the detail is all," for Nabokov, there too (Ada 71) -- but in 
life as it unfolds in real time, as it shows up in the present, as it is lived in the here and now.   is, I 
22.  ese embedded arguments for detail include Ada's assertion, in Ada, or Ardor, that, in memory 
as in life, "the detail is all" (71); Martin's celebration of literary detail in Glory ("Just as, in the New 
Testament, Martin enjoyed coming across 'green grass' or 'indigo chiton,' in literature he sought not 
the general sense, but the unexpected, sunlit clearings, where you can stretch until your joints 
crunch, and remain entranced") (62-63); Krug's Nabokovian observation, in Bend Sinister, that "the 
edible Galilean ﬁshes in the ﬁrst century A.D. would be primarily chromids and barbels although in 
Raphael's representation of the miraculous draught we ﬁnd among nondescript piscine forms of the 
young painter's fancy two specimens which obviously belong to the skate family, never found in 
fresh water" (155), among many other examples.
145believe, is where we should look ﬁrst for an understanding of what Nabokov's detailphilic style is all 
about.  Readers who look, instead, in their explanations of that style, to Nabokov's inheritance from 
other writers, or to the inﬂuence upon him of literary movements, or to the e ect upon him of 
political developments at home and abroad, begin their inquiries from too late a point in the author’s
life.  Nabokov's passion for detail had already been set well before his ﬁrst encounters with Russian 
Formalism, or even before his ﬁrst serious encounters with Flaubert.
23 It evolved earlier on, as Speak, 
Memory suggests and as I've emphasized here, in the parks and parlors of Vyra and Morskaya Street.  
 at isn't to say that that early passion didn't make Nabokov more open to the inﬂuence of those 
writers and movements; but it is to say that it precedes, and exceeds, that inﬂuence.  Nabokov's 
famous passion for detail, in sum, extends less from his encounters with books than from his 
encounters with and adventures in the world outside them.
Above all, I've emphasized the premium Nabokov places on a certain way of being in the world, 
what he calls the "highest form[] of consciousness."   is, of course, is "the capacity to wonder at 
triﬂes," a way of attuning oneself to the world in such a way that its smallest, most trivial and 
peripheral, aspects show up as occasions for wonder.  Nabokov suggests that the value of this way of 
being lies in its ability to allow things to show up as distinct and non-interchangeable, weighty, 
meaningful, as genuinely important both for us and in themselves -- to show up, in a word, as 
mattering.  It does this in open opposition to "commonsense," on the one hand, which hardly allows
things to show up as mattering at all; and, on the other, the sort of self-involved solipsism that 
23. For arguments emphasizing Nabokov's inheritance from Flaubert, for example, see James Wood, 
 e Broken Estate; for his relation to Russian Formalism, see Glynn, Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian 
and Russian Formality Inﬂuences in His Novels; for the contrary inﬂuence of Soviet collectivism, see 
Bell-Villada's Art for Art's Sake and Literary Life. 
146threatens to cut one o  from the world altogether.   is ethos, so particular to and characteristic of 
Nabokov, lends itself naturally to the detail-oriented style we see on display in Speak, Memory and 
also, though in more complicated ways, in his novels.   e desire to allow things to show up as 
distinct, non-interchangeable, intrinsically "important" lends itself to precisely the sorts of stylistic 
techniques for which Nabokov is so well-known: the emphasis on visual precision and verbal 
speciﬁcity; the closeness and extravagance of his authorial attention; the almost pedantic emphasis on
descriptive accuracy, on seeing and describing things clearly, rather than diminishing them with 
inattention, or obscuring them by seeing something else in their stead. 
Some Objections to Nabokov's Detailphilic Style
My account of Nabokov's detailphilic style addresses itself, in particular, to two ways in which our 
present explanations of that style fall short.   e ﬁrst, introduced in my ﬁrst chapter and carried 
through to the last, is the tendency to understand Nabokov's detailed style in terms of the 
importance he places on noticing well, paying attention to things, being a good observer.   is 
relatively ﬂat understanding of what Nabokov is up to is problematic in itself, inasmuch as it keeps 
us from appreciating the full import of what is, perhaps, the most central part of his artistic creed; 
and it can also, as I've shown in Chapter Four, lead us to actively misunderstand other aspects of his 
work.  So long as we think Nabokov's details are merely indications of having "notic[ed] things that 
most other people do not notice, being curious about what others take for granted, seeing the 
momentary iridescence and not just the underlying formal structure," we'll tend to see his "artistic 
gifts" as being provocatively similar to those of a good noticer like Humbert Humbert (Rorty 159).  
 e other tendency, which I have addressed in a less direct way, is the tendency to see this aspect of 
147Nabokov's style as being, essentially, just about "style," a style of writing and a style of seeing, an 
inheritance from other stylists, capable of being parodied, emulated, inherited in turn.   ere are 
other ways of thinking about Nabokov's details, too; Brian Boyd, for example, emphasizes the way 
those details involve the reader in a special drama of perception and pattern-ﬁnding:
Reading one of Nabokov's works allows us to become aware of the process of 
gradually distinguishing and relating things in more and more detail: we experience 
an ever-deepening knowledge of reality, a succession of mingled pleasures and 
vexations, in which attention meets with obstacles, distractions, the illusion of 
insigniﬁcance, but can suddenly discover a connection hitherto unseen (Nabokov's 
Ada 41).
Daniel Albright, on the other hand, has seen in Nabokov's approach to detail a preoccupation with 
the limits of representation, with the way "reality" always eludes the artist who tries, as Nabokov 
does, to seize it; and with the way that very elusiveness opens up certain possibilities for the writer 
that might not have been available had "reality" been easier to seize.   e more general trend, 
though, is toward those two forms of under-reading: seeing Nabokov's love of detail as merely an 
expression of his commitment to good noticing, or as merely an aspect of style.
I want to turn now, in this last chapter, to this latter way of thinking about Nabokov's details.  In
this view, Nabokov's details are primarily related to a certain style of looking or seeing and, especially,
of writing.  Many people simply love the style -- the surface "manner...mannerisms, various special 
tricks" that stamp Nabokov's work as his (Nabokov, LL 113).  Lila Azam Zanganeh, for example, in 
her recent, exuberant, unapologetically uncritical celebration of the author, begins her chapter on 
Nabokov's details in the following way:
Once he had crossed over the transparent abyss of exile, borne the loss of his 
boyhood, his Russian, and his father, VN fervently wrote himself into happiness.  
His writing became the joyous "record of his love a air" with language.  A magic 
148carpet on which the lucky reader might zip in and out of a light-infused sky, loll on 
limpid clouds, ogle at detail after detail of landscapes wild and new.
Because, no matter how snarled the stories, how outlandish the plots, all it 
amounts to (in the end) is a certain way of looking.  Amid spinning planets, where 
nothing is impossible and mad lovers are immortal, details are the only spell. 
"Caress the details!  e divine details!" (107).
Zanganeh delights in Nabokov's details.  Still, she sees them as expressions of a "certain way of 
looking" and a certain way of writing, and these aren't fully adequate terms.  Nabokov's details, as I 
hope to have shown by this point, are expressive not merely of a "way of looking" but of a whole way
of being, of disposing oneself toward the world, of a special attunement to the world that exceeds its 
manifestation in words.  To see them as merely an expression of style, of certain aesthetic interests 
and commitments, is to not quite see them for all that they are.
 e real value of this account, though, lies not so much in its ability to respond to committed 
Nabokophiles like Zanganeh as in its ability to respond to those who are more skeptical of 
Nabokov's mania for detail, who see in it something frivolous, insu cient, or otherwise problematic.
Even those who admire Nabokov for other reasons sometimes express frustration with his unending 
love-a air with triﬂes and particulars.   e speciﬁcity of his terms can seem fussy and artiﬁcial; the 
visual brilliance of his descriptions can appear "dazzling to the point of weakness" (Michael Wood 
23);
24 his extravagant articulation of the material world can seem like a distraction from more 
important things.  In his essay "Half-Against Flaubert," James Wood takes a strong position against 
24. "Dazzling to the point of weakness" is Michael Wood's description not of Nabokov's style but of
what he calls his "signature" -- Nabokov's typical "habit" and "practice," the special "marks" we
easily recognize as his. It isn't, Michael Wood says, always dazzling to the point of weakness, but it
can be. Nabokov's style, on the other hand, is something di erent -- stealthier, rarer, harder to
recognize yet more "intimately" his own.
149this aspect of Nabokov's art.   ere Wood, who admires both Nabokov and Flaubert, argues that it is
nevertheless "hard not to resent" the latter for making "style a problem for the ﬁrst time in ﬁction," 
and points to Nabokov as part of Flaubert's legacy in this regard.  After Flaubert, style becomes self-
conscious, a "trapped decision," surrounded always by anxiety and scruple, a primary object of 
attention in itself, so that the issue of style becomes impossible to avoid ( e Broken Estate 57).   is 
is true even for those writers who try to avoid “style” altogether, for a decision against style is, of 
course, still a stylistic decision.   us Flaubert, Wood writes, "gave birth to Nabokov on one side, 
and to Hemingway on the other" (59).  Nabokov is Wood's example of a writer for whom style is all-
important, for whom style is practically everything.  
Nabokov inherits one aspect of Flaubert's style in particular, his emphasis on visual detail: 
From Flaubert comes that fetishizing of the visual for which Nabokov is always 
praised and which is actually his deepest limitation...[T]he danger of Flaubert's 
heavily visual details is that they ﬂatter the visual over the unseen, the external over 
the interior..., that writing becomes primarily, and in some cases only, a way of 
making us feel 'almost materially the objects [it] describes.'  Furthermore, in 
addition to the tyranny of the visual, comes the tyranny of the detail...Flaubert gave 
birth to the orthodoxy that the ﬁnest style of writing is a procession of strung 
details, a necklace of sensualities.  We see this in Updike and above all in 
Nabokov...In Nabokov especially, the anxiety with which Flaubert surrounds detail -
- the awful chosenness of it -- becomes a kind of terror, an inability to draw away 
from detail; and a concomitant paralysis, a static cult of the local; a frieze...[P]recise,
observed detail is the food of any decent ﬁction.  But Flaubert surely 
institutionalized this way of writing, canonized it into orthodoxy.  Flaubert made it 
into a style (61) [.] 
 ere are really two kinds of objections here, one aesthetic, one more philosophical.  First, Wood 
argues that a style that puts so high a premium on precision and solidity may ultimately become 
fragmented and immobile.  Nabokov’s detail-centric prose, he writes, risks devolving into nothing 
but a string of details, a series of static, self-enclosed, deliberate descriptions.  Each distinctly 
150observed detail, moreover, has about it an aura of terrible deliberation, “awful chosenness,” and this 
has the e ect, among other things, of drawing attention to the surface of the style, so that we end up 
attending more to Nabokov’s descriptive techniques than to what they aim to reveal.  Whereas Saul 
Bellow "notices superbly," as Wood says elsewhere, "Nabokov wants to tell us how important it is to 
notice.  Nabokov's ﬁction is always becoming propaganda on behalf of good noticing, hence on 
behalf of itself" (HFW 62-63).
 e second objection is ultimately more philosophical in nature.  Wood worries that an outsized 
artistic emphasis on the visual outlines of the world -- an overindulgence in what Nabokov, in his 
lecture on Dickens, calls the “art of vivid sensuous evocation” (LL 113) -- may come at the expense 
of exploring and evoking other, deeper, more important things.  If we take the job of the novel -- or 
one of its more important jobs -- to be that it gives us access to the inner life, to consciousness, to the
“unseen” world of feeling and belief, then this overemphasis on surface forms and colors and textures 
must seem a “danger” and a distraction, a misallocation of energy and interest.  
 is particular objection has a long history, inasmuch as it recalls Augustine’s argument against 
the dangers of “curiosity.”  In Book Ten of his Confessions, Augustine describes the habit of 
wondering at triﬂes -- of delighting, inquiring into, and speculating about "trivial and insigniﬁcant 
matters" (243), of taking pleasure in visual surfaces and indulging in the "gratiﬁcation of the eye" 
(241) -- as a temptation we ought to resist, lest it distract us from deeper, more important things:
For in addition to our bodily appetites...the mind is also subject to a certain 
propensity to use the sense of the body, not for self-indulgence of a physical kind, 
but for the satisfaction of its own inquisitiveness...
[W]ho can tell how many times each day our curiosity is tempted by the most 
trivial and insigniﬁcant matters?  Who can tell how often we give way?...I no longer 
go to watch a dog chasing a hare at the games in the circus.  But if I should happen 
to see the same thing in the country as I pass by, the chase might easily hold my 
151attention and distract me from whatever serious thoughts occupied my 
mind...[U]nless you made me realize my weakness and quickly reminded me, either 
to turn my eyes from the sight and raise my thoughts to you in contemplation, or to
despise it utterly and continue on my way, I should simply stop and gloat.  What 
excuse can I make for myself when often, as I sit at home, I cannot turn my eyes 
from the sight of a lizard catching ﬂies or a spider entangling them as they ﬂy into 
her web?  Does it make any di erence that these are only small animals?  It is true 
that the sight of them inspires me to praise you for the wonders of your creation 
and the order in which you have disposed all things, but I am not intent upon your 
praises when I ﬁrst begin to watch.  It is one thing to rise quickly from a fall, 
another not to fall at all (243.)
Augustine’s objection to such wondering is di erent from that of commonsense.  For Augustine the 
issue isn’t so much that wondering at triﬂes is childish, impractical, irrational, a waste of time; the 
issue is that it actively disperses our energy and attention, so that we become distracted from higher, 
more important things.   is wondering, Augustine concedes, might eventually lead to the 
contemplation of those higher things, but Augustine worries that it represents too indirect and 
incidental a path to them, and notes that we might very well get lost along the way.  For these 
reasons, he characterizes this particular “propensity” -- this “lust of the eyes,” “futile curiosity,” and 
“idle speculation” -- as a temptation, a danger, and a sin, to be avoided as much as any other 
(241-243).  
Heidegger updates Augustine’s argument against “curiosity” in Being in Time:
When curiosity has become free...it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to 
understand what is seen...but just in order to see.  It seeks novelty only in order to 
leap from it anew to another novelty.  In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue 
for care does not lie in grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies 
rather in its possibilities of abandoning itself to the world.   erefore curiosity is 
characterized in a speciﬁc way of not tarrying alongside what is closest.  
Consequently it does not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks 
restlessness and the excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters.  In 
not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction.  
Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marvelling at them...To be 
152amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest.  
Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known 
(216-217).
 e inquisitive wonderment Nabokov describes, because it so clearly involves “tarrying alongside 
what is closest,” “observing entities and marvelling at them,” is fairly easy to distinguish from 
Heidegger’s concept of “curiosity.”   e comparison, in fact, helps us to appreciate just how di erent 
Nabokov’s attentiveness to triﬂes, and the delight he takes in them, is from the restless, excited, 
scattered, novelty-seeking state of mind Heidegger describes.  Yet it’s somewhat harder to distinguish 
wondering at triﬂes from what Augustine describes in his Confessions.  Augustine’s transﬁxion by 
“small animals,” his inability to turn his eyes from “the sight of a lizard catching ﬂies or a spider 
entangling them as they ﬂy into her web,” which leads eventually to an experience of praise and 
wonder, doesn’t seem all that di erent from Nabokov’s fascination with butterﬂies.  
And yet what Nabokov views as the highest form of consciousness Augustine views as a sin.  
James Wood, too, implies that there may be something deeply problematic about paying too much 
attention to the details and small “sensualities” of the visible world -- in literature, at least, if not also 
in life.  For Wood the problem isn’t that such details turn our attention away from thoughts of God 
or even, as Heidegger says, from “being knowingly in the truth,” but is rather that they siphon 
attention away from the inner life, from immaterial, essentially spiritual concerns and values, from 
the “interior” and the “unseen.”
Responses to  ose Objections
I take James Wood's case against Nabokov to be representative of a certain way of understanding 
153Nabokov's characteristic attentiveness to detail: that it's something Nabokov learned to do from 
other writers; that it reﬂects, primarily, a set of stylistic choices; that it deliberately calls attention to 
itself; and, ﬁnally, that it results -- or, at least, too often results -- in a somewhat superﬁcial artistic 
vision, drawing attention to the surface of the work and the world and away from more important 
matters.   at case looks less convincing, though, once we've recognized how this critique depends 
on an idea of "what reality is" that di ers in fundamental ways from Nabokov's own, and when we 
connect Nabokov's detailphilic style to the broader ethos, the broader world of value, attunements, 
meaning, mattering, wondering and speculation described in these pages.
First, then, we should note that while Nabokov attends more closely and more emphatically to 
the contours of the visual world than most writers, the charge of superﬁciality doesn't apply as 
readily in his case as it might in another's.  Both Wood and Augustine appear to conceive of "reality"
in a dualistic way.  Augustine imagines a material world on the one hand, and a transcendent, 
immaterial, spiritual world on the other; Wood, like Boyd and de la Durantaye, imagines an 
"external" world and an "interior" one, an apparent, manifest, "visual" world and an "unseen" one.  
But Nabokov's idea of reality, as we saw at length in Chapter Four, is very di erent from this.  
Nabokov doesn't distinguish between the inner life and the outer world; for him "reality" resides in, 
and has no meaning apart from, the embracement of one by the other.  In Nabokov's view "reality" 
always shows up for someone and as something, and so, for him, the external and the interior always 
go together, as do the seen and the unseen, the apparent world and the world of feeling, thought, 
belief, inner experience.  It's easy to mistake this for a kind of expressionism, as Ellen Pifer seems to:
Every item perceived by Nabokov's narrators and protagonists similarly acts a 
mirror of the observer's consciousness.   e e ect of Nabokov's self-conscious 
method is to suggest, furthermore, that objects are subjective mirrors in reality as 
154well as in art, because for Nabokov the world is not an objective entity but a 
"universe embraced by consciousness."  By arranging the details of his literary 
landscape as reﬂections of their very observers, Nabokov made James's "modulations
of perception" -- or, as he called them, "the shifts of levels" of perception -- the very 
form and context of human reality (127).
But we have to be careful.  Pifer's account is only half right: the "item[s] perceived" by Nabokov's 
narrators and protagonists and, in Speak, Memory, by Nabokov himself, don't merely function as 
"mirrors": they tell us something about the protagonist's way of perceiving, true, but they also tell us 
something about the "item perceived."  In extreme cases -- in Humbert's case or Kinbote's -- this 
might be less true, or even untrue; but in many of the other novels, and certainly his memoir, 
Nabokov's details reveal something about the "item perceived" as well as the consciousness that 
perceives it.
25 In any event, both sides of the equation are important.  Consequently it doesn't make 
sense -- from Nabokov's point of view, at least -- to say that Nabokov's attention to the external 
world comes at the expense of the inner one, since the inner, unseen world of value and meaning is 
always present in Nabokov's descriptions, and especially in his details.
Second, a more robust understanding of that relation -- between Nabokov's details and the world
25.  is is especially true of novels that draw, at least occasionally, on the same store of memories 
Nabokov draws on for his autobiography, books like Mary, Glory,  e Gift,  e Real Life of Sebastian 
Knight, Bend Sinister, and  e Defense -- a novel in which, among several other familiar images, Elena
Nabokov's boletes appear:
Yes, they were there, those edible red boletes.  Green needles adhered to their 
delicately brick-colored  caps and sometimes a blade of grass would leave on one of 
them a long narrow trace.   eir undersides might be holey, and occasionally a 
yellow slug would be sitting there -- and Luzhin senior would use his pocketknife to
clean moss and soil from the thick speckled-gray root of each mushroom before 
placing it in the basket (58).
Pifer's metaphor of the mirror is more appropriate to a book like Lolita, with its explicit interest in 
problems of madness, delusion, and solipsism.
155of value and meaning -- would, I think, help to temper the impression of tyranny, propaganda, 
fussiness, showiness, and pedantry his elaborately detailed prose sometimes creates.  Wondering at 
ﬂies or butterﬂies must seem like a perverse use of attention so long as we have an impoverished idea 
of why that wondering-at is, for Nabokov, so important; and insisting that we linger and wonder, 
too, must surely seem like the strange whim of a tyrant, the caprice of a "cult" leader, so long as it 
strikes us a distraction from more important things.  If, on the other hand, we were able to more 
fully appreciate the high stakes of that wonder for Nabokov, I think we would see in his details 
something other than tyranny and distraction.  Instead we would see, behind Nabokov's precise and 
"heav[y]" details, the aura of a particular way of revealing, of disposing oneself to the world, of 
allowing things to show up, to matter, to make demands, and an e ort to preserve that aura in 
words.  We would see his details, in other words, in relation to questions of attunement, value, and 
meaning, rather than merely in relation to questions or problems of style.  When we encountered one 
of Nabokov's details, we wouldn't only about the stylistic e ect it achieves.  We would also ask 
questions like: What does this detail say about the way the world is showing up for the person who is
wondering at it?  What does it suggest about the way that person is involved in the world?  About 
the way the world makes demands upon him or her?  About the nature, composition, texture, 
patterns, potentialities, and limitations of his or her "reality"?
In a sense, of course, these are still questions about style, just style understood in a di erent way. 
 is is "style" in Michael Wood's sense of the word: "a complex but still legible trace" of a "person's 
interaction with the world" (23).  Surely there are some uninspired details in Nabokov; but his best 
details, his most memorable ones, always refer back to that interaction, or the idea of such an 
interaction, in which the world, illuminated by him in a certain way, revealed itself as an occasion for
156wonder.   e sense of that "interaction" might be present only in its absence, so that, in Lolita, 
Humbert's solipsistic details have a way of pointing to, and evoking, the aura of wonder that 
Humbert himself doesn't feel, just as the wonderful details of Speak, Memory often seem to inscribe 
within themselves, and to actively deny, the voice of commonsense.   
In sum, we shouldn't think of Nabokov's details as reﬂections of reality or mirrors of minds; as 
propaganda for good noticing; as a means of making strange; as a necklace of sensualities.  Most of 
the metaphors we use to talk about Nabokov's details are misleading.  Instead we should think of 
them as things revealed, like this singular hawkmoth in Bend Sinister:
"Look," you said.
Very slowly, rosewise, you opened your hands.   ere, clinging with all its six ﬂu y 
feet to the ball of your thumb, the tip of its mouse-grey body slightly excurved, its 
short, red, blue-ocellated inferior wings oddly protruding forward from beneath the 
sloping superior ones which were long and marbled and deeply notched (134) [.]
Here -- as with the boletes that emerge after the rain, or the majolica chips that turn up on the shore,
or the insects that show up in the light of Nabokov's acetylene lamp -- the hawkmoth, a triﬂe by 
commonsense standards, shows up as something wonderful, and not in a scene of estrangement or 
distraction or self-dramatizing deliberation but rather of revelation.  "Bring[ing] out" (SM 43), 
"shin[ing] on" (134), opening up -- these, I think, are the right metaphors for thinking about what 
Nabokov is doing with his detailphilic style. 
*
Few writers have been as many di erent things as Nabokov was -- artist, scientist, Russian, 
157American, wealthy heir, impoverished emigre -- or worked so well in so many di erent genres.  Over 
ﬁfty years, and working across di erent disciplines, languages, traditions, and continents, Nabokov 
fashioned himself into a novelist, poet, playwright and screenplaywright, an author of short stories 
and scientiﬁc papers, an essayist, translator, critic and scholar, lecturer, memoirist, composer of chess 
problems, biographer and brilliant interviewee.  Later, in the pages of his critics, he would assume 
more roles still: as a rigid moralist and a frivolous ﬁrebird; a perverse postmodernist and an old-
fashioned emigre; a tender magician, a haughty mandarin; a mystic with his eyes turned always 
toward the “otherworld,” a realist rooted ﬁrmly in this one. 
Nabokov really was all of these things.  But he was also one thing: a lover of details, and a 
wonderer.   is is something he was all the time, throughout his life, throughout his career, in every 
book and project.  It was a role he entered into early and never gave up.  His most extreme, most 
mandarin, most tyrannical claims insist on this fact: details are everything! details are all! the ﬁrst rule
of reading! the main delight of the mind!  And yet the substance of these assertions is surprisingly 
modest.   e highest form of consciousness, he tells us, isn't the moment of poetic inspiration; it 
isn't the moment of elegant solution; it isn't even the moment after the butterﬂy's been caught.   e 
highest form of consciousness is a readiness for wonder -- and for wonder not at magniﬁcent things, 
but at small things, triﬂes.  To some this vision of Nabokov -- humble, reverent, earnest, appreciative 
-- might at ﬁrst seem unfamiliar.  But it is something "one cannot unsee once it has been seen" (SM 
310).
158BIBLIOGRAPHY
Alexandrov, Vladimir E. Nabokov’s Otherworld. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991. Print.
Albright, Daniel. Representation and the Imagination: Beckett, Kafka, Nabokov, and Schoenberg. 
Chicago: U of Chicago Press, 1981. Print.
Andrews, David. Nabokov, Aestheticism, and Lolita. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 1999. Print.
Augustine, Saint, Bishop of Hippo.  Confessions. Trans. R. S. Pine-Co n. London: 
Penguin, 1961. Print.
Bachelard, Gaston.   e Poetics of Space. Trans. Maria Jolas. Boston: Beacon Press, 1994. Print.
Bell-Villada, Gene H. “On the Cold War, American Aestheticism, the Nabokov Problem -- and Me.”
Art and Life in Aestheticism. Ed. Kelly Comfort. New York: Palgrave, 2008. 159-170. Print.
Blackwell, Stephen H.  e Quill and the Scalpel: Nabokov’s Art and the Worlds of Science. Columbus: 
Ohio State UP, 2009. Print.
Bloom, Harold, ed.  Lolita.  New York: Chelsea House, 1993. Print.
Boyd, Brian.  Nabokov’s Ada: the Place of Consciousness. 1985. Christchurch: Cybereditions, 2001. 
Print.
_____. Vladimir Nabokov:  e American Years.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1991. Print.
_____.Vladimir Nabokov:  e Russian Years.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 1990. Print.
Canﬁeld, Michael R, ed. Field Notes on Science and Nature. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2011. Print.
Carroll, Lewis. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland. 1865. New York: Morrow, 1992. Print.
Culler, Jonathan. Literary  eory: a Very Short Introduction. Oxford: Oxford UP, 1997. Print.
de la Durantaye, Leland. Style is Matter: the Moral Art of Vladimir Nabokov.  Ithaca: Cornell UP, 
2007. Print.
de Vries, Gerard and D. Barton Johnson. Vladimir Nabokov and the Art of Painting. Amsterdam: 
Amsterdam UP, 2006. Print.
Descartes, René. Passions of the Soul. Trans. Stephen H. Voss. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989. Print.
159Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World: a Commentary on Heidegger’s Being and Time, Division 1. 
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991. Print.
Dostoevsky, Fyodor.  e Brothers Karamazov. Trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky. New 
York: FSG, 2002. Print.
Elkins, James. How to Use Your Eyes. New York: Routledge, 2000. Print.
Fisher, Philip.  e Vehement Passions. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2003. Print.
_____. Wonder, the Rainbow, and the Aesthetics of Rare Experiences. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 
1998. Print.
 
Geertz, Cli ord. Local Knowledge: Further Essays in Interpretive Anthropology. New York: Basic Books,
1983. Print.
Glynn, Michael. Vladimir Nabokov: Bergsonian and Russian Formalist Inﬂuences in His Novels. 
  New York: Palgrave, 2007. Print.
Gosetti-Ferencei, Jennifer Anna.   e Ecstatic Quotidian: Phenomenological Sightings in Modern Art 
and Literature. University Park: Penn State UP, 2007. Print.
Heidegger, Martin.  Being and Time.  Trans. John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: 
Harper, 2008. Print.
_____.  e Essence of Truth. Trans. Ted Sadler. 2002. London: Continuum, 2007. Print.
_____. “ e Question Concerning Technology.” Basic Writings. Ed. David Farrell Krell. New York: 
HarperCollins, 1993. 307-342. Print.
Kaufman, Kenn. “One and a Half Cheers for List-Keeping.” Field Notes on Science and Nature. Ed. 
Michael Canﬁeld. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2011. 49-66. Print.
Maar, Michael. Speak, Nabokov. Trans. Ross Benjamin. London: Verso, 2009. Print.
Mack, John.  e Art of Small  ings. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007. Print.
Nabokov, Vladimir.  Ada, or Ardor: a Family Chronicle. 1969. New York: Vintage, 1990. Print.
_____.  e Annotated Lolita. Ed. Alfred Appel, Jr.  1970. New York: Vintage, 1991. Print.
_____. Bend Sinister. 1947. New York: Vintage, 1990. Print.
160_____. “ e Creative Writer.” NEMLA Bulletin. January 1942. Print.
_____.  e Defense. Trans. Michael Scammell in coll. with the author. 1964.  New York: 
Vintage, 1990. Print.
_____.  e Gift. Trans. Michael Scammell in coll. with the author. 1963. New York: 
Vintage, 1991. Print.
_____. Glory. Trans. Dmitri Nabokov in coll. with the author. 1971. New York: Vintage, 
1991. Print.
_____. Invitation to a Beheading. Trans. Dmitri Nabokov in coll. with the author. 1959. 
New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
_____. King, Queen, Knave. Trans. Dmitri Nabokov in coll. with the author. 1968. New 
York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
_____. Lectures on Literature. Ed. Fredson Bowers. San Diego: Harcourt, 1980. Print.
_____. Look at the Harlequins! 1974. New York: Vintage, 1990. Print.
_____. Mary. Trans. Michael Glenny in coll. with the author. 1970. New York: Vintage, 
1989. Print.
_____. Nikolai Gogol. 1944. New York: New Directions, 1961. Print.
_____. Pale Fire. 1962. New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
_____. Pnin. 1957. New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
_____.  e Real Life of Sebastian Knight. 1941. New York: Vintage, 1992. Print.
_____. “ e Russian Professor.” Trans. Olga Voronina and Brian Boyd, with Dmitri Nabokov.  e 
New Yorker. 13 & 20 June 2011. Print.
_____. Speak, Memory. 1967. New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
_____.  e Stories of Vladimir Nabokov. New York: Vintage, 1996. Print.
_____. Strong Opinions. 1973. New York: Vintage, 1990. Print.
_____. “To Edmund Wilson.” 29 Feb. 1956. Letter 276 of Dear Bunny, Dear Volodya: the Nabokov-
161Wilson Letters, 1940-1971: Revised and Expanded Edition. Ed., ann., and intro. Simon Karlinsky. 
Berkeley: U of California P, 2001. 331. Print.
_____. Transparent  ings. 1972. New York: Vintage, 1989. Print.
Norman, Will, and Duncan White, eds. Transitional Nabokov. Oxford: Peter Lang, 2009. Print.
Pifer, Ellen. Nabokov and the Novel. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 1980. Print.
Pope, Alexander.  e Dunciad: in Four Books. Ed. Valerie Rumbold. London: Longman, 1999. Print.
Popkin, Cathy.  e Pragmatics of Insigniﬁcance: Chekhov, Zoshchenko, Gogol. Stanford: Stanford UP, 
1993. Print.
Rampton, David. Vladimir Nabokov. Houndmills: MacMillan, 1993. Print.
Rorty, Richard. Contingency, Irony, Solidarity. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989. Print.
Schor, Naomi. Reading in Detail: Aesthetics and the Feminine. New York: Methuen, 1987. Print.
Schulz, Kathryn. “Distant Reading.” New York Times Sunday Book Review. 26 June 2011. BR14. 
Print.
Shapiro, Gavriel.  e Sublime Artist’s Studio. Evanston: Northwestern UP, 2009. Print.
Taylor, Charles.  A Secular Age. Cambridge: Belknap, 2007. Print.
Wood, Michael.   e Magician’s Doubts: Nabokov and the Risks of Fiction.  Princeton: Princeton UP, 
1994. Print.
Wood, James.  e Broken Estate: Essays on Literature and Belief. 1999. New York: Modern Library, 
2000. Print.
_____.  How Fiction Works. London: Jonathan Cape, 2008. Print.
Woodru , Paul. Reverence: Renewing a Forgotten Virtue. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002. Print.
Wordsworth, William. “Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood.” 
 e Norton Anthology of Poetry. 4th ed. Eds. Margaret Ferguson, Mary Jo Salter, and Jon 
Stallworthy.  New York: Norton, 1996. 728-732. Print. 
Wrathall, Mark A.  Heidegger and Unconcealment: Truth, Language, and History. Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2011. Print.
162Zanganeh, Lila Azam.   e Enchanter: Nabokov and Happiness. Norton: New York, 2011. Print.
Zimmer, Carl.  “Nonﬁction: Nabokov  eory on Butterﬂy Evolution is Vindicated.”   e New York 
Times. 1 February 2011. D3. Print.
163